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BORN FREE YET EVERYWHERE IN CHAINS*: GLOBAL SLAVERY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
DR. RANEE KHOOSHIE LAL PANJABI**

I. INTRODUCTION

The chasm between illusion and reality confronts us in many realms of our
world today but nowhere more starkly than in the terrible realization that our
global family, striding boldly into a new millennium carrying banners proclaiming
the universality of human rights, still tolerates the existence of slavery, the oldest
of human crimes. It has been estimated that slavery today "chains" twenty-seven
million victims1 in its cruel grip, a figure approximately equivalent to the
population of Venezuela, or Malaysia, or Uzbekistan.
An estimated twenty-seven million people (deemed a "conservative"
number) 3 80 percent of them women and children 4 - endure the terror and fear of
being literally owned by others, their lives prey to violence and intimidation, their
entire bleak sojourn on earth one of back-breaking labor and soul-searing
humiliation. For them, whether they labor as peasants in Africa or toil as stone
cutters in Asia or whether they work as sex slaves in almost every country, any
notion that the fine-sounding phrases of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights could even be applicable or germane to their brutal existence on this earth is
a travesty of the grim reality that usually only ends with death. Barbara Kralis,
Analyst with RenewAmerica commented on the chasm between reality and the law
. With apologies to JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL

RIGHT (G.D.H. Cole trans., London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons 1923) (1762), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm (rendered into HTML and text by Jon Roland of the

Constitution Society).
**Dr. Ranee Panjabi, L.L.B. (Hons.), is a Labor Relations Arbitrator and Professor of History
and
Human Rights at Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada. I dedicate this article to my mother,
Lata K.L. Panjabi, who, after reading abolitionist literature, urged me to research this subject. I always
listen to my mother! I also dedicate this to the memory of my father, Khooshie L. Panjabi, who taught
me that injustice can always be vanquished provided the good persist.
1. KEVIN BALES,

DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,

8-9

(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1999).
2. See, e.g., Gobiemo Bolivariano de Venezuela, http://www.ine.gov.ve (last visited Sept. 9,
2008) (Population as of Sept. 9, 2008 is 28,006,761); Dep't of Statisticos Malaysia,
http://www.statistics.gov.my/english/frameset keystats.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2008) (Population in
2008
around
27,730,000);
Central
Intelligence
Agency,
The
World
Factbook,

http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html#people

(last visited Sept. 9,

2008) (July 2008 population estimate of 27,345,026).
3. CAROLINE COX & JOHN MARKS, THIS IMMORAL TRADE: SLAVERY IN THE 21 sI CENTURY, 11
(Oxford: Monarch Books, 2006).
4. iAbolish: American Anti-Slavery Group, Modem Slavery 101 Fast Facts (2008),
http://www.iabolish.org/modern-slaveryl 01.
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stating that "[n]o government in the world today officially endorses slavery.
5
the face of the earth.",
Banned worldwide, slavery thrives in every nation on
Most horrifying of all is the fact that this terrible crime, now universally
declared illegal even though it prevails globally, holds millions of children in its
grip. The United Nations estimated in 2004 that 700,000 children were forced into
domestic servitude in Indonesia; 559,000 in Brazil; 264,000 in Pakistan; 200,000
in Kenya; and 250,000 in Haiti. 6 These millions of children are deprived of
healthcare, decent food, a normal family life, education, and all the rights that the
United Nations has proclaimed as fundamental in a plethora of international
covenants.7
The enslavement of children, particularly young children, is the most heinous
form of cruelty. However, one cannot overlook the fact that millions of adults,
men and women are trafficked annually and forced into lives of near-bestiality to
provide the profits that are the allure for so many slavers and traffickers. The State
Department of the United States estimated in 2006 that approximately 600,000 to
800,000 victims are trafficked across the world every year. 8 The State Department
also estimated in 2007 that eighty percent of victims are female, with up to fifty
percent being minors. 9 The end of the Cold War and ensuing financial disaster for
the former states that comprised the Soviet Union, brought slavery and
international trafficking into the lives of many nationals of that region. Eastern
European women have been trafficked all over the world, mainly into prostitution,
and have suffered both physical abuse, exposure to diseases such as AIDS,
emotional and psychological trauma, and the mental havoc caused by subjection on
a daily basis to violence and degradation. 10 Through the lens of the trafficking and
slavery situation, it seems as though millions of people are on the move. Asians,
Africans, Latin Americans, East Europeans, all peoples are being caught in the
5. Barbara Kralis, Different Forms of Human Slavery, RENEW AMERICA, July 20, 2006,
http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/kralis/060720.
6. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Helping Hands or Shackled Lives? Understanding Child Domestic
Labour and Responses to it, 2004 (preparedby June Kane) noted in DAVID BATSTONE, NOT FOR SALE:
THE RETURN OF THE GLOBAL SLAVE TRADE-AND How WE CAN FIGHT IT, 6-7 (HarperCollins, 2007).
7. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Rest. 2200A(XXI), arts.
18(3), 23(1), 24(1), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), arts. 10(1), 11, 13, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(lII), art. 26-27, U.N. GAOR
at 71, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
8. HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CTR., U.S. STATE DEP'T, Human Trafficking: Better

Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad 2 (2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06825.pdf.
9. Off. to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons and International
DEP'T,
available
at
(2007),
U.S.
STATE
Organizations
1
Militaiy
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82447.pdf.
10. See generally Francis T. Miko & Grace Park, Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S.
and InternationalResponse, 6-7, CRS REPORT FOR CONG, U.S. STATE DEP'T, Mar. 18, 2002, available
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9107.pdf (discussing the trafficking of Eastern European
Women and the abuse they have suffered).

2008

BORN FREE YET EVERYWHERE IN CHAINS

coils of this particularly evil manifestation of globalization. As the United Nations
has explained: "No country is immune from the crime of human trafficking, either
as source or destination countries."'" According to Barbara Kralis, forced labor
exploitation exists on every continent except Antarctica.12
Although the clandestine nature of the crime and the fear instilled in its
victims bedevils attempts at statistical precision, there can be no doubt that the
problem is both global and very large. 13 Scholars and legislators come up with
varying statistics, but it is important to focus on the massive amount of human
suffering implicit in those bare numbers. The divergence in numbers should not
hinder us to the urgent necessity for action. Most authorities agree that despite the
divergent numbers, it seems apparent that the majority of those trafficked across
the world, women and children, 14 face conditions of brutality and bestiality that are
almost beyond comprehension.
In those states that denigrate the role and
significance of women on the basis of tradition or historical cultural systems,
women and young girls are particularly at risk. 15 If slavery is a globalized crime
that encompasses twenty-seven million people as its victims, it bears frequent
repeating that the female ratio has been estimated by the United Nations at nearly
eighty percent. 16 The detrimental impact on so many millions of people uprooted
from their own countries and forced into alien environments and a brutally
degrading life is hard to reconcile with the progress and economic betterment
globalization has produced for those lucky enough never to have been enslaved.
The slavers and traffickers have utilized all the tools of globalization to accomplish
their goals, including ease of communications, particularly cell phones and the
internet, and the simplicity of moving money and people.' 7 Consequently, the
"traffickers' web spans the whole planet."' 18
While this crime exists and involves millions of people, it is a criminal action
that is perceived as abhorrent and illegal throughout most of the civilized world. 19
There are several international agreements, conventions, and covenants that outlaw
slavery and trafficking and condemn its practice.2 ° If a flood of words alone could
11. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME [UNODC], Annual Report 2008: Human Trafficking: A Crime
That Shames Us All
5 (2008), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/aboutunodc/AR08_WEB.pdf
12. Barbara
Kralis,
21s
Century Slavery,
RENEWAMERICA,
July
18,
2006,
http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/kralis/060718.
13. Id.
14. Miko & Park, supra note 10, at 4.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Trafficking in Persons and InternationalMilitary Organizations,supra note 9.
17. See generally U.N. INTER-AGENCY PROJECT ON TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN

THE MEKONG SUB-REGION, Globalization, Migration and Trafficking: Some Thoughtsfrom the SouthEast
Asian
Region
(2001)
(prepared
by
Phil
Marshall),
available
at
http://www.un.or.th/TraffickingProject/Publications/globalisation.paper.pdf.
18. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME [UNODC], Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns II (Apr.
2006), http://new.vawnet.org/category/www.unodc.org/pdf/traffickinginpersons-report- 2006ver2.pdf
19. KEVIN BALES, ENDING SLAVERY: HOW WE FREE TODAY'S SLAVES 17 (Berkeley: Univ. of

California Press, 2007).
20. See, e.g., International Covenant, on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, art. 8;
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eradicate this hideous crime, the verbal efforts of the United Nations would have
freed every man, woman and child on this planet from bondage. Unfortunately,
words alone will not solve this problem. Both the United Nations and its
predecessor, the League of Nations framed international agreements against
trafficking.2 1 Slavery and the slave trade are specifically prohibited in Article 5 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.22 The issue has emerged in various
human rights conventions and covenants, which have been accepted and ratified by
most of the nations of the world. To mention only some of these instruments,
Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (1981)23 calls for the suppression of all forms of traffic in women;
Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1976)24 protects children from economic and social exploitation; Article 8 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976)25 outlaws slavery, the
slave trade, and forced labor.
Most relevant of these agreements is the United Nations Protocol to Prevent,
26
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.
This international agreement supplemented the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, which was adopted by the General Assembly in
2000 and entered into force in 2003.27 The Protocol is the first "global legally
binding instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in persons. 28 Having
articulated the first internationally accepted definition of trafficking, the Protocol
required that countries criminalize trafficking in human beings.2 9 The Protocol
provided for the protection of victims and cooperation among States. 30 The
question that springs to mind is, why, in the face of so much globally expressed
abhorrence for this crime, the existence of so many international prohibitions on its
practice, and the daily evidence of the suffering it causes around the world, is this
allowed to persist? Why are the eloquent words not supplemented with firm action
to eradicate this terrible evil? What will it ultimately take for the world to realize
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7, art. 5-6; G.A. Res.
217A(III), supra note 7, art. 4-5.
21. See BATSONE, supra note 6, at 179-80.
22. G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 7, art. 5.
23. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.

34/180, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180 (July 17, 1980).
24. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7.
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7.
26. U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc A/Res/55/25/Annex II (Nov. 15, 2000).
27. See U.N. OFF. OF DRUGS & CRIME, United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and its Protocols, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2008).
28. Id.

29. U.N INTER-AGENCY NETWORK ON GEN. AND WOMEN EQUALITY, United Nations
Peacekeepingin the Service of Peace: Human Trafficking and United Nations Peacekeeping 4, DPKO
(Mar. 2004), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/news/documents/DPKOHuman
TraffickingPolicy03-2004.pdf.
30. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, supra
note 26.
POLICY PAPER
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that twenty-seven million men, women, and children cannot simply be ignored as
31
so many disposable people?
According to writer E. Benjamin Skinner, "Annually, traffickers now take
more slaves into the United States than seventeenth century slave traders
transported to pre-independence America. '' 32 That the United States of America
views the continuation of this crime as a serious matter is proven by the bipartisan
attention that has been paid to articulating concern about it. Democratic President
Bill Clinton signed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act in 2000." 3 This
legislation was reauthorized in 2003 and in 2005. 34 In 2003, Republican President
George W. Bush expressed his nation's concern about this global crime when he
addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations and informed its members
that annually nearly a million human beings are bought, sold, and forced across the
in
borders of the world.35 President Bush commented in his inaugural address
' 36
2005 that "[n]o one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave.
Assuming the international responsibility befitting its superpower status, the
United States instituted in this legislation a process for ranking countries and
preparing annual reports according to the performance of nations in combating
human trafficking.37 Tier One countries are deemed to have complied with the
minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act; Tier 2 countries
demonstrated, on the basis of U.S. investigation, inadequate compliance but
significant efforts in that direction. 38 By contrast, Tier 3 countries are determined
to be in a state of non-compliance and lack significant efforts to achieve the
standard. 39 Tier 3 countries would, after a period, be subject to sanctions by the

United States. 40 David Batstone, reflecting the views of abolitionists and human
rights advocates, critiqued the implementation of this promising plan alleging that
"geopolitical politics" influenced the report for the year 2002.41 Batstone found
Tier 3 countries are often on hostile terms with the United States, while friendly
countries with terrible trafficking records were listed in the top two tiers.42

31. BALES, supra note 18, at 8.
32. E. BENJAMIN SKINNER, A CRIME SO MONSTROUS: FACE-TO-FACE WITH MODERN-DAY

SLAVERY 265 (Free Press: A Division of Simon 2008).
33. Id. at xvi.
34. Jim Finckenauer & Min Liu, State Law and Human Trafficking 8-9 (draft presented at

MarshallingEvery Resource: State Level Responses to Human Trafficking Conference 2006), available
.

at http://www.princeton.edu/prior/events/conferences/past-events/conference-39.html- 1
35. George W. Bush, President, U.S., Speech to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080923-5.html.
36. George W. Bush, President, U.S., Inaugural Address (Dec. 7, 2005), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural.
37. See e.g., U.N. OFF. TO MONITOR
Persons
Report,
U.S.
DEP'T
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/ris/tiprpt/2005.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. BATSTONE,

supra note 6, at 193.

42. Id. at 192-93.

AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, 2005 Trafficking in

OF

STATE,

June

3,

2005,

available

at

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:1

Unlike the nineteenth century when slavery was a legitimized, even accepted,
institution in so many parts of the world, today it is internationally outlawed,
globally condemned, and yet it persists. Worse, there are more slaves today than
ever in the past, although because of the global population explosion they represent
a smaller percentage of the total.43 According to Batstone, "more slaves are in
bondage today than were bartered in four centuries of the transatlantic slave
trade. 44 The persistence of slavery despite its global condemnation and illegal
status begs the question as to why this hideous form of discrimination cannot be
removed when there are ample international instruments and national, state, and
provincial laws in many nations that forbid its practice and threaten serious
penalties for slavers and traffickers. This article seeks to understand some of the
reasons why even though there are such good intentions to eradicate the evil, the
problem continues to plague the world. The problem of slavery has caught the
attention of governments, political leaders, abolitionists, community activists,
journalists, and academics. There is no shortage of excellent suggestions for its
speedy eradication. Yet it persists, and in the process twenty-seven million people
pay the price for the world's apparent inability to come to grips with this practice.
Because it is illegal, slavery now lurks in hidden corners of the world's
economy and spreads its tentacles in secretive areas where people are forced to
labor for bare subsistence with little or no possibility of escape. This is the
clandestine economy that partially provides us in North America with cheap goods
and enables us to indulge in an orgy of consumerism. In the words of Antonio M.
Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "[t]he
blood, sweat and tears of trafficking victims are on the hands of consumers all over
the world., 45 Because free slave labor is highly profitable for those who are not
averse to exploiting their fellow human beings, slavery has spread internationally.
The United Nations has estimated the total market value of human trafficking at
$32 billion, with $10 billion being made on the sale of individuals and the rest
being profits on the victims' labor.4 6 The globalized market system brings the
products made by slaves into homes all over the world, with a financial return from
slavery ranging by one estimate, as high as 800 percent.47 The United States
Government's Department of Health estimated in 2004 that trafficking was the
"fastest growing criminal industry in the world," second only to drug dealing 48 in
terms of its money-making potential. The irony is that globalization and the
expansion of the free market system were supposed to usher in a world of better
economic conditions in poor countries, a higher standard of living, and increased
43. SKINNER, supra note 31 , at xi.
44. BATSTONE, supra note 6, at 6.

45. Press Release, U.N. OFF. OF DRUGS & CRIME, FirstEver GlobalForum on Human Trafficking
to Launch United Campaign to Fight the Crime, Feb. 12, 2008 (statement by Executive Director of the
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/
releases/2008-02-12.html.
46. U.N. OFF. OF DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 11, at 25.
47. BALES, supra note 18, at 12.
48. Loring Jones et al., Globalization and Human Trafficking, J. OF SOC. & SOC. WELFARE
118 (June 1, 2007).
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economic opportunity. That has occurred to some extent. However, the dark side
of globalization has been the demand for very cheap goods that can only profitably
be made by slave labor. As consumers, all of us bear a responsibility to consider
whether or not our purchasing power is being used to provide economic betterment
or to further the crime of slavery. Globalization will, in this century, be about
individual responsibility for actions taken internationally. While the prospect is
daunting, the possibilities for having a salutary impact are challenging and should
enthuse, not discourage, those who wish to see the world finally rid itself of this
evil practice that has prevailed for thousands of years. The cost in terms of human
deprivation, sacrifice and waste alone justify that we now pay attention to the ideas
for eradication and commit our energy to this cause. To return to Rousseau, if all
of us are really born free, then sixty years after the enactment of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 49 and nearly two and half centuries after
Rousseau penned those famous words that inspired a revolution in France, it would
appear to be timely to bring concrete reality to the ideal that individual freedom is
a universal right and has to be universally applicable whether a person is born in
the United States of America or in any other part of the world.

II. THE PROBLEM
A. Definitions
As slavery has persisted for thousands of years, one cannot but wonder why
there is still so much debate and discussion about the definition of slavery. It is not
my inteition in this paper to debate the definitional disputes. That task has already
been addressed comprehensively and exhaustively. Rather, my task is to explore
the consensus on definition and provide an introduction to the causes and scope of
the problem.5 ° It would be preferable to suggest that implementation of the
existing law, not more verbiage about definition, has to be our priority if slavery is
to be eradicated in the near future. Universal acknowledgment and realization that
this is a "crime that shames us all,"'" would hopefully galvanize the international
community to meaningful action.
Much energy has been expended delineating the precise nexus between
slavery and trafficking and the equally particular distinctions between smuggling
and trafficking. Trafficking per se is perceived via a lens focusing on its
components, servitude, debt bondage, sexual exploitation, and peonage. 52 It is
suggested that smuggling, although a crime, does not involve the exploitation of
the person smuggled, which trafficking clearly does.53 In reality, cases of
voluntary smuggling can in a second become cases of trafficking when the
smuggler refuses to release his passengers and turns them into slaves. For years

49. G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 7.
50. See Kevin Bales, Defining and Measuring Modern Slavery, FREETHESLAVES.NET, 2007,
available at http://216.235.201.228/NETCOMMUNITY/Document.Doc?id=21.
51. U.N. OFF. OF DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 44.

52. Finckenauer & Liu, supra note 33, at 3.
53. ORGANIZED CRIME: FROM TRAFFICKING TO TERRORISM 388 (Frank G. Shanty & Patit Paban

Mishra eds., ABC-CLIO, vol. 1, 2008).
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now, academics, lawyers, and legislators have pondered the precise and applicable
54
While these
definition that would meet the requirements of a particular law.
debates have rambled on, millions of men, women and children have paid the price
for the dilatoriness of the world in addressing their plight and acting to stop the
annihilation of their hopes for a decent existence. Were we or our children caught
in the coils of a slaver, would we be so patient with the ponderings about precise
definitions that have taken priority over the urgent and immediate right of all
people to be free; to be not merely born free but to live their lives as free
individuals?
A significant amount of time has also been spent on the nexus between
prostitution and slavery; the debate focusing on whether prostitution is
automatically slavery or only when force is involved. 55 It might be timely now to
get past the barriers established by this desire to delineate on the basis of our
ideological inclinations and proceed instead to implement with vigor the laws that
are already in existence along with the universal norms established by the United
Nations.
To cut the Gordian knot of definitional disputes and competitive agendas with
respect to which aspects of the problem deserve priority, some authors have sought
an inclusive methodology for identifying the components that constitute this crime
so that laws can be applied and perpetrators can be prosecuted.56 For instance, the
definition prepared by E. Benjamin Skinner is useful; he states that a slave is
"someone who is forced to work, through fraud or threat of violence, for no pay
beyond subsistence. 57
With respect to trafficking, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(U.N.O.D.C.) has specified that "[t]rafficking involves the forcible movement of
persons from one location to another for the purposes of exploitation and for
commercial gains. Victims are recruited and transferred either against their will or
through deception., 58 With respect to the differentiation between smuggling and
trafficking, many writers on this subject agree now that all too frequently
individuals, particularly from poor countries, pay handsomely for their facilitated
illegal immigration to a rich Western country only to find themselves, once across
the border, in the hands of thugs and gangs that hold them for forced labor
including prostitution against their will. In such a situation, the distinction
between a person who is smuggled and a person who is trafficked dissolves in the
brutal reality that he or she (as is often the case) has paid to enter into captivity;

54. See Kevin Bales & Peter T. Robbins, "No One Shall Be Held in Slavery or Servitude: - A
CriticalAnalysis of InternationalSlavery Agreements and Concepts of Slavery, HUM. RTS. REV., Jan.
01, 2001.
55. See KEVIN BALES, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SLAVERY: A READER 62-64 (University of

California Press 2005).
56. See A. Yasmine Rassam, ContemporaryForms ofSlavery and the Evolution of the Prohibition
of Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary International Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 303, 349-51
(1999).
57. SKINNER, supra note 31, at 289.
58. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 11, at 18.
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dreams of a better financial life destroyed for the illicit profits of the
smugglers/traffickers. The ultimate challenge lies not in the words that define the
facets of this crime but in recognizing its occurrence and in turning the spotlight of
world public opinion on the prevalence and proliferation of the problem. As more
and more people become aware that the clothes they wear, the food they eat, and
the toys their children enjoy come with a possible trail of human tragedy, hopefully
the moral conscience of the world will acknowledge the evil of this crime and
work actively to eradicate it.
Because of its chameleon-like nature and the necessity to hide itself from the
law, slavery can today be disguised, hidden and passed off as adoption (in the case
of young children); generosity to poor relatives; compassion to unemployable
persons; and work aid projects for destitute peasants.5 9 Cruel exploitation can be
represented as the most compassionate form of kindness. Hence it is not so much
that we cannot define slavery as that it is sometimes hard, particularly for the
uninitiated, to recognize and identify situations of slavery when they are
encountered.In view of the fact that slavery prevails in virtually every country on
this planet, it ought not to be so hard to locate slaves. By training professionals,
particularly police officials and social workers, the initial identification of a slave
situation could be facilitated. The record thus far is not very promising. With
respect to the United States of America, although awareness of crime has definitely
increased and there have been prosecutions and convictions, between 200060 and
2006, by one estimate, this nation liberated less than two percent of its slaves.
Kevin Bales, a professor and President of Free the Slaves, one of the leading
abolitionist organizations, has suggested that the poorest countries in the world
have the highest incidence of slavery while the richest nations also have significant
pockets of this crime because nationals of poor countries are trafficked for labor to
the rich countries. 61Explaining that no country is immune from trafficking, the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime explained in its 2008 Annual Report
that "victims from 127 countries undergo exploitation in 135 nations., 62 Professor
Bales has also emphasized the tragedy of over one billion people today living on
one dollar per day or less; these are the families most vulnerable because their
"children are regularly harvested into slavery. 63 By way of contrast, the average
64
cow in North America and Europe is provided a subsidy of two dollars per day.
Although it is useful to delineate, define, and document the problem, it is
more important to eradicate the crime and free the victims who have been trapped.
Miller,
U.S. Ambassador to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, John
65
concluded that slavery is "one of the great moral struggles of our day.",
59. See Temporary Slavery Commission Report to the Council, League of Nations Doc. A. 17 1924
VI (1924), quoted in Bales & Robbins, supra note 53, at 21.
60. SKINNER, supra note 31, at 282.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

BALES, supra note 1, at 16.
U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 11, at 25.
BALES, supra note 1, at 15-16.
Id. at 168.
Derek Ellerman, "The John Miller Interview," Polaris Project, February 13, 2003; cited DAVID
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B. Causes of Slavery
The causes of slavery and all the attendant crimes of kidnapping, torture, rape,
murder, mutilation, and forced labor can be linked directly to every negative aspect
of the state of today's world. According to Professor Phyllis Coontz and Catherine
Griebel, Case Manager for an anti-trafficking program in a non-profit organization,
"[c]oncern about trafficking lay dormant throughout most of the Cold War, but
interest was rekindled in the late 1980s with the growth of the sex industry,
globalization, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 66 Commenting on the
significance of trafficking by the early 1990s, these two authors explain the
reasons as related to escalating concerns with "transnational crime, particularly
drug trafficking and the trade of
with such activities as money laundering,
67
weapons, human organs and people."
The creation of a global market place has brought significant prosperity to
many areas of the developing world and there is evidence of a growing middle
class in economically booming countries like India and China.68 However, the
wealth has not trickled down sufficiently nor has it touched the rural core of these
ancient societies. 69 In Southeast Asia, the problem is compounded by the
instability of governments, a growing terrorist threat, and religious conflict. 70 The
rapidity of economic change and the onset of global involvements have multiplied
the scope of the problem. As David Batstone commented: "Whenever a society
faces seismic changes, the powerless suffer most. ' 7 According to Nobel Peace
Prize winner, Muhammad Yunus, the explanation is the global income distribution:
Ninety-four percent of world income goes to forty percent of the people,
while the other sixty percent must live on only six percent of world
income. Half of the world lives on two dollars a day or less, while
almost a billion people live on less than one dollar a day.72
Traditional ways of living have crumbled before the demands of a growing market
BATSTONE, NOT FOR SALE 4, (New York: HarperOne, 2007).

66. Phyllis Coontz & Catherine Griebel, International Approaches to Human Trafficking: The
Callfor a Gender-Sensitive Perspective in InternationalLaw, WOMEN'S HEALTH J., Apr. 2004, at 47,
49.
67. Id. at 49-50.
68. Barbara Stark, When GlobalizationHits Home: InternationalLaw Comes ofAge, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1551, 1561 (2006).

69. See J. Wyatt Kendall, Microfinance in Rural China, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 375, 387-88
(2008).
70. See generally Mohammad Sadli, Restoring Investor Confidence in Indonesia, 12 INST. OF S.E.
ASIAN STUD. 3 (2000), availableat http://www.iseas.edu.sg/trends 1220.pdf (explaining that continuing

political instability will produce sharp devaluation of Indonesia's currency); Hist. Peace Churches Int'l
Conf., "Peace in Our Land": Historic Peace Churches in the Asian Context of Religious Pluralism,
Poverty and Injustice (Dec. 2-7, 2007) (unpublished conference handout) (stating that careless
religiosity can be fatal for the poor); Press Release, General Assembly, Poverty Reduction, Terrorism,
Disarmament, Humanitarian Relief Discussed as General Assembly Continues Review of SecretaryGeneral Report, U.N. Doc. GA/9917 (Sept. 9, 2001) (describing the eradication of terrorism as essential
to development and poverty reduction).
71. BATSTONE, supra note 6, at 21.

72. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREATNG A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY 3 (PublicAffairs 2008).
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economy where cash rather than crops dominates; where diversified agrarian
systems have bent to the necessity for cash crop production; where farmers cannot
focus on growing food to feed their families but must grow the one crop that can
be sold.73 Meanwhile, the price for any such cash crops is determined not by the
farmers but by speculators in far-away countries who trade in the peasants' labor
for greater personal profits. 74 Such peasant farmers in countries in Asia are so
beaten by the economic cruelty of the world that encompasses them that they are
forced to conclude that the only hope for survival is to send family members often the youngest and the brightest - to the cities to make some kind of a decent
wage and keep the family financially afloat. The rural poor are the most likely to
fall victim to the lures put out by slavers and traffickers who appear in villages and
"recruit" youngsters for impossibly wonderful "opportunities," preying on the
gullibility born of naivet6 of the parents, who sometimes out of sheer love send
their children, they think, to a better life. These are the targets who wind up as
slaves, working long hours making rugs, matches, crushing stone, performing
servant chores, in fact any kind of work that yields a profit. They get very little
food, rarely any money, and cannot leave for they are trapped not just by the slaver
but by their own fears. They are routinely tortured and raped to ensure that terror
will hold them in bondage. Hence it is that Asia, moving upward and booming
economically in some sectors, also provides, because of searing poverty, a plentiful
harvest of people, mainly young people, for the labor and prostitution markets of
the world.
In Africa, dictatorship, tribal and ethnic conflict, along with the predatory
actions of egomaniacal warlords and their followers, have virtually decimated the
traditional structures and agrarian way of life of society in states like Somalia,
Sudan, and Zimbabwe.75 Decades of war, the absence of stable governments, the
non-existence of democratic structures in a number of failing or failed African
states make any notion of human rights impossible to implement. Africa provides
evidence of the abduction of thousands of young children and their brutal
conversion into child soldiers, a phenomenon that has raised international concern
but still persists.76 By one estimate, forty thousand children have been turned into
child soldiers or sex slaves in just one country, Uganda.77 Save the Children has
estimated that approximately 11,000 children are being held by various groups
fighting each other in the Democratic Republic of Congo.7 ' This problem of using

73. Peter Straub, Farmers in the IP Wrench -- How Patents on Gene-Modified Crops Violate the
Right to Food in Developing Countries,29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 187, 197-98 (2006).
74. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Globoecopragmatism:How to Think (and How Not to
Think) About Trade and the Environment, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 129, 142 (2006) (demonstrating how
financial pressure from the I.M.F. and World Bank forces farmers to intensify cash crop production).
75. For insight into the impact of cash crop economies in the West African production of cocoa,
see Humphrey Hawksley, Child Cocoa Workers Still 'Exploited', BBC NEWS, Apr. 2, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/africa/6517695.stm.
76. See generally BALES, supra note 1, at 159-60 (explaining efforts by U.N. peacekeepers to curb
violence in countries that have seen increasing slavery of child soldiers).
77. BATSTONE, supra note 6, at 18.
78. HumanTrafficking.com, A Report by Save the Children Reveals Millions of Children Live as
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children to fight is not confined to Africa. According to UNICEF, more than
300,000 children under the age of eighteen are being utilized in over thirty armed
conflicts in various parts of the world.7 9 Some of these children are just seven
years old.80
Africa's rich mineral wealth has bred more misery as the famous gold and
diamond mines are sometimes manned by forced labor, the gems being utilized to
81
purchase weapons to continue the nightmare of tribal conflict and warfare. In the
case of jewelry particularly in the developing world, from the mines to the stone
cutters and polishers, to the gold setters to the wholesale and retail vendors the
gem can travel through many slave hands before gracing the ring finger of a welloff purchaser.82 Efforts have been made internationally to curtail the trading of
"conflict diamonds. 8 3 Slavery in the gem industry has not been adequately
addressed.
Poverty and structural breakdown of the pillars of society can also account for
the vast numbers of slaves that have been trafficked from Eastern Europe to
markets all over the world. Massive unemployment resulted from the political and
social breakdown of the governmental systems that had dominated Eastern Europe
for much of the twentieth century.84 The power vacuum was filled by criminal
gangs who networked very rapidly across the globe and preyed on their own
people for a pool of labor that provided huge profits for very little investment. By
one estimate, the ranks of the poor in Eastern Europe climbed from 14 million in
1989 to 147 million in 1999. 85 Traditional society virtually imploded in those
states that made up the former Yugoslavia, as ethnic cleansing and war became
part and parcel of everyday life. Russia became the Wild Wild East as the
twentieth century wound down and a new millennium emerged, trailing a host of
problems, including massive corruption, rampant crime, poverty, hunger, and war.
The fall of communism should have heralded a new era of democracy and
individual rights and freedom. Instead. it brought a Darwinian social environment
where the most corrupt and criminal triumphed and those who were unable to ride
the wave to success became victims and its slaves. The International Organization
a
for Migration estimated that between approximately 1991 and 2004, about
86
quarter of a million women were trafficked from Eastern to Western Europe.

Child Slaves, http://www.humantrafficking.org/updates/707 (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
79. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Trafficking in Persons Report 21 (2008), available at
http:/iwww.state.gov/documents/organization/105501.pdf [hereinafter Dep't of State 2008 Trafficking
in Persons Report].
July 25, 2006,
80. Barbara Kralis, Combatant Human Slaves, RENEWAMERICA,
http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/kralis/060725 (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
81. See generally BALES, supra note 1,at 159 (describing how various forms of slavery, including
gold and diamond mining, are used to fund warlords).
82. Id. at 181.
83. See Id. at 170.
84. BATSTONE, supra note 6, at 170.
85. SKINNER, supra note 31, at 134.
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Latin America, having endured decades of guerrilla wars, terrorist attacks,
dictatorship, and deprivation, particularly for the aboriginal people, also
experienced economic poverty on a massive scale. The United Nations has
estimated that in that region the "richest one tenth of the population earn 50 per
cent of income, the poorest tenth earning 1.6 per cent.''87 The evidence was seen
daily in the numbers rushing to the borders of the United States of America, where
they hoped to make a decent living. Those illegal migrants frequently wound up as
trafficked persons and, once in the United States, disappeared into a murky world
of hidden and clandestine slavery where exploitation and cruelty accompanied by
rape, torture, and back-breaking labor became their only knowledge of the Land of
the Free and the Home of the Brave.
' 8
It is indeed true that "[s]lavery feeds on poverty, insecurity and ignorance.
Were the problems of poverty, hunger, economic deprivation and landlessness as
well as rural indebtedness alleviated, even in some measure, the human well spring
which is, now exploited for the profits of criminals could be the source for on-site
development and rural reinvigoration. The irony is that while human beings
survived long before industrialization and machinery dominated the world, no
civilization can sustain itself without food, which comes from its agrarian base.
By depleting the rural base of so many countries and by denigrating its
significance, we are virtually dooming the sustainable future of the entire planet.
According to the United Nations trafficking "takes many different forms. It is
dynamic and adaptable and, like many other forms of criminal activity, it is
constantly changing in order to defeat efforts by law enforcement to prevent it." 89
Traffickers today are vigilant, flexible, and able to move slaves from one location
to another to prevent any groups from attempting to free them. Only surprise raids
on known slave locations can enable abolitionists to rescue these victims.
A related challenge is evident in the nexus between human trafficking and
human smuggling, both distinct crimes, but as the United Nations admits, "they
represent overlapping crime problems." 90 One distinction between smuggling and
trafficking that has been emphasized is the fact that "smuggling is always
transnational in nature, but trafficking may or may not be." 91 The problem lies not
just in catching the criminals but in prosecuting them and convicting them
particularly when aspects of their crimes are transnational, their targets are multinational and their ill-gotten gains are secreted in tax haven shelters. The legal
challenges are obvious but when the human cost is factored in as a priority, the

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published-docs/books/changi
ng-pattems.pdf, noted in BATSTONE, supra note 6, at 172.
87. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation, at v,
U.N. Sales No. E.05.XI. 13 (2005), availableat http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Alternative-Development
_EvaluationDec-05 .pdf.
88. BALES, supra note 1,at 59.
89. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, at ix, U.N. Sales
No. E.06.V. 11 (2006), availableat http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Trafficking-toolkitOct06.pdf.
90. Id. at xiv.
91. Id.
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nations of the world have to overcome these obstacles and ensure that their
governments are focused on the freeing of slaves and the eradication of all aspects
of this criminal activity. Admittedly, law enforcement is consistently playing
92
catch-up with criminals who form part of elaborate international networks. Such
that
criminals now have the means to shuffle victims freely across borders
93
routes.
transportation
the
eases
corruption
when
sometimes become porous
C. Scope of Slavery
The scope of slavery and trafficking encompasses the entire globe. The
United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime estimated in 2006 that trafficking
affected human beings from 127 countries and they were exploited in 137
countries.9 4 To consider the situation only in the United States, the abolitionist
organization Free the Slaves determined from its research that between 1998 and
2003, trafficking victims brought to the U.S.A. came from thirty-five countries
with the majority of slaves being found in states such as California, Florida, Texas,
and New York. 95 The research team from Free the Slaves and the Human Rights
Center at the University of California, Berkeley, concluded on the issue of the
scope of slavery, that forced labor prevailed in five sectors of the American
economy: prostitution and sex services (46%), domestic service (27%), agriculture
(10%), sweatshop factory work (5 percent), and restaurant/hotel work (4%).96
Although some advocates of the abolition of slavery focus on the illicit sex
trade, indentured bondage is a far more prevalent manifestation of trafficking.9 7
This is particularly true in countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal,
where it is estimated that there are at least fifteen million bonded slaves 98 working
in fields, mines, and quarries, brought to dire straits by loans, sometimes of less
than one dollar, a sum sufficient to tie a family to indenture for generations.
The gruesome reality is that, although definitions vary and statistics are
sometimes intelligent estimates, slavery has been recognized as existing in a huge
variety of agricultural, craft, and industrial enterprises around the world. As
attorney Elissa Steglich commented: "Trafficking is an equal opportunity crime
affecting a diverse pool that includes all nationalities and education levels. 9 9
Slaves produce and harvest basic foods such as rice, coffee, cocoa, sugar, beef,
fish, vegetables, and fruit; apparel basics such as cotton; building requirements like

92. Id. at xx.
93. Id. at 179.
94. UNODC, supra note 17, at 17.
95. Free the Slaves & Human Rights Ctr., Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, at 7
(2004), CORNELL UNIV. ILR SCHOOL, availableat http://digitalcommons. ilr.cornell.edu/forcedlabor/8/,
quoted in BATSTONE, supra note 6, at 227-28.
96. Id.
97. See generally Off. to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, How Can I Recognize
Trafficking Victims?, U.S. STATE DEP'T., July 28, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/34563.htm.
98. BALES, supra note 1,at 9, quoted in BATSTONE, supra note 6, at 11.
99. Elissa Steglich, Address at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School Conference:
available at
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timber and brick; metals including iron, steel, gold, and tin; gemstones like
diamonds; and crafts such as jewelry making. 00 Slaves have been discovered
making sporting goods, clothing, rope, rugs and carpets, shoes, and fireworks.' 0 '
As Bales explains: "Slavery in the product chains of the food we eat, the clothes
we wear, and the cars we drive is an ugly blot on our lives."' 1 2 Although the
proportion of such items produced by free labor as opposed to slave labor varies
depending on the country, the region, economic necessity, and a host of other
variables, the infiltration of slave-made goods into the product chain for so many
commodities that are in regular use throughout the world makes the task of
identifying and uprooting the illicit producer, who uses slaves, from the ranks of
the genuine producers who pay regular wages a real challenge in every society.
David Batstone lists various areas where the victims of slavery can be found
working at cleaning homes and landscaping and gardening. They can be found at
construction sites, casinos, hotels, strip clubs, massage parlors, and brothels.0 3
"Hidden in plain sight,"' 1 4 slaves can be found at a significant variety of
employment locations including even modeling studios, bars, escort services, and
adult bookstores.10 5
Assessing the scope of the crisis of slavery, researchers have discovered that
this crime is prevalent in certain sports as well, specifically camel racing in the
Persian Gulf States. 10 6 The U.S. State Department has found that annually,
children as young as two years are trafficked from countries like Sudan, Pakistan,
and Bangladesh for use as camel jockeys for the entertainment of camel racing
fans in the Gulf States. 0 7 These children are "often sexually and physically
abused; most are physically and mentally stunted, as they are deliberately starved
to prevent weight gain."' 08 These young children are often seriously injured,
stampeded to death by camels, and live as isolated prisoners without family contact
in camps surrounded by barbed wire. 10 9 They are said to number in the
thousands. 10
The scope of human trafficking has been manifested in the global spread of
sexually transmitted diseases and the higher incidence of HIV among victims."'
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111. Jay C. Silverman et al., HIV Prevalance and Predictors of Infection in Sex-Trafficked
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Children are particularly vulnerable. Referring to medical research, the State
Department explained, "HIV prevalence among women trafficked from Nepal and
of HIV infection exceeded 60% among girls
prostituted in India is 38%. The rate
'1 12
age."
of
years
15
prostituted prior to
The globalization of slavery today is evident from the conclusion of the U.S.
State Department that "traffickers are seizing upon any targets of opportunity for
exploitation and relying on vast distances and cultural and linguistic differences to
increase the vulnerability of victims.' 1 13 Hence, Zambian girls were trafficked to
Ireland for sexual exploitation; Filipina women were trafficked to Cote d'Ivoire for
the same purpose; Vietnamese children were trafficked to the United Kingdom for
work in drug smuggling; Thai men were trafficked to the U.S.A. for labor work;
Dominican women were trafficked to Montenegro for sexual exploitation as
similarly were Chinese women sent to Afghanistan; and Russian students were
trafficked to the U.S.A. forcibly to sell ice cream. 1 4 Clearly, the "slave trade is
driven by the dynamics of supply and demand." ' 1 5 Antonio Costa, head of the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, explained the dynamic:
Like any other market - and it is a perverse kind of market - there is a
supply in terms of people who are duped, coerced, or tricked, and a
demand, in terms of people who may be buying the sort of commodities
of connecting the supply and
we are talking about. And there is the act
16
trafficking.
the
do
who
demand - those
III. THE SOLUTION

A. EradicatingSlavery: The Challenge Ahead
Transnational crimes require international intervention. The globalized world
has grasped the reality that when markets internationalize and travel restrictions
ease, crime and victimization can spread across the world. Human trafficking will
require firm and determined global measures to bring about its eventual
eradication. The United Nations has admitted that "human trafficking is a crime of
such magnitude and atrocity that it cannot be dealt with successfully by any
Government alone."' l17 There is no shortage of suggested remedies, a plethora of
legal instruments exist, both international and national, and there are plenty of very
pertinent and relevant suggestions that abolitionists, lawyers, politicians, and social
workers have made to alleviate the worst excesses of this widespread crime and
assist in its permanent eradication. If the United Nations and its sovereign state
members will commit funding and resources with a determined will to work
together to eradicate slavery, much could be achieved. The ideas exist; what is

of Trafficking in Persons,Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/91537.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Dep't of State 2008 Trafficking in Persons Report, supra note 78, at 7.
114. Id. at 7.
115. BATSTONE, supra note 6, at 9.
116. Stephanie Holmes, Trafficking: A Very Modern Slavery, B.B.C. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2008,
availableat http://www.bbb.co.uk.2/hi/europe/7243612.stm.
117. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 17, at 26.
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needed is the will to implement those ideas and to pursue slavers and traffickers
and rid the world of this terrible crime. The international effort is grounded in the
provisions of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which entered into
force on December 25, 2003.118 The global measures focus on three principles:
prevention, prosecution, and protection.' 19
The initial step is to acknowledge across the world that this crime extends
beyond national boundaries and requires international intervention. Because it
takes advantage of the facilities available in an increasingly globalized world,
slavery has to be confronted and challenged both within and outside the bounds of
national sovereignty. The United Nations admitted the challenge involved:
"Trafficking is frequently a crime of an international nature, crossing national
borders and jurisdictions. Law enforcement efforts can often be confounded by the
need to conduct investigations or pursue criminals across international borders."' 2 °
The twentieth century has seen the scope of international intervention expand
considerably in terms of protecting populations at risk, for example, in cases of
genocide and ethnic cleansing. One possibility would be to expand this
international cooperation that has sent United Nations peacekeepers to the far
corners of the world and extend this mandate to policing against slavery and
protecting populations at risk of being trafficked. The existence of disciplined,
dedicated international forces in failing states could be a usual preventive measure
in terms of protecting civilians against slavery. Where genocide is occurring, or
even ethnic cleansing or war, there is always a greater risk of slavery and
trafficking being utilized by one side against the civilians of an opposing group.
Kevin Bales has suggested the creation of a United Nations force with a specific
anti-slavery mandate. 121 Equally interesting is Bales' proposal for United Nations
slavery inspectors, much like the weapons inspectors 122 who went to Iraq.
The greater challenge, in view of the continuing, frequently insistent emphasis
of governments on the supremacy of national sovereignty, is to find an
international solution within states that are not failing or suffering from civil war
but nevertheless are negligent about the prevalence of slavery and trafficking.
Greater awareness and the growth of an articulate public opinion about the evils of
slavery and a refusal to accept its existence in any country might serve to jog
negligent governments into dealing with this problem. The new abolitionists are
both articulate and very eloquent
in highlighting the impact of this crime and in
23
galvanizing public opinion.
118. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Signatories to the CTOC Trafficking Protocol, U.N.Doc.
A/55/383 (Dec. 25, 2003).
119. Loring Jones et al., supra note 47.
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122. Id. at 25.
123. See generally BALES, supra note 18 (highlighting ways in which abolitionists have raised
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According to the United States State Department, "[b]ecause trafficking in
persons is usually an 'underground' crime, it can be difficult for law-enforcement
personnel, the public, or service providers to readily identify a trafficking victim
and/or a trafficking scenario."1 24 Within states, there is a clear need to educate
police, social workers, community activists, and any one else who wishes to get
involved to the need to identify and recognize signs of this clandestine crime; to
work to ensure that the law enables perpetrators to be prosecuted and convicted;
and that governments are not ambivalent about the need to eradicate slavery within
their borders. Although many states have a tolerable legal framework to address
the issue, the implementation of the law is perceived as difficult if not impossible.
This occurs because the crime is often unreported; slaves are too terrified to testify
against their exploiters for fear that their families may be targeted for reprisal and,
in the case of children and women who have been tortured, too traumatized to cope
with the stress of enduring a judicial procedure. 125 Having been kept in virtual
isolation, slaves are often unfamiliar with either the language or the customs of the
country to which they have been trafficked. They are terrified of the unknown and
fear authority figures like policemen. They have learned the brutal way not to trust
anyone and are unlikely to reveal much until those barriers are broken down.
There is also the ancillary problem whereby freed slaves can themselves face
prosecution, either as illegal immigrants or as criminals where they have been
forced to work as prostitutes. 126 Often the victims have no identification papers as
their exploiters all too often take their documents away. These legal anomalies
whereby victims are criminalized by the law are being redressed in some
countries. 127
The United Nations has suggested that member states establish domestic laws
that would criminalize any involvement with trafficking, with appropriate penalties
for perpetrators, protection for victims, including medical assistance, and the
opportunity of voluntary return to their home countries. 128 Additionally, the
United Nations recommended the implementation of training programs for
officials involved in the prevention, prosecution, and protection aspects of the
slavery problem. 129 These excellent suggestions, if implemented internationally,
could seriously erode the arrogant defiance of the law, a hallmark of slavers and
traffickers.
The American experience demonstrates the significant impact of increased
awareness about the problem and systematic training of law enforcement at every
level including judges. Within the United States, the Federal Department of
Justice reported that it had increased prosecutions since 2001, obtaining thirty-six
convictions on human trafficking in 2007 and ninety-eight convictions in 2006.

124. Off. to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, How Can I Recognize Trafficking
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125. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 17, at xxi.
126. Id. at 126.
127. Id. at 128.
128. Id. at 12:
129. Id.

2008

BORN FREE YET EVERYWHERE IN CHAINS

The same report also specified that between 2001 and 2006, the Civil Rights
Division and U.S. Attorneys' Offices had prosecuted 360 defendants, secured 238
convictions and guilty pleas and opened 639 new investigations.' 30 These figures
were considerably higher than for the previous six years. 13 1 Although these efforts
are worthwhile, their impact has to be weighed against the fact that there are an
1 32
estimated 50,000 slaves in the United States of America.
If these efforts against traffickers succeed, an ancillary but significant impact
could be a salutary and useful detriment to organized crime in America. The nexus
between slave trafficking and organized crime is evident in many nations of the
world. Trafficking assists in the growth of organized crime and this "criminal
activity has increased social costs, undermined and corrupted governments, broken
' 133
down social systems, and damaged public health.
The vast profits to be made from trafficking have generated an emphasis on
the importance of running parallel financial investigations with respect to exposing
the perpetrators and the extent of their profits. The United Nations deems such
financial investigations critical and emphasizes the golden rule: "Follow the money
and you will find the trafficker.' ' 134 This type of financial investigation can only be
conducted on a transnational basis, given the ease with which traffickers can whisk
their money electronically around the globe. Seizing the assets of those who have
profited from trafficking and compensating the victims from those assets ought to
become standard practice.
A number of abolitionists have suggested35 that
by financial restitution for the freed slaves.'
accompanied
be
must
conviction
B. The United Nations Protocol
On November 15, 2000, after two years of intensive negotiation, 136 the United
Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 55/25 adopting the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Crime. 137
This Convention included
supplemental agreements titled the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish
trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air.1 38 A third Protocol dealt with
the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components
and Ammunition. 139 The Protocol against trafficking in persons entered into force
on December 25, 2003.14° While, because of space limitations, it is not my
130. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet: Civil Rights Division Efforts to Combat Modern-Day
Slavery (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/January/07 crt 061 html.
131. Id.
132. SKINNER, supra note 31, at 265.
133. Sharon Anne Melzer, International Trafficking of Men, Women, and Children in I
ORGANIZED CRIME (Frank G. Shanty & Patit P. Mishra eds., ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2008).
134. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 17 at 76.
135. Id. at 52.
136. Finckenauer and Liu, supra note 33 at 6.
137. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 17 at 2.
138. G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex Il-Ill, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter
Convention against TransnationalOrganized Crime].
139. G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (May 31, 2001).
140. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
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intention here to analyze in great detail the significance and impact of the Protocol,
it is important to emphasize that this document reflects a global realization that the
world needs a "comprehensive international approach in the countries of origin,
transit and destination that includes measures to prevent such trafficking, to punish
the traffickers and to protect the victims of such trafficking, including by
protecting their internationally recognized human rights."'4 1 Referred to as the
Palermo Protocol because it was signed in that Italian city in 2000, this
international instrument explains its purpose as being to prevent and combat
the
trafficking in persons, particularly women and children; to protect and assist
142
victims; and to promote cooperation among States to fulfill these objectives.
The United Nations tackled the problem of defining this crime with a broad
and comprehensive approach. Although somewhat wordy, the definition seeks to
cover many of the possible methods by which slavery becomes a brutal reality for
so many millions of people. The U.N. definition states:
'Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception,
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or
43
the removal of organs. 1
The Protocol also specifies, in relation to the above definition, that the
victim's consent is irrelevant. Children under 18 years are provided broad
protections from trafficking.' 44 A conviction that the epidemic of "human
trafficking is a crime against humanity,"' 145 impelled the member states to adopt the
Protocol and commit to adopting domestic legislation to implement its
provisions. 146 The United Nations confined the specific application of the Protocol
to offences that were "transnational in nature," and to those that involved an
"organized criminal group."' 14 7 The United Nations defined this latter factor as "a
structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against

Transnational Organized Crime, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE
&tabid=2&id=375&chapter- I8&lang=en (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).

141. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 137, at Annex II Preamble.
142. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 137, at Annex II art. 2.
143. Id. art. 3(a).
144. Id. art. 3(d).
OFF.
145. U.N.
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www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/AR06_fullreport.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) [hereinafter
Annual Report 2007].
146. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 137, at Annex I art. 5.

147. Id. art. 4.
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in order to obtain, directly, or
established in accordance with the Convention,
148
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.'
In setting up a number of specific tasks for States parties to undertake, the
United Nations in this Protocol formulated the creation of a nation-by-nation
structure of law and policies that might someday eradicate slavery, provided
nations are willing to commit funding and demonstrate a will to implement the
directives. 49 Besides formulating appropriate legislation to prevent trafficking,
prosecute perpetrators, and protect slaves, the Protocol also asks States to conduct
research and mass media campaigns along with social and economic initiatives to
combat this crime.' 50 The involvement of non-governmental organizations is
mentioned and there is a call to tackle problems such as poverty and
underdevelopment, which lead to trafficking.' 5 ' Additionally there are provisions
asking States' officials in law enforcement and immigration to exchange
152
information; to spot possible perpetrators and victims as they cross borders.
Making various officials aware of and sensitive to the slavery issue has also been
stressed in this Protocol. 5 3 Additionally, the Protocol required States parties to
provide legally relevant information to victims and it opened the possibility of
54

compensation for victims. 1

The Protocol obtained 117 signatures and 111 ratifications by the end of
2006,155 reflecting a global dedication, at least in theory, to its principles. The
reality, however, is far different as the "custodian" of the Convention, 15 6 the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, admitted in its 2007 Annual Report:
"Translating the Protocol into reality remains problematic. Very few criminals are
convicted and most victims are probably never identified or assisted.', 157 The
Protocol has also been criticized for not representing an international consensus
with respect to its wordy definition, which has been considered "too conceptually
comprehensive to be effectively understood.', 158 Despite these critiques, it is
important to remember that the purpose of the international instrument is to
-'establish minimum standards. States parties are bound to adhere to this threshold

148. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Trafficking in Persons Global Patterns, at 6,
www.unodc.org/pdf/traffickinginpersons-report_2006-04.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) [hereinafter
GlobalPatterns2006].
149. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 137, at Annex II.
150. Id. art. 9(2).
151. Id. art. 9(3).
152. Id. art. 10(1)(a).
153. Id. art. 10(2).
154. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, at 163,
www.unodc.org/pdf/Trafficking-toolkit OctO6.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Toolkit].
155. Annual Report 2007, supra note 144, at 18.
156. Global Patterns 2006, supra note 147, at 68.
157. Annual Report 2007, supra note 144, at 19.
158. Phyllis Coontz & Catherine Greibel, InternationalApproach to Human Trafficking: The Call
12,
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http://www.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/International-Approaches-to-HumanTrafficking-The-Call-for-a-Gender-Sensitive-Perspetive-in-Intemational-Law.
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159
The United Nations Office on Drugs and
but may still adopt stricter measures.,
Crime has assisted a number of countries such as Armenia, Lebanon, and South
Africa to draft appropriate anti-human trafficking laws and has additionally trained
officials from Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, and Ukraine and other nations in this field of
law enforcement. 160 Victim refenal services have been established with United
Nations expertise in the Czech Republic, the Philippines, Poland, Moldova. and the
Slovak Republic. 16 '

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2007 established a Global
Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT), described as "an innovative
programme whose ultimate mission is nothing less than the eradication of human
trafficking."'162 To fulfill this mandate UN.GIFT has dedicated itself to raising
international awareness, assisting states to draft legislation, writing training
manuals for law enforcement personnel and judges, and standardizing systems for
collection of data and its analysis' 63 There has been a considerable amount of
recent activity under the aegis of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
toward these aims. In 2007. this widespread activity included a conference in
Uganda to train peacekeepers to detect and prevent trafficking; a meeting in Brazil
to develop national plans; an event in Thailand to discuss criminal justice options;
an innovative event in South Africa entitled "Interfaith dialogue: what the religious
community can do to combat human trafficking;" a conference in India to consider
trafficking and sexual exploitation; a prevention-oriented conference in Lithuania;
164
Time alone will
and a workshop in Egypt to consider legislative options.
determine whether all these efforts will substantially reduce, if not eradicate, the
problem of trafficking. Former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi
Annan, pleaded for effective action in an address before the British Houses of
Parliament: "Let us take action to prevent any more victims from having their
165
dreams of a better future turn into nightmares of exploitation and servitude."'
Despite its international activities the United Nations drew criticism with respect to
its handling of the problem of slavery. As Bales explained: "The U.N. is trying
hard, but in ways that are hamstrung by national governments, stymied by
bureaucrats in its own ranks, and scattered and disorganized across a range of its
own agencies. " 166 Bales concluded that "the United Nations suffers terribly from
the distance between dream and reality."'16 7 While the governments and law
enforcement agencies train and prepare themselves to do battle with trafficking and
slavery, the slaves around the world continue their lives of unremitting toil and
degrading humiliation. Men, women, and children who are no longer owners of
159. Toolkit, supra note 153. at 2.
160. Annual Report 2007. supra note 144, at 22.
161. Im. at 21.
2008,
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wN\\\.unodc.org/docurnents/about-unodc AR08\N EB.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
163. Id. at 26-27.
164. Id. at 27, 28, 48.
165. Id. at 25.
166. BALES, supra note 1, at 140.
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their own bodies, are used and abused until their brutal existence on this planet has
ended in the only escape they have: death. There are no acceptable global statistics
on the number of slaves who escape and who can lead somewhat normal lives after
their ordeal. The reality is that percentage is miniscule. Time alone will tell
whether the flurry of bureaucratic and legislative activity on a global scale has a
significant or negligible impact on the number of slaves and on the crime of
trafficking. While it is beneficial to have the international agreements, unless there
is a universal will to implement their provisions, this activity and the lofty
and of little
speeches denouncing the evils of slavery will be meaningless
168
consequence: full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.
C. Some Additional Suggestions to Deal With the Problem
According to Baroness Caroline Cox and Dr. John Marks, if "slavery is to be
abolished in the twenty-first century. We need first to break the bonds of
ignorance, silence, interest, ideology, complacency, and complicity. ' 69 While
implementing the ideas of the United Nations Protocol on Trafficking would
constitute a very significant step for all nations of the world, there are numerous
other ways in which governments, legislators, and law enforcement personnel
along with academics, media representatives, members of non-governmental
organizations, and community activists - indeed each citizen can play a vital role
in utilizing varied expertise to alleviate some aspects of this vast problem on a
daily basis. Many authors who have been horrified by the plight of slaves have
provided plenty of useful and helpful ideas. It would be worthwhile to examine
some of these suggestions because they are pragmatic and practical. All that is
required is a sense of dedication to implementation and a commitment to utilize
one's energy toward helping to free those in bondage around the world. Although
ultimate eradication may well take a massive international campaign, this
particular cause can also be assisted by each of us as citizens of the world and of
our nations. Because the products of slavery are so pervasive in our society, we
are bound by intangible threads to those who work under such brutal conditions to
provide us with our consumer comforts. We are in a position as citizens of free
societies, as consumers, ultimately as members of an increasingly globalized
market economy, to have an impact however small on this problem.
One fundamental methodology is to raise awareness and to write and publish
materials about this criminal practice. 70 Slavery is so clandestine and so low on
the scale of media priorities that it often remains hidden and slavers prefer to live
unobtrusively, shielding the reality of the dark side of their lives from even their
closest friends. Bales has commented that "slavery can be hard to see if you are
not used to looking for it.'

71

The increasing level of public awareness can only

result in an enhanced capacity for people to recognize, identify, and point the
finger at perpetrators. Bringing this terrible evil out from hiding is one way that

168. Id. at 139-42.
169. COX & MARKS, supra note 3, at 155.

170. BALES, supra note 1, at 235-36.
171. Id. at 225.
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every person who constitutes that wonderful force we call world public opinion
can play an active role in this cause. Slavers and traffickers do not want to face the
glare of publicity. They definitely do not want to be named or publicly exposed.
Media managers have to be convinced to bring this issue to the forefront of their
information dissemination agenda so that populations, especially in the free world,
will be galvanized to look for slavery and, when they identify it, to go to the
authorities. Many writers have suggested the importance of initiating discussions
on this subject through our schools and universities, our community groups, even
our neighborhoods. According to Barbara Kralis, "[t]he greatest weapon against
human trafficking and slavery is inquisitive neighbors. 172 By increasing public
awareness, particularly in the democratic countries, it will be possible to hold
governments accountable for the measures they have taken to eradicate slavery. At
one time, a few short decades ago, environmentalism was hardly on the public
radar. The work of environmental activists, the convening of international
conferences like the Rio Earth Summit in 1992,173 and the heightened global
interest and awareness have now made environmentalism mainstream in our
thinking. Indeed those who oppose environmentalism are the anachronistic
elements, demonstrating how far public opinion has traveled in a short time span.
With that much effort placed on slavery and slave trafficking and with greater
awareness globally, this terrible evil already outlawed in much of the planet and
certainly in international fora, could be eradicated.
Because slave-made goods are mixed-in with legitimate products, it is
impossible for the average consumer to determine whether or not slavery has
tainted any product he is consuming. Nowhere is the need for precise information
more important than in this realm of awareness raising. Given enough incentive
and consumer prodding, the large multinational corporations could conduct
extensive investigations to ensure that no slavery has entered their product lines.
These ideas have floated for years but successful implementation on a significant
scale has still not occurred. Louisa Waugh suggests in her book, Selling Olga, that
if "retailers were held legally responsible for the workers who produce the goods
they sell, this would make a vital difference." 174 The Bureau of International
Labor Affairs of the United States Department of Labor has committed to
preparing and publicizing a list of goods believed to be produced by forced labor
and child labor. 175 The State Department announced at the commencement of
2008 that a globally oriented list of such products is slated for publication by
2009. 176
172. Barbara Kralis, Catholic Church Fights Human Trafficking & Slavery, RENEWAMERICA, Aug.
4, 2006, http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/kralis/060804.
173.
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The secrecy surrounding actual cases of slavery has bedeviled attempts at
statistical measurement of the problem. Increasing awareness, particularly on a
public scale of its existence, will undoubtedly bring more and more cases to light
and, eventually, this may enable statisticians to deal with definitive figures and
statistics on the extent of the crime. The importance of basing research on clear
statistical data is obvious. However, we have to remember that the priority is to
free the slaves as fast as possible. Where so many human lives are at stake, we
cannot afford the luxury of insisting first on counting the victims and focusing so
much on studying the problem that we neglect actively dealing with it. That said,
it is important to note the remarks of researchers who formulated a paper on the
quantification issue for the February 2008 Vienna Forum to Fight Human
Trafficking. 177 These researchers suggested that in "the absence of systematic and
reliable statistical time series, we do not even know with any degree of precision if
the number of reported trafficking cases is increasing or decreasing and why this
might be so.",178 Baroness Caroline Cox and Dr. John Marks put this issue in
appropriate perspective when they pointed out that "behind each statistic is a
human being - a man, woman or child; and behind each human being is a family
and a community, which have been devastated or destroyed by the horror of
slavery in our world today."1 79 The secrecy enables slavery to continue and
persist. Emphasizing this aspect of the problem, Terry Coonan, Executive Director
of the Center for the Advancement of Human Rights at Florida State University,
commented that "[w]e need to crack this code of silence." 180 Public awareness,
greater involvement, active discussion and sharing of information all form part of
the methodology by which the veil of secrecy will eventually be lifted.
It is important as well for us in North America and Europe to insist that our
governments provide resources to increase awareness about this terrible crime in
the countries of origin, which are in the developing world. It is imperative that the
message gets out to the villages and small towns of Asia, Africa, Latin America,
and Eastern Europe so that parents, aware of the threat, will not so easily be gulled
into handing over their children to slavers posing as compassionate philanthropists.
The people of rural areas have to be warned about the potential danger and alerted
to the tactics and wiles utilized by traffickers to lure victims into this terrible
situation. Women in particular have to be enlightened about the dangers of
trusting people to smuggle them across borders, under the illusion that a new life
of freedom and economic betterment awaits them. Traffickers are initially con
artists and heightened awareness has to be raised in those areas most vulnerable to
their lures. It is also important that the message be conveyed in a manner that is
clear and coherent and believable by people, the majority of whom cannot read and
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/08/100208.htm.
177. The Vienna Forum to Fight Human Trafficking 13-15 Feb. 2008, Austria Center Vienna
Background Paper, 024 Workshop: Quantifying Human Trafficking, Its Impact and the Responses to It,
U.N. GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO FIGHT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, UN.GIFT B.P.: 024 (2008).
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most of who have an ingrained distrust of authority figures like policemen and
government bureaucrats. Those of us whose entire working day is meshed with the
technology of modem communications have to understand and appreciate that the
internet, radio, newspapers, and television may not have penetrated to the remote
areas where traffickers seek out victims for their hideous trade. We will need 'low
tech' methodologies to reach and convince some of these remote villages. One
possibility might be to utilize the services of local residents who have suffered the
ordeal and been freed to raise the awareness of their own family, relatives, and
neighbors. This system has apparently worked in countries like India and should
be widely utilized. Schools and religious institutions in developing countries could
be urged to provide information to children about the threat of abduction and
kidnapping and about the necessity to be alert to the perils.
Bales has suggested that an anti-slavery lens be the methodology for perceiving
many other realms of political and economic activity, particularly with respect to
development assistance programs. 181 As he stated: "If the World Bank reviews
each of its grants and loans through an antislavery lens, it will ensure that no
projects would increase a local population's vulnerability to slavery."18 Similar
levels of heightened awareness of the need to eradicate slavery incorporated into
would bring
the daily programs and deliberations of the World Trade 1Organization
83
the matter to the forefront of the global economic agenda.
Similarly, most authors have emphasized, as has the United Nations, the need
for extensive training for law enforcement personnel. 184 The United States
Government has mandated anti-trafficking training for all of its service members
including civilians working for the Department of Defense.1 85 The United States
Departments of Labor and Homeland Security and other1 86governmental agencies
are involved in various plans that target human trafficking.
Space constraints prevent detailed discussion and analysis of the multiplicity
of ideas that abolitionists have provided for implementation by all sectors of
society, working together to eradicate slavery. The existence of so many
suggestions, proposals and plans makes the route ahead easier because the paths
have already been charted.1 87 The range of ideas is extensive; from prevention
programs to deter traffickers to awareness projects that can slave-proof entire rural
communities; from legislative action to prohibit these crimes, to law enforcement
action to prosecute and convict perpetrators; from rehabilitation proposals to
curtail the horror of poverty and hunger, to elaborate funding and development
schemes to revitalize economies; from protection and the provision of shelter for
rescued and freed slaves, to fulfillment of their dream of a new life with adequate

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
DEP'T OF
187.

BALES, supra note 1,at 237-41.
Id. at 166.
See Id. at 171-75.
See Finckenauer & Liu, supra note 33, at 13.
Off. to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, supra note 9.
Off. to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Facts About Human Trafficking, U.S.
STATE, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2005/60840.htm.
See generally BALES, supra note 1.

2008

BORN FREE YET EVERYWHERE IN CHAINS

financial and educational resources and finally, to reunification of families torn
apart by the horrors of this vicious crime.
The irony is that the eradication of slavery is almost a motherhood issue,
arousing no opposition to its agenda and no detractors. Eradication commands
extensive support, both internationally and within many nations and yet slavery
persists and may, with the market demands of globalization, even be increasing.
Its prevalence makes a mockery of the altruistic efforts of those who seek to
eradicate this crime. What this indicates is that human trafficking requires greater
effort, more dedication and more active participation on a global level to bring
about its destruction. If the proliferation of slavery has been one tragic
consequence of globalization, perhaps in its eradication via international efforts
mankind can find some redemption for the suffering of millions of men, women,
and children who have been the innocent victims of this crime. Pope Benedict
XVI has referred to trafficking in human beings as a "scourge;" appropriate
terminology, echoing the horror of his predecessor, Pope John Paul II, who called
this trade "a shocking offense
against human dignity and grave violation of
'' 88
rights."
human
fundamental
IV. CONCLUSION

Today, "[h]uman trafficking and slavery flourish in the form of sex slavery,
domestic servitude, forced debt bondage, involuntary servitude, combatant slaves,
' 89
child sex tourism, child sports slaves, contract slavery, and cheap child labor."
The eradication of all these crimes will take enormous dedication and commitment.
As John R. Miller, United States Ambassador tasked to deal with this problem,
said, "[a]ll of us must be committed to the new abolition movement of ending
human trafficking. ' 90
Antonio M. Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, eloquently summarized the challenge ahead when he said,
We have to decrease the number of victims by preventing trafficking,
we have to increase the number of victims who are rescued and
supported and we have to increase the number of traffickers who are
convicted. We have the tools to do this, but we do not have the political
191
will, large-scale public awareness or the resources to make it happen.
This article has sought to explore aspects of the problem and to discuss some
of the many suggestions and proposals for its elimination. Whether or not all of us
are up to the challenge that lies ahead; whether we will find the will and the energy
to confront the criminals and convict them; whether we can return the millions to
freedom and assure them of justice; whether this new millennium will be lauded
for its liberty or derided for its indifference to human misery, remain to be seen.
188. Kralis, supra note 171.
189. Barbara Kralis, Human Trafficking: A Trans-NationalCriminal Enterprise,RENEWAMERICA,
July 28, 2006, http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/kralis/060728.
190. Barbara Kralis, Exposure of Evil Makes Way for the Good, RENEWAMERICA, Aug. 8, 2006,
http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/kralis/060808.
191. Annual Report 2008, supra note 11, at 25.
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Ambassador John R. Miller has warned that the "struggle will be a
However if in the future we succeed in this great venture, which is
beyond the scope of our planet, then the words of Rousseau
appropriately and aptly be misquoted in context: "People are born
finally, nowhere in chains."
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SHARED BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY:
INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN FIGHT AGAINST

TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS
ANNA GEKHT*

I. INTRODUCTION

Trafficking in persons is a serious violation of fundamental, predominant and
non-derogable human rights and freedoms. It is deeply rooted within the very
heart of international world order and invokes not only moral, but also legal,
economic, social and political implications.
Although the states have acknowledged the graveness of the consequences of
trafficking, government complacency, corruption and lack of political will resulted
in unchecked escalation of trafficking in human beings. The connection of
trafficking and prostitution, together with strict state immigration policies have
stalled international legal and political counter-trafficking efforts. The widespread
nature of human trafficking, violations of fundamental principles of international
law and human rights it implies, and evident fragmentation and lack of
effectiveness and enforcement capacity of current laws, suggest a need for reform.
The process of trafficking consists of three distinct phases, interconnected but
not entirely dependent on each other: (i) the actual act of trafficking; (ii) the
subsequent phase of exploitation that the act of trafficking is committed for; and
(iii) post-trafficking rehabilitation.1 The execution of the act of trafficking is
independent of the realization of its intended purpose 2 and implies the notion of
criminal intent as its main characteristic. The structure of the trafficking chains
involves (a) agents in the home state of the victims, (b) the transit states which host
the victims on their way to final destination, and (c) the states receiving the victims
of traffic. The three distinct components of the chain involve a multiplicity of
different countries and thus evoke different aspects of human rights, criminal,
immigration, labor and public international law, and imply different international
obligations and responsibilities of the states involved.

* Ms. Anna Gekht has an LL.M. (adv) in Public International Law, from Universiteit Leiden,
Leiden, The Netherlands.

1. With the third stage only indirectly related to the topic of this paper, the focus of the paper is
predominantly on the act of trafficking as such and its consequences, without dwelling into a detailed
analysis of specific implications of each of the exploitative purposes for which trafficking is conducted.
2. A person is considered trafficked despite the work of the law-enforcement authorities which
may 'rescue' the victim at the very beginning of the trafficking journey envisioned for him or her. The
victim is subjected to the initial coercion or deception, regardless of whether these techniques succeed
at placing the person within the 'trafficking industry.'
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Being an international malady, trafficking cannot be solved by independent
domestic responses. This essay will argue that in order for the anti-trafficking
policies to become successful they must combine and integrate the various
obligations of the involved countries into a single non-fragmented framework built
on the foundations of the norms of international human rights law. Within this
framework, the states of origin, transit and receiving end of the trafficking chain
must assume their part of the shared responsibility for ensuring the protection of
the vital social, political and economic rights of the victims, as means for
preventing the trafficking in human beings and addressing its consequences; while
realizing their obligations of international criminal, immigration and refugee law,
ensuring deterrence, prevention and adequate remedies for the victims.
This essay will summarize some of the most pertinent norms and obligations
of international human rights relevant for human trafficking. It will analyze the
obligations and responsibilities of states deriving from these norms, general
principles of international law and specific legal provisions addressing human
trafficking directly. On the basis of these normative summaries and implications,
it will propose a model of differentiated state responsibility based on a
mainstreamed and simplified system of legal human rights commitments integrated
within other domains of international law, namely that of criminal and refugee law.
By doing so, it will create and discuss in detail a two-fold anti-trafficking model of
state responsibility, which will include the responsibility for the act of trafficking;
as well as the responsibility for the subsequent exploitation arising out of such
,act'. Among the purposes of trafficking addressed here, prostitution and forced
labor aspects will be covered in more detail in this essay.
II. IN SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION

Human trafficking is a complex phenomenon that involves various social,
political, cultural and legal aspects. It touches upon some of the most sensitive and
rudimentary elements of international order, such as the notions of morality and
sovereignty, and spreads across the entire globe. In order to provide in-depth
analysis of the legal connotations of trafficking, we shall first discuss the scope and
magnitude of the phenomenon; analyze some of the main elements, root-causes of
the recent escalation and linkages of human trafficking with violations of human
rights; and study the definitions of human trafficking contained in various
instruments of international law.
A. The Scope of the Problem
The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates there are 12.3 million
people in forced labor, bonded labor, forced child labor, and sexual servitude at
any given time.3 The US Department of State approximates that 600,000-800,000
people are annually trafficked across national borders, which does not include
millions trafficked within their own countries. 4 Trafficking is the third most
3. PATRICK BELSER ET AL., INT'L LABOUR ORG., ILO MINIMUM ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOUR
IN THE WORLD 8, (Int'l Labour Office 2005), availableat http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ednorm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081913.pdf.
4. Id. at 35.
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lucrative illicit business in the world after arms and drug trafficking and is a major
source of organized crime revenue. 5 The initial sale of trafficked persons generates
an estimated US$ 7 to $12 billion annually, with subsequent sales generating
6
additional US$ 32 billion a year.
7
"The nationalities of trafficked people are as diverse as the world's cultures.",
South-East Asia and South Asia are home to the largest numbers of internationally8
trafficked persons, with 225,000 and 150,000 persons trafficked respectively.
About 100,000 persons are trafficked from the former Soviet Union, 75,000 from
Eastern Europe, 100,000 from Latin America and the Caribbean and 50,000 from
Africa each year. 9 In Asia the largest numbers of women are trafficked within one
or between multiple regions. In South Asia and Middle East, child trafficking for
0
domestic exploitation is of particular concern.'
Approximately 80 percent of transnational victims are women and girls and
up to 50 percent are minors."l The majority of cross-border victims are females
trafficked into commercial sexual exploitation, with the greater part of persons
trafficked within their countries being used for forced and bonded labor.' 2 Usually
persons who fall into the hands of traffickers desire to leave their countries,3
seeking to improve their lives through low-skilled jobs in more prosperous states.'
Child trafficking mostly relies on kidnapped minors or children given by their
families to relatives in hope for education and earning opportunities, who in turn
sell them into exploitation. 14
In many cases the exploitation of victims of traffic is progressive: a person
trafficked into one form of labor may be further exploited in another. The victims
are often beaten and sexually abused, suffer from forced substance abuse, sexually
transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS, food deprivation, psychological torture,
which often lead to death.
Despite the common misconception, trafficking is as much of a local and
regional phenomenon, as it is an international one. A person may decide to travel
within or outside his or her own country for a job, and subsequently fall into
involuntary servitude. Trafficking also implies placement of the victim in an
unfamiliar milieu where he or she is culturally, linguistically or physically isolated
and denied legal identity or access to justice. Such dislocation increases the

5. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, STATE OF WORLD POPULATION REPORT 44 (2006),

available at
UNFPA].
6. Id.

http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib-pub-file/650-filenamesowp06-en.pdf

7. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 8

(June

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/66086.pdf [hereinafter TIP REPORT].
8. UNFPA, supra note 5, at 45.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. TIP REPORT, supra note 7.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 8-10.
14. Id. at 10.

[hereninafter

2006), available at
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marginalization and, therefore, the risk of abuse, violence, exploitation, domination
or discrimination both by traffickers and by state officials represented by the
police, the courts, immigration officials, etc.
Trafficking chain starts with the recruiter or the person facilitating migration
and ends with the last person who buys or receives the victim and holds him or her
in conditions of slavery or slavery-like practices, forced labor or servitude.
Despite the fact that the victims of trafficking are often the victims of5crime, they
are often perceived and treated as criminals in countries of destination.'
16
B. Trafficking-The Dark 'Underside' of Globalization
Historically, human trafficking has been directly affiliated with prostitution.
Consequently, given the ambiguous moral implications of prostitution, the issue of
trafficking remained absent from the international political arena for centuries.
The moral aspects evoked by this connection were perceived as internal sovereign
matter of each state and have traditionally remained within their margin of
appreciation. 17 Ironically, the earliest international response to human trafficking
grew out of the 1900s movement against growing numbers of women trafficked
into prostitution. 18 It specifically focused on the trafficking of white women and
girls for the purpose of prostitution or sexual exploitation, reflected by the terms
'white slave traffic' and "the procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes
abroad."' 9 Consent became the formative factor for determining the trafficking
status of white-skinned prostitutes.2 °

15. Id. at 36.
h
16. The Director-General, Int'l Labour Conference, Geneva, Switz., 891 Sess., Int'l Labour Org.
[ILO], Stopping Forced Labour: A Global Report Under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on
FundamentalPrinciplesand Rights at Work,, at 47, Report I (B) (2001).
17. The legalization of prostitution, abortion, euthanasia, and same sex marriages and adoptions
remain within the 'margin of appreciation' of the sovereign states. See Vo v. France, App. No.
53924/00, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 84; Pretty v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 155 (2002); R.H. v.
Norway, Decision on Admissibility, App. No. 17004/90, 73 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155
(1992); Boso v. Italy, Decision on Admissibility, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 451 (2002).; Paton v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 8416/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408 (1981) (Commission report); Case C-268/99,
Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2001 E.C.R. 1-08615 (illustrating
the differences between nations regarding the judicial treatment of issues evoking strong moral
reactions).
18. See International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18, 1904, 1
L.N.T. S. 83 [hereinafter Agreement]; International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic, May 4, 1910, 211 Consol. T.S. 45, 1912 GR. Brit. T.S. No. 20, as amended by Protocol
Amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, and Amending
the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 4, 1949, 2 U.S.T.
1999, 30 U.N.T.S. 23 [hereinafter Convention]; International Labour Organization Convention
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, ILO No. 29, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 [hereinafter
Forced Labour].
19. Agreement, supra note 18, art. 1.
20. Recently the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the issue of consent in prostitution,
and subsequent characterization of prostitution as a means of employment in Aldona MalgorzataJany
v Staatssecretarisvan Justitie. Case C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris
van Justitie, 2001 E.C.R. 1-08615 (2001).
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In response to the ineffectiveness of consent-based policies, the international
community was forced to gradually agree that consent was an irrelevant parameter
in determining and punishing the crime of trafficking. 21 Instead, it was the element
of coercion, deception or use of force that set trafficking apart from other forms of
persons' smuggling and illegal migration. The resolution of the consent debate
had an additional outcome. The authorities dealing with trafficking came to realize
that by focusing on trafficking for prostitution and sexual exploitation they failed
to address trafficking of women and girls as well as men and boys for other
purposes such as bonded/forced labour, child soldiers, domestic work or organ
donations. Such widened understanding of the concept of human trafficking has in
turn expanded the application of the instruments of international human rights law.
The recent rise in the scope of international trafficking is attributable to a
number of political, social and economic factors. Globalization of the world
markets, demand for cheap workers, growing global economic gaps, lack of
opportunities for development, discrimination and violence against women and
children, corruption and organized crime, political instability and armed conflict,
growing deprivation and marginalization of the poor, extreme poverty,
governmental complacency, discrimination, communication technologies and
transport advancements; have all contributed to a recent increase in sales of people.
Political and economic global changes brought about by the end of Cold War
and opening of international borders in Asia, resulted in the creation of a massive
highly mobile migrant workforce.22 In the absence of employment opportunities,
growing poverty and discrimination in the newly independent and developing
countries, the possibility to earn a decent living abroad has lured many into illegal
migration and trafficking. While the numbers of those looking for opportunities to
immigrate for work rose exponentially, the immigration policies of the developed
states have been becoming increasingly restrictive.2 3 "Trafficking economieswhich arise out of a combination of supply, demand and illegality-are less likely to
develop in situations in which opportunities for legal migrant work exist.

'24

By

limiting the possibilities of legal entry, national authorities of these states have not
21. See generally D. Scharie Tavcer, Causal Factors in the Crime of Trafficking of Women for the
Purpose of Sexual Exploitation: An Exploration into Push and Pull Factors Relevant to Women
Trafficked from Moldova to Western Europe, at 57-63 (November 2006) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Mount Royal College) (on file with author), http://www.freidok.unifreiburg.de/volltexte
/4426/pdf/TavcerDoktorarbeit.pdf.
22. Paul J. Smith, Military Responses to the Global Migration Crisis: A Glimpse of Things to
Come, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77, 78-79 (Fall 1999). The ILO estimates the population of

migrant laborers to be 120 million. Saudi Arabia (7.5 million), the United Arab Emirates (2.3 million),
Malaysia (2.3 million) and Kuwait (1.3 million) lead the markets in demand for foreign migrant
workers. The Philippines (7 million), Indonesia (3 million), Bangladesh (3 million), and Sri Lanka (1.5
million) are the leading suppliers of these workers. TIP REPORT, supra note 7,at 7.
23. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Integration of the Human
Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective, Violence Against Women,

E/CN.4/2000/68 (Feb. 29, 2000) [hereinafter ECOSOC Report].
24. Id. at 22.

61,

U.N. Doc.
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discouraged would-be migrants, and have forced many to look for alternative,
often illegal ways that lead them to traffickers.25
In the global market of trafficking, victims occupy the supply side, whereas
the abusive employers and sex buyers represent the demand. Sex tourism and
child pornography have become worldwide industries, facilitated by the Internet.
Although consumers of forced labor products are ignorant of their involvement
with slavery, their existence in high numbers increases the demand for sex
workers. Consequently, the demand for cheap illegal labor and prostitution is the
primary "pull" factor for the unchecked escalation of human trafficking.
Anti-immigration policies also fuel trafficking. Statistics demonstrate that
inflexible policies of exclusion, enforced through severe penal punishments and
deportation for their breach, feed directly into the hands of traffickers. 26 Strict
anti-immigration policies reduce opportunities for legal migration, encourage
migrants to turn to third parties for assistance, and "serve to provide an evergrowing number of clients to the increasing number of underground networks of
immigrant smugglers." 27

C. Legal Definition
A clear, usable legal consensus definition accepted by all actors in the
international community is a key first step to drafting and implementing successful
anti-trafficking policies. The first of such legally binding definition emerged in
2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children (UN Protocol), supplementary to the United Nations
Convention against Organized Crime (UNCOC). 28 The definition discussed in
more detail in subsequent chapters reads:
(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
offorce or otherforms of coercion, of abduction, offraud, of deception,

of the abuse ofpower or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,forced labor
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended
exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be
irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have
been used;
25. Id.
26. Id. at21.
27. Id. at 22.
28. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children art. 3, G.A. Res. 55/25, at 53, U.N. Doc.
A/55/383, A/Res/55/25/Annex II (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Prevent Trafficking].
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(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a
child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in
persons' even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article.29

Additionally, as noted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women
,the separation of the victims with their own community must be included as the
defining factor of trafficking.3 °
The definition contained in the Protocol creates an important legal threshold.
It specifically distinguishes the differences between trafficking, illegal migration
and migrant smuggling as contained in the variety of acts involved in traffic
(recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, purchase, sale, receipt of person),
actors (chain of individuals or criminal enterprise in various countries constituting
the import, transit and export states), means (threat, attempt or use of force,
violence or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power,
etc), intended exploitative purposes (forced labor or services, debt bondage,
slavery or slavery-like conditions, sexual
exploitation, servitude, etc) in unfamiliar
31
and foreign to the victims' location.
It is, however, important to note that since any apparent, implied, or express
consent is mitigated by the use of deception, coercion, or other forms of violence,
the matter of victim's consent is an element of evidence, not of definition. A
person who hires a "smuggler" or travels for a job promised by a "recruiter" is
unaware that the "smuggler" or "recruiter" intends to hold or place him or her in
forced labor, servitude or slavery-like conditions.32 In accordance with the above
definitions, it is the element of criminal intent, mens rea, to coerce a person into
29. Id.at annex I, art. 3(a) (emphasis added). According to the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Sex trafficking is "the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sexual act." "Involuntary servitude
includes a condition of servitude induced by means of (a) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause
a person to believe that, if the person did not enter into or continue in such condition, that person or
another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (b) the abuse or threatened abuse of
the legal process." "Debt bondage means the status or condition of a debtor arising from a pledge by the
debtor of his or her personal services or of those of a person under his or her control as a security for
debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the
debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined." "Coercion
means (a) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; (b) any scheme, plan or
pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm
to or physical restraint against any person; or, (c) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process."
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 103, Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1464
[hereinafter Victims] (codified as 22 U.S.S. 7101) (emphasis added).
30. "Recruitment, transportation, purchase, sale, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons: (i) by
threat or use of violence, abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion including abuse of authority, or
debt bondage, for the purpose of; (ii) placing or holding such person, whether for pay or not, in forced
labour or slavery-like practices, in a community other than the one in which such person lived at the
time of the original act described in (i)." ECOSOC Report, supra note 23, at T 4.
31. Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28.
AND

32.OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY
CO-OPERATION
IN
EUROPE,
TRAFFICKING
IN
HUMAN
BEINGS
(2007),

http://www.legislationline.org/?tid = 178&jid = I&less=false.
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forced labour, not the actual execution of the intent, that is decisive in determining
the crime of trafficking.33 It is, the extreme degree of coercion with intent for
potential lifetime servitude to an 'owner' who exercises dominion over all aspects
of a person's life will be regarded as defining elements of the process of trafficking
in this paper.
III. LEGAL

INSTRUMENTS AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS

Coercion, use of force or deception with intent to broker human beings via

inter or intra-national transport into exploitative or servile conditions in unfamiliar
and foreign to the victims' locations are key steps of human trafficking pattern.34
Each of these steps entails serious violations of fundamental human rights and
freedoms, such as (a) the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; (b) the right to
liberty and security of person; (c) the right to be free from torture, cruel or
inhumane treatment; (d) freedom of movement; (e) freedom from discrimination;

and (f) the right to life.
International law imposes positive and negative obligations on all the states to
recognize, prevent, ensure, and protect these rights within their territory and
jurisdiction. Consequently, the crime of human trafficking evokes a number of
such obligations inscribed in the fundamental international and regional human
rights instruments described in this Chapter in more detail.
A. InternationalHuman Rights Instruments Against Trafficking

1. Prohibition of Trafficking as a Form of Slavery
Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention defines slavery as: "the status or
condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
In accordance with this definition, slavery entails a
ownership are exercised....
life-long permanent ownership over another human being, who is consequently
deprived of the right to liberty and property. While not meeting all of the criteria
of classic slavery, human trafficking is strikingly similar to it in its allusion to
ownership accompanied by extreme physical and psychological coercion.
The core elements of the act of trafficking, as described in the internationally
accepted definition, is the application of deception, coercion, or use of force for the
purpose of exploitation of the victim often involving severe physical and
psychological abuse.36 The use of deception, coercion, or use of force places the
victim under absolute control of his or her traffickers or owners and deprives him
or her of fundamental rights and freedoms for the entire period of retention in
servitude and thus constitute the condition of slavery. In the context of trafficking,
12-14, 16.
33.ECOSOC Report, supra note 23,
34.Id.
13, 15.
35.Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926
art. 1(1), 60 L.N.T.S. 253; See also Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter
Supplementary Convention].
How

36. See OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
at
(2004),
available
VICTIMS?
TRAFFICKING
CAN
I
RECOGNIZE

http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/34563.htm.
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exploitation of a person subsequent to the act of enslavement often results in full,
albeit non-permanent, ownership, equivalent to slavery.37
Article 8 of The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
provides that no one shall be held in slavery, servitude, or be required to perform
forced or compulsory labor, and awards the prohibition of slavery a non-derogable
character. 38 Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights similarly
establishes an absolute non-derogable prohibition of slavery, forced and
compulsory labor.39 In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
proclaimed that "no one shall be held in slavery or servitude...."4 However, more

than half a century after the complete abolition of slavery by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 41 the problems of slavery and slave-labor have
expanded and evolved beyond their historical characterizations into the
phenomenon of human trafficking.
The debt bondage form of trafficking defined as the condition arising from a
pledge by a debtor of his personal services or those of a person under his control as
security for a debt, if the value of those services is not applied towards the
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not
respectively limited, is specifically outlawed in Article 1 of the Supplementary
Convention to the Slavery Convention. 42 The Supplementary Convention also
contains explicit prohibitions of other forms of human trafficking, such as forced
marriages, transfer of women "for value received or otherwise," and delivery of a
child "to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation
of the child or young person or of his labour." 43 The International Labor
Organization Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor also prohibits
the use of all forms of forced or compulsory labor that trafficked persons similarly
to slaves are forced to perform.
2. Trafficking as a Form of Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
The type of treatment that victims of trafficking are exposed to undoubtedly
constitutes torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. The 1984 Convention
against Torture (CAT) proclaimed that any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or
37. See LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Note, Global Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing the Success of
the United Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv 227, 237
(2003).
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 8, Dec. 16, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6316,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; view confirmed by the International Court of Justice in
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33-34 (Feb. 5) (Second
Phase Judgment).
39. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 4, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (also known as the European Convention on Human Rights) [hereinafter
Protection].
40. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948).
41. Id.
42. Supplementary Convention, supra note 35, art. I.
43. Id.
44. Forced Labour, supra note 18, art. 2..
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degrading treatment or punishment is an offense to human dignity that should be
45
condemned as the violation of the main principles of human rights. ICCPR and
European Human Rights Convention also confirm that no one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 46 Under
international law, states under any circumstances may not tolerate torture or similar
practices or derogate from their duty to prevent and punish torture and inhuman
treatment.47
Involuntary engagement in forced sexual acts evident in prostitution of
trafficked women has been numerously acknowledged as such.48 Rape and
extreme physical maltreatment conducted by persons in position of authority such
as traffickers or 'owners' has been explicitly recognized by the jurisprudence and
Statutes of international tribunals as a form of torture. 49 Although cases in which
trafficking is recognized as inhuman or degrading treatment are still rare, the
European Court of Human Rights has ruled on a few of them,50 thereby
substantiating the linkage between these violations and human trafficking.
3. Trafficking and Discrimination
As noted above, discrimination on various grounds contributes to the
The
proliferation of trafficking both as its root-cause and consequence.
discriminatory policies and practices of governments help to create a climate in
which human rights violations are officially tolerated, if not encouraged, or in
some cases perpetrated by the state actors. 5 1 The principles of equality before the
law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination are at the foundations
of the legal structure of national and international public order. "Discriminatory
treatment of any person, owing to gender, race, color, language, religion or belief,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age,
property, civil status, birth or any other status is
economic situation,
52
unacceptable."
4. Trafficking as Women's and Children's Rights Issue
Since sexual exploitation of women and girls is one of the main purposes of
trafficking, it is undoubtedly a women's rights issue. As mentioned earlier,
discrimination against women in the source countries is one of the main rootcauses of trafficking. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) condemns such discrimination in all

45. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1974, U.N. Doc. A/39/46, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture]..
46. ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 7; Protection, supra note 39, art. 3.
47. ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 4(2).
48. See, e.g.. Aydin v. Turkey, App. No. 23178/94, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 251 (1997).
4,8,10 (Sept. 2,
49. See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment
1998).
50. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 & 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482, 493, 536-7 (1976).
51. ECOSOC Report, supra note 23, 4.
52. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Advisory
Op., OC-18/03, 101 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.cidh.org/migrantes/seriea1I 8_ing.doc.
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53
forms and obliges the States Parties to ensure its complete elimination.
According to the Convention, the States Parties are required to take all appropriate
measures to achieve the elimination of prejudice and stereotyped roles for men and
54
women, thereby ensuring the full development and advancement of women.
Furthermore, CEDAW explicitly requires States Parties to "take all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and
exploitation of prostitution of women. ' ,55 Article 6(1) of the American Convention
on Human Rights (ACHR) and Article 14 of the European Convention also contain
provisions specific to discrimination of women,56 while the rights of trafficked
children are explicitly addressed by the Inter-American Convention on
International Traffic in Minors (1994) 57 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC).58

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides that children shall
be given opportunities and facilities for healthy and adequate physical, mental,
moral, spiritual, and social development with special consideration given to the
children living in exceptionally difficult conditions.59 With respect to trafficking,
the CRC explicitly provides that: "States Parties shall take measures to combat the
illicit transfer and non-return of children abroad[,], '60 as well as protect the children
from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse, 61 abduction, sale, or traffic for any
purpose or of any form.62 Moreover, it requires states to "protect the child from all
forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse,

63

economic

exploitation and performance of work harmful to child's health or "physical,
mental, spiritual, moral or social development," 64 all of which are inherent results
of trafficking.6 5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

53. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 2, Dec.
18, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/180, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
54. Bertrand G. Ramcharan, A Victims' Perspective on the International Human Rights Treaty
Regime, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND 30 (Yael

Danieli et al. eds., Baywood Publishing Company 1999).
55. CEDAW, supra note 53, art. 6.
56. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Protection, supra note 39, art. 14.
57. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on International Traffic in
Minors art. 1, Mar. 18, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. No. 79, 33 I.L.M. 721.
58. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC].
59. Id. art. 3.
60. Id. art. 11.
61. Id. art. 34.
62. Id. art. 35.
63. Id. art. 19(1).
64. Id. art. 32(1).
65. Article 24 of ICCPR and Article 10 of ICESCR require adequate measures of protection from
economic and social exploitation of each child in his status of a minor. Article 10(3) of ICESCR
explicitly requires that special measures of protection and assistance be taken on behalf of all children
and young persons to protect them from economic and social exploitation; employment that may be
harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development.
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also contains a specific provision on protection of children from economic and
social exploitation.66
Trafficking also violates two other absolute prohibitions set by the CRC: (a)
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and (b) unlawful or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 67 Should a child become a victim of exploitation,
abuse, torture, or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, such as trafficking, the states (not only their state of nationality, but
also the state within the jurisdiction of which the child is found) are under an
obligation to take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological
recovery and social reintegration.68
B. InternationalTrafficking Specific Conventions
A number of important regional and international documents specifically
addressing trafficking in human beings set a plethora of international norms and
obligations. Among these, were the early 2 0 th century Convention against White
Slave Traffic, 1951 Trafficking Convention, followed by 2003 UN Convention
against Organized Crime and its Protocol on Trafficking, as well as Special
Protocol on the Sale of Children of the CRC. The transnational treaties and
agreements are supplemented by numerous regional ones, such as Convention on
Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution
(2002) adopted by the member-States of South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC). 6 9 ECOWAS Action Plan and African Charter of Human
and Peoples' Rights 70 also contain important provisions aimed at eliminating
trafficking in human beings in the region. For the purpose of this paper, however,
we shall focus on the specific policies and programs implemented through
international agreements as well as some of the European legislative bodies and
71
agencies.
1. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others and Preceding Agreements.
The international trend to address the crime of trafficking in persons goes
back to 18 May 1904 when the governments of a handful of states came together to
conclude the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave

ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 24; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 10,
Dec. 16, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
66. ICESCR, supra note 65, art. 10(3)..
67. CRC, supra note 58, art. 37.
68. Id. art 39.
69. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Convention on Preventing and Combating
and Children for Prostitution, Jan 5, 2002, available at
in Women
Trafficking
http://www.humantrafficking.org/uploads/publications/SAARCConvention onTrafficking-.Prostit
ution.pdf (adopted by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).
70. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
71. The analysis of European action against trafficking will not include all regional and state
specific programs and policies (the Commonwealth of Independent States and Eastern European
initiatives will not be highlighted); instead, the analysis will focus on some of those affecting the whole
European continent.
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The agreement was followed by the 4 May 1910 International
Traffic.72
Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic,73 the 30 September
1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
Children 74 (amended by the Protocol approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 20 October 1947), and the International Convention of 11
October 1933 for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age.75 The goal
of these agreements was to secure effective protection against the criminal 'white
slave traffic' of women or under-age girls. Consequently, the agreements were
inapplicable to boys or women and girls of color and focused on prostitution as the
main purpose of trafficking.
The 1904 Agreement defined trafficking as the "procuring of women or girls
for immoral purposes abroad," thereby limiting the scope of its application to
international, trans-border traffic. 7 6 "While the agreement obliged [the] states to
adopt measures in the areas of information exchange, identification of victims, and
supervision of employment agencies," no section of it specifically provided for
victims' protection or enhanced law enforcement.7 7 The law enforcement aspect of
trafficking was addressed by the 1910 International Convention for the
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, which urged the states to amend national
legislation to extradite and punish the offenders.78
Although the 1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic
in Women and Children maintained the traditional focus on prostitution and sexual
exploitation, explicit in the earlier agreements, the term "white slave traffic" was
omitted from the title, thereby extending the application of the Convention to
women and children, both girls and boys, of any race. 79
The Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others was approved by General Assembly
Resolution 317(IV) of 2 December 1949 and entered into force 25 July 1951.80
The Convention similarly to the earlier agreements equated human trafficking with
prostitution. 81 It imposed an obligation on the States Parties to instigate criminal
proceedings against "any person who, to gratify the passions of another: (1)

72. Agreement, supra note 18. State-parties included the UK, India, Prussia, Belgium, Spain,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland.
73. Convention, supranote 18.

74. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, Sept. 30,
1921, 96 L.N.T.S. 271 [hereinafter Women and Children]..
75. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, Oct. 11,
1933, 150 L.N.T.S. 431.
76. Agreement, supra note 18, art. 1.
77. TOM OBOKATA, HUMAN TRAFFICKING FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE: TOWARDS A
HOLISTIC APPROACH 14 ( MARTINUS NiJHOFF 2006).

78. Agreement, supra note 18.
79. Women and Children, supra note 74.
80. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 [hereinafter Exploitation] (currently, the
Convention has 14 signatories and 74 state-parties).
81. Id.
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Procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution, another person, even
with the consent of that person; (2) Exploits the prostitution of another person,
even with the consent of that person., 82 The Convention retained the 1921 gender
neutral approach to trafficking. It focused on criminalization of offenders,
trafficking of both men and women for prostitution inter and intra-nationally, but
sex tourism and other forms of
ignored modem forms of prostitution such as
83
marriage.
and
labor
forced
as
such
exploitation
Although providing important steps in criminalizing trafficking, the 1951
Convention and its predecessors failed to prevent its spread. They lacked
universality in ratification and application: the Convention, being the most ratified
instrument of all, only had 74 States Parties. 84 The focus on prostitution as main
motif for trafficking overlooked other purposes and awarded inadequate protection
to the potential victims. The absence of a clear-cut legal definition led to
implementation problems for criminal law specialists and governmental agents,
who equated trafficking with illegal migration and treated its victims in accordance
with the national immigration laws.
2. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime & Additional
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons
The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime & Additional
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 85 was adopted by
the General Assembly of the UN on 15 November 2000 and entered into force 29
September 2003.86 Unlike its predecessors, the Convention is open for signature
not only to states but also to regional economic integration organizations, provided
87
that at least one Member State of such organization has signed the Convention.
Its main purpose is to punish and prevent crimes committed by organized criminal
groups where either the crimes or the groups that commit them have an element of
transnational involvement. Among the measures undertaken by States Parties in
accordance with the Convention are "adoption of domestic legislation and
measures to establish [relevant] criminal offenses; measures to assist and protect
victims and witnesses; frameworks for mutual legal assistance; extradition; law
enforcement cooperation; technical assistance and training provisions. 88
The Convention is supplemented by two additional protocols of direct
relevance to the crime of trafficking-one against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land Sea and Air and another to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
82. Id. art. 1.
83. Laura Reanda, Prostitutionas a Human Rights Question, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 202, 210 (1991).
84. See Exploitation, supra note 80.
85. See Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28.
86. The Protocol currently has 147 signatories and 133 state-parties from all regions and
continents. Id.
87. Id. art. 36.
88. Valerie Wahl, Trafficking in Human Beings for the Purposes of Sexual Exploitation-Legal
Challenges in the Fight Against Modern Slavery in Crisis Regions: A Case Study of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,

in

PRACTICE AND POLICIES OF MODERN PEACE

SUPPORT OPERATIONS

INTERNATIONAL LAW 229 (Roberta Arnold & Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops eds., 2006).

UNDER

2008

SHARED BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY

Persons, especially Women and Children. 89 Although the Migrants Protocol has
some relevance to the issue in discussion, as it addresses the problem of organized
criminal groups smuggling migrants across the borders, it is the Trafficking
Protocol that will be discussed here in more detail.
Adopted by the General Assembly, the Protocol 9° came into force on 25
December 2003 and currently has 93 parties (states and organizations) and 117
signatories. 91 It sets international legal standards on criminal characterization of
the crime of trafficking, makes suggestions on the severity of criminal punishment
for the trafficking offenses, as well as provides benchmarks for anti-trafficking
preventive policies and effective human rights measures to protect the victims. 92 It
contains provisions ensuring that trafficked persons are treated as victims and not
as criminals, and, therefore, assigns them specific human rights protections,
regardless of their origin, race, religion, occupation, or other characteristics.93
These measures are direct reflection of already existent international human rights
and criminal law norms that States have an obligation to respect and enforce.
Thereby, the Protocol does not establish a new category of rights, but sets out
specific measures aimed at enforcing the existing ones.
Article 3 of the Protocol introduces the first comprehensive international
definition of Trafficking in Human Beings and exploitation for the purposes of
trafficking.94 The definition awards the status of victims of trafficking to all
persons, men and women, recruited, transported or transferred by the means of
coercion, deception, threat or use of force for the purpose of exploitation of sexual
or other nature with or without their initial consent. According to the Protocol,
traffic of children occurs in all the cases where "recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of [a child]... for the purpose of exploitation" is
involved even in situations where coercion or threat against the victims is not
95
applied.
The definition regards as trafficking all steps in the process: "transportation,
transferring and harboring, for the purposes of exploitation., 96 Its provisions are
not gender-specific and thus recognize that trafficking affects both genders

89. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex III, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Nov. 15, 2000); Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28.
90. See Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28.
91. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (TOC) (Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/56006.htm.
92. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, UNODC and Human Trafficking,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
93. These rights include temporary resident status, temporary shelter, medical and psychological
services, access to justice, compensation, and restitution. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime,
Protecting
Victims
of
Human
Trafficking,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/humantrafficking/protection.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
94. Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28, art. 3.
95. Id.
96. Bruce Oswald & Sarah Finnin, Combating the Trafficking of Persons on Peace Operations,in
10 INT'L PEACEKEEPING: THE Y.B OF INT'L PEACE OPERATIONS 1,5 (2006).
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equally. It does not require cross-border movement and thereby includes within its
scope of application the internal in-country traffic. However, being a supplement
to the framework Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol can
only be applied to the offences of transnational character, i.e. those that either
involve cross-border transfer of victims, are committed by foreign nationals on the
territory of the given state, or as part of a larger transnational organized crime
scheme.97
3. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography
Another international document worth noting in this section is the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.98 The main purpose of the Protocol, as
described in its Preamble, is addressing "significant and increasing international
traffic in children for the purpose of the sale of children, child prostitution and
child pornography... " through the adoption of"a holistic approach, addressing the
contributing factors, including underdevelopment, poverty, economic disparities,
inequitable socio-economic structure, dysfunctioning families, lack of education,
urban-rural migration, gender discrimination, irresponsible adult sexual behaviour,
harmful traditional practices, [and] armed conflicts and trafficking in
children.... 99 To this effect, the Protocol prohibits: (a) sale of children, defined as
"any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of
persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration;"100 (b) child
prostitution, defined as "the use of a child in sexual activities for remuneration or
any other form of consideration;" '1 11 and (c) child pornography, i.e. "any
representation, by whatever means, of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit
sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily
sexual purposes. 10 2
The Protocol maintains a predominantly criminal law approach, evidenced by
the Article 3(1), which requires the States Parties to ensure national criminal
liability for the acts related to international or domestic sale of children, including
attempt to commit and complicity for participation, offering, delivering or
accepting a child for the purpose of sexual exploitation; organs sales; engagement
a child in prostitution or production and
in forced labor; illegal adoption; engaging
03
dissemination of child pornography.

97. Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28, arts. 1, 4.
98. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution, and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (Jan. 18, 2002)
[hereinafter Child Prostitution].
99. Id.at pmbl.
100. Id. arts. 1, 2(a).
101. Id. art. 2(b).
102. Id. art. 2(c).
103. Id. art. (3)(1).
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C. Case-Study: Europe
European continent, represented by the Council of Europe (CoE), is an
interesting example of a region divided into various political and economic entities
and hosting receiving, transit and shipping segments of the trafficking chain.
Europe has witnessed a substantial increase in trafficking since the collapse of the
Men, women, and children from Eastern Europe found
Soviet Union.104
numerous brothels and sweatshops, engaged in prostitution,
in
trapped
themselves
10 5
sale of organs, and pornographic materials in the West.
labor,
slave and bonded
In order to suppress the future spread of human trafficking European States
have traditionally put much emphasis on co-operation in criminal matters. In
doing so they have often relied on regional instruments to suppress the act of
trafficking, such as the European Convention on Extradition and its Additional
Protocols10 6 and the Europol Convention, as well as more general treaties
containing relevant provisions, such as the Treaty of Amsterdam and European
Convention on Human Rights. 0 7 Although co-operation in criminal matters still
remains an important aspect of the European anti-trafficking policies, the recent
policies of the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU), experienced a
significant shift towards the protection of human rights of the victims.l8
1. Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human
Beings
A plethora of agreements, resolutions and programs was implemented by the
Council of Europe to fight trafficking in human beings. Among these, a central
place is occupied by the two conventions briefly discussed in this paper: the
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 0 9 and 1the
0
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.
The 2005 Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings is a
comprehensive treaty aimed to "protect the human rights of the victims of
trafficking, design a comprehensive framework for the protection and assistance of
victims and witnesses, while guaranteeing gender equality, as well as to ensure
effective investigation and prosecution."' 11 It contains a number of provisions to

104. Ryszard Piotrowicz, The UNHCR's Guidelines on Human Trafficking, 20 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
242, 242 (2008).
105. Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and The
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J. 207, 218, 225, 237, 249-50 (2007).
106. Tom Obokata, 'Trafficking' and 'Smuggling' of Human Beings in Europe: Protection of
Individual Rights or States' Interests?, 5 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2001),
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issue5/obok5.html.
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Protocol No. 8 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done Mar. 19,
1985, 1604 U.N.T.S. 271.
110. Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, opened for signature May 16,
2005, Europ. T.S. 197.
111, Id. art. Il(1)(b).
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prevent trafficking in the supply countries as well as discourage the demand for
trafficking on the recipient end. 1 2 It applies to all forms of trafficking, national or
transnational, whether or not connected to organized crime involving persons
legally and illegally residing in the country. The Convention also applies
regardless of whether the victims are women, men, or children or whether their
nature.' 1 3
exploitation is of sexual, forced labor, slavery, servitude or organ trade
Consequently, it creates a different, more comprehensive and all-inclusive
definition of the phenomenon, which states that 'trafficking in human beings'
shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or
14
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.'
Article 4 of the Convention establishes three conditions that must be present
simultaneously for trafficking of adults to occur: action, means, and purpose.
When it comes to children, however, "recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation" constitutes a
sufficient trafficking threshold, according to the Convention.' 15
When compared to other international anti-trafficking instruments, the
Convention contains a number of revolutionary features that target all forms of the
trafficking sequence and aim to protect and prosecute all parties involved. As
noted in its commentary, it is the first international binding document that
explicitly recognized human trafficking as a violation of human rights and focuses
primarily on assistance to victims and protection of their rights." 16 Additionally,
unlike its international predecessors, the Convention establishes an independent
monitoring mechanism, a Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in
17
Human Beings (GRETA), charged with monitoring its implementation.
Furthermore, as a regional instrument with a higher degree of applicability and
justiciability than international treaties, the Convention recognizes the need for
truly international efforts to combat trafficking and therefore attempts at creating

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. art. 5-6.
Id. arts. 2,4.
Id. art. 4(a).
Id. art. 4(c); see also

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON ACTION

57 (2005), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dg2/trafficking/campaign/Source/PDFConv 197 Trafficking-E.pdf [hereinafter
Explanatory Report].
116. Although the degree to which it is binding is severely damaged by currently low number of
ratifications and consequent lack of justiciability of the Treaty in the absence of the required number of
ratifications necessary for its entry into force. See Explanatory Report, supra note 115, 51.
117. Id. 51, 59.
AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS AND ITS EXPLANATORY REPORT
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an international regime of human rights protection and criminalization of
trafficking by allowing non-European States as parties. 18
IV. PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND STATES' RESPONSIBILITY

A. Human Rights Law and Norms of.Jus Cogens
Prior to discussing the applicability of human rights law and its particular
normative structure to human trafficking, one must clearly understand the purpose
of human rights, the very idea of which presupposes a certain concept of the
human being whose rights are being protected. By assigning legal entitlements to
every person regardless of gender, age, color, or occupation, the international
community recognized the dignity of every person, which is to be respected under
any circumstances."' 9 Human rights are, therefore, "rights which a person enjoys
1 20
by virtue of being human, without any supplementary condition being required.
The domain of human rights under the international law includes two
categories of rights: fundamental and secondary rights. 21 The fundamental human
rights category includes the rights that are non-derogable. 122 They form the
peremptory norms of general international law, embodied in the notions of jus
cogens and erga omnes. 123 The norms of jus cogens introduce a category of
imperative uncontestable international law existent in contrast to jus
dispositivum,124 and include the right to life, prohibition of torture, "genocide,
force, and
slavery, racial discrimination, aggression, the acquisition of territory by
125
the forcible suppression of the right of peoples to self-determination."'
B. Obligations Under Human Rights Treaties
Violations contained in the crime of trafficking lead to direct infringement of a
number of these non-derogable rights and appeals to specific obligations of the
international community and all of its members on the basis of treaty and
customary international law.12 6 The 'universal' acceptance of general rules of

118. Id.
30, 381. Instead of limiting its scope to State-Parties of the Council of Europe, the
Convention was envisioned as a truly international instrument, with its membership being available not
only to member States, but also to States directly involved in its drafting, that of Canada, Holy See,
Japan, Mexico and the United States.
119. The principle of 'human dignity' is implicitly expressed in the Preamble of the UDHR:
"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
Universal
"
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 40, at pmbl.
120. CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS:

BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 3 (Philip

Alston, Grainne de Bairca, & Bruno de Witte, eds., Oxford University Press 2003).
121. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (Vaughan

Lowe ed., Oxford University Press 2006).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 8, 268-70.
124. Id. at 53-54.
125. Id. at 54.
126. See id. at 53-58. While multilateral treaties on any given issue bind only those States that
ratify them, customary international rules bind all State-parties unless one of them acted as a persistent
objector during the rule's formation. The rule of the persistent objector is inapplicable to the formation
of non-derogable peremptory norms ofjus cogens.
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customary international law justifies the erga omnes character of the obligations,
thereby recognizing that all states have a collective interest to stop and prevent acts
that are delictajurisgentium. 127The provisions of the Universal Declaration and
the two Covenants, together with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, form the core of customary international human rights
law.128 Being widely accepted among the States, the provisions of these
instruments become the norms of customary international law, and in theory
generate obligations binding even non-signatory states.
In practice, however, the degree to which these instruments are binding varies
considerably.
Although, regional treaty regimes, such as the European or
American systems, have strong enforcement capabilities from within the regions,
their systems have limited potential for enforcing trafficking prohibitions
worldwide. 129 Evidently, the rights constituting the core of ICCPR imply strict
obligations, some of jus cogens statute, which States Parties are obliged to abide
by. However, almost all of the rights contained in the Covenant are accompanied
by limitation clauses which permit reduction in their scope in accordance with the
strict requirement of proportionality. Moreover, the Covenant has allowed a
number of reservations applicable to all but non-derogable civil and political
rights. Additionally, strict applicability, judiciability and binding power of the
provisions of ICCPR are limited by the magnitude of its ratification status. Despite
that, the Covenant has been widely recognized by 13the
states, it currently has 67
0
signatories (including China) and 153 States Parties.
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights currently has 68
signatories and 159 Parties, with Pakistan, South Africa, and the USA remaining as
non-parties.
Since economic and social rights are "context-dependent" on the
state being the potent provider of these rights, their application is limited by the
scarcity of available resources. 132 Furthermore, the rights to education, health,
work, etc. gain legal stature only once the fundamental rights (to life, liberty,

127. See Yasmine Rassam, ContemporaryForms of Slavery and the Evolution of the Prohibitionof
Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary InternationalLaw, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 303, 307 (1999).
"In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary
international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, [and] as also from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination." Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
32 (Feb. 5) (Second Phase Judgment).
128.TOMUSCHAT, supra note 120, at 32.
129.Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 32, Nov. 4,
1950, Europ.T.S. 5.
130.ICCPR, supra note 38; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES [N FORCE 85 (2007), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89668.pdf (listing the parties adopting the Covenants).
131.See ICESCR, supra note 66; see also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Sept. 26, 2008,
available at http:www 2 .ohchr.org/English/bodies/ratification/3.htm (listing information regarding
signatories and parties).
132.TOMUSCHAT, supra note 120, at 39.
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movement, security, freedom from slavery and torture and non-discrimination) are
fully achieved.
The rights of the child included in the International Convention on the Rights
of the Child form a special category of rights. Due to its practically universal
acceptance, the CRC and its two Additional Protocols created a universal binding
rule of international law which prohibits child labor and outlaws the sale of
children, child prostitution and pornography and the use of children in armed
conflict. 133
Although the international community has given a lot of attention to the rights
of the 'third generation' such as freedom from poverty, right to development,
etc.,1 34 these rights do evoke binding obligations of the states and retain their
political, recommendatory character. Recognized as important in achieving high
standards of living and preventing such massive human rights violations, as human
trafficking, they are non-universal, non-binding or justiciable on international
level. Their justiciability remains within the discretion of state sovereignty and
state margin of appreciation.
Also, norms establishing the legal basis for equality and non-discrimination
provide "a legal standard which is intimately related to the very concept of human
rights" and thereby create their own category of international human rights
norms. 135 They are indispensable for the realization of many of the fundamental as
well as the majority of social and economic rights and thereby require high degree
of enforcement.
C. States Responsibilityfor Violations of Human Rights Obligations
"Legal rules, unlike rules of morality or ethics, are not addressed solely to
human conscience. Since they are committed to the care of the public authorities of
the community concerned, they are, or should be, vigorously defended, and
sanctions should be imposed on anyone committing a breach.', 136 Enforcement
under international law entails state responsibility137triggering a state to cease its
wrongful conduct and to remedy its consequences.
As provided by the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of the States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State
entails the international responsibility of that State.', 138 However, in cases of
human trafficking, can an act of an individual or criminal network be attributed to
a particular state? The Draft Articles stipulate that an act is attributable to the
given state "when conduct consisting of an action or omission (a) is attributable to
the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international
133.CRC, supra note 58, arts. 34-35, 38-39.
134.See, e.g., Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 55/2
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000).
135.ToMUSCHAT, supra note 120, at 41.
136.4d. at 1.
137.CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING

11-20, U.N. Doc.

OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5

(2005).

138.Draft Articles on the Responsibility of the States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83, U.N. Doc. A56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4 (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
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obligation of the State" 139 The Articles also provide that a breach of an obligation
of peremptory norm by a state is considered serious if it "involves a gross or
40
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfill the obligation,"'1 evidenced
by the scope and magnitude of trafficking worldwide.
In cases where violations of human rights reach exceptionally high
proportions, where they may even be classified as crimes against humanity, the
individual criminal responsibility must be complemented with the responsibility of
the state, often that of positive nature. The state responsibility under international
law is evoked in cases where state authorities fail or neglect to protect their
the violations or punish the perpetrators and apply penal
citizens, prevent
141
sanctions.
Therefore, if trafficking or the events and conditions leading to the act of
trafficking as well as violations occurring during the process of trafficking and
subsequent exploitation are established as states' 'omissions' to prevent this
conduct, they are to be considered internationally wrongful acts that evoke
responsibility of the states involved. 142 Human rights violations may arise from an
action of any authority, official, agent, or person who de jure or de facto is a
member of the state authorities, or from an omission of the state's duty to abide by
and meet the conditions necessary 43for the effective and general, nondiscriminatory, respect of human rights.
Should an internationally wrongful act occur, the Draft Articles continue, the
responsible state(s) is under an obligation to provide measures for immediate
cessation and non-repetition as well as relevant reparations as proscribed by the
international law.' 44 The responsibility of the state in reparation of the human
rights violation is not criminal in nature. Traditionally, in human rights cases
before the international courts, the responsibility established does not entail the
punishment of the offender, instead, it entails that the guarantees for the exercise of
and rootthe violated rights are safeguarded in the future, that their consequences
45
causes are remedied and that relevant indemnifications are paid. 1
V. PRINCIPLES OF STATES RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

International human rights instruments impose a duty upon the states to
respect and ensure respect for human rights law, which entails the duty to prevent
and investigate violations, to take appropriate action against violators and to afford
remedies and reparation to those who have been injured as a consequence of such
violations. Together, these duties constitute the state's responsibility to act with

139.Id. arts. 1-2.
140.Id. art. 40.
141.1d. art 42.
142.1d. art. 15.
143.Hector Gros Espiell, International Responsibility of the State and Individual Criminal
Responsibility in the International Protection of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 153 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., Martinus Nijhoff

2005).
144.Draft Articles, supra note 138, arts. 29-31.
145.Espiell, supra note 143, at 152.
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due diligence to "prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights
recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the
right violated and provide compensation as warranted by the damages resulting
from the violation.' 46 Such 'due diligence' standard has been widely accepted as
the measure by which state responsibility for violations of human rights by non147
state actors is measured.
This principle, supported by the Protocol to the CRC Convention, invokes an
explicit obligation of the states to ensure "prevention, detection, investigation,
prosecution and punishment of those responsible for acts involving the sale of
children, child prostitution, child pornography and child sex tourism," including
providing international assistance to the victims and alleviating the root causes of
the crimes against children. 148 European Court of Human Rights has similarly
interpreted the obligations under the European Convention to include the duty of
each Contracting State to:
[S]ecure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in... [the] Convention"; hence, if a violation of one of those
rights and freedoms is the result of non-observance of that obligation in
the enactment of domestic legislation, the responsibility of the State for
that violation is engaged.... The responsibility of the respondent State
for any resultant breach of the Convention is thus engaged on this
basis. 149
A. Obligation to Prevent-Addressingthe Root-causes of Trafficking
The notion of positive obligations is supported by the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility and jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals and
constitutes one of the main assertions of human rights law and international law in
general.1 50 The sheer magnitude of the problem of human trafficking' 5 leads us to
believe that the process itself and the crimes it involves justify the conclusion that
a threat to life and well-being of certain particularly vulnerable populations exists.
The very existence of such 'reason to believe' puts the states involved under an
obligation to fight poverty and discrimination as causes of trafficking. Poverty
reduction calls upon the obligation of the states to provide for medical care,
education, foodstuffs and basic housing, which if not implemented may incur

146.Veldsquez-Rodriquez v. Uruguay, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at 166.
147.See generally ECOSOC Report, supra note 18. Reports of Special Rapporteurs on Violence
against Women, on torture, on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, and on the use of
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to
self-determination; by treaty bodies such as the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; by expert group meetings such as the meeting on children and juveniles in detention; in
resolutions and declarations, particularly on violence against women.
148.Child Prostitution, supra note 98, art. 10.
149.Young James and Websters v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49 (1981).
150.See, e.g., Osman v. United Kingdom, 101 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998) (discussing the notion of
positive obligations).
151.600,000-800,000 people trafficked every year according to the U.S. D. of State. TIP REPORT,
supra note 7, at 6.
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accountability for violations.15 2 It also requires receiving states and states of transit
cultural rights. 153
to co-operate to ensure full realization of economic, social and
In the context of human trafficking, the insurance of such positive obligations
is mostly applicable to the initial phase, precluding the actual execution of the act
of trafficking. In other words, it implies the states' duty to address the root-causes
of trafficking in order to prevent the violations from occurring. The failure of
national authorities to prevent foreseeable violations of human rights, such as
trafficking from impoverished or war-torn areas, constitutes a direct breach of the
obligations of the States Parties to the European Convention as well as
international obligations under customary international and treaty law and evokes
direct state responsibility.
Among the roots of trafficking, poverty, lack of opportunity, economic
stagnation, are embodied in the ICESCR, which by "recognizing the fundamental
right of everyone to be free from hunger" imposes an obligation on States Parties
to take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures,
including specific programs, which are needed to (a) improve methods of food
production, conservation and distribution through dissemination of relevant
knowledge; and1 54(b) ensuring equitable distribution of world food supplies in
relation to need.
Discrimination (racial, religious, and gender) and violence against women are
also among the root-causes of trafficking. Therefore, to prevent human rights
violations from occurring, the States Parties are obliged to "undertake to ensure the
equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights. 1 5
However, such measures must not be left for the source states to solve alone.
Trafficking constitutes an international, transboundary criminal act that involves
every country in the world, and therefore involves universal responsibility of all
the states. Therefore, in accordance with human rights instruments as well as
trafficking-specific conventions, states are under an obligation to take steps
individually and through international assistance and cooperation to the maximum
of protective human
of their available resources to ensure full implementation
1 56
rights measures that would fight trafficking from its roots.
B. Obligation to Investigate andPunish the Offenders

The obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish the offenders is the key
feature of the rule of law. In case of trafficking, it refers to obligations of the states
to criminalize the conduct of traffickers, pass necessary legislation and other
measures to ensure such criminalization, coordinate information, provide sufficient
training for law enforcement agents, cooperate in border control for the purpose of

152.OBOKATA, supra note 77, at 162.
153.ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 2; Comm'n. on Econ. Soc. and Cultural Rights [ECOSOC],
General Comment 3, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991).
154.ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 11.
155.ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 3.
156.Protection, supra note 39, art. 1.
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prevention, and provide access to justice for the victims and traffickers.' 5 7 This
obligation embodies the law enforcement strategies traditionally favored by the
states. The integral part of the state obligation to investigate the offenses and
punish the perpetrators is to ensure victims' direct access to justice and
participation in the investigation and judicial process against traffickers.
C. Obligation to Provide Remedies to the Victims
In the context of trafficking, "[s]tates have a responsibility to provide
protections to trafficked persons pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and through ratification or accession to numerous international
and regional instruments,"' 58 rules of opiniojuris, and customary international law.
The duty to ensure the rights of the victims of trafficking is an international
obligation of erga omnes character. 159 "To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy" is the
160
primary purpose of international human rights, and consequently, criminal law.
International law grants victims the right to justice and it is the responsibility of
each state to ensure this right by inter alia allowing for adequate, meaningful and
direct participation in relevant judicial proceedings, providing for representation,
protection and physical and psychological rehabilitation and assistance. 161
Protection of victims as an obligation to provide psychological assistance,
educational and vocational training, temporary or permanent residence permits is
explicit in the Trafficking Protocol as well as regional Conventions and measures
adopted against trafficking. 162 Since the initial act of trafficking is the direct result
law
of states' failure to protect citizens from human rights violations, international 163
demands states to ensure that the adequate compensation is paid to the victims.

157.See, e.g., Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28, art. 9-11 (enumerating responsibilities of State
Parties to further the goals of investigation, prosecution, and punishment of offenders).
158.GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST TRAFFIC IN WOMEN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS FOR
THE TREATMENT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS 1, (1999). Such protections are found in the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the Slavery Convention, the Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to
Slavery, and International Labour Organization Conventions No. 29 concerning Forced Labour and No.
105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour. Id. at 1, n.l.
159.The U.N. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,
defines victims as "persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights,
through acts or omissions that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws but of
internationally recognized norms relating to human rights." Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/30, 96th plen. mtg.,U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34,
Annex 1 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter Justice].
160.ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 2(2)(a).
161 .Justice, supra note 159, Annex, 6 (a)-(e).
162.Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28, arts. 2(b), 6-7.
163.See Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988);
X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1997); Draft Articles,
supra note 140, art. 34.
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However, trafficking involves extremely sensitive issues. Its victims are often
subjected to psychological and physical abuse as well as xenophobia and
persecution in the host countries. 164 By taking away their documents and
identities, and restricting their freedom of movement, traffickers deter or prevent
the victims' attempts to report their situations to local authorities. 165 The victims
are often afraid of the measures that the local authorities may take against them as
illegal migrants; afraid of possible retaliation by the traffickers in response to their
testimonies; and significantly damaged psychologically and physically to become
active participants in the trials against traffickers. 166 In cases of trafficking for
marriage, for example, women victims of domestic violence and marital rape are
unable to seek assistance of police or the judiciary as such publicity would make
167
them subject to immediate deportation.
Therefore, their access to justice and remedies has to be tailored by
recognition of their special needs and must involve a somewhat different set of
provisions of criminal, human rights and refugee law. The states where victims are
rescued or apprehended have a special duty to ensure their safety, protection and
rehabilitation inherent in the principle of non-refoulement.168
D. Principleof Non-Refoulement
This Principle has traditionally been applied to persons outside their countries
who qualified for the status of refugees under the Refugee Convention of 1951.169
According to the Convention and customary international law, a refugee is a
person who is outside the country of his nationality or, "in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any state in which he last habitually resided, and is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of, the
protection of that country, because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion. 170 In situations where such well-founded fear
of persecution exists, the states have accepted the obligation to retain the victim on
their territory.' 7 ' This obligation supersedes state sovereignty, the basic premise of

164.OBOKATA, supra note 77, at 126.
165.Potts, supra note 37, at 229-230.
166.OB3OKATA, supra note 77, at 126.
167.Ryszard Piotrowicz, Victims of People Trafficking and Entitlement to InternationalProtection,
24 AUSTL. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 159, 162, 164, n.27 (2005).
168.Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 1989 U.N.T.S. 150.
169.Id.
170.Anton Katz, Refugees, in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (John

Dugard ed., 2005).
171.Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Lyudmyla Dzhygun, App. No. CC-5062799(00TH00728), April 13, 2000 (Immigration App. Trib. 2000). Immigration Appeal Tribunal
recognized that the respondent belonged to a particular social group under the definition of a refugee;
see also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 168, art. 1. The Chamber ruled that
in case of the woman trafficked for prostitution to the UK from Ukraine, the government of the Ukraine
failed to protect her and made it more likely for her to be persecuted by traffickers if she was returned
to the Ukraine.
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international law, and allows for the domination of international human rights
72
norms over national sovereignty. 1
Applicable also in cases of founded fear of torture or in response to
perpetrated inhuman or degrading treatment, 73 non-refoulement has been
incorporated in the national legislations of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the
US, and has been widely applied in various international anti-trafficking
conventions.74 The EU Framework Decision and relevant Directives, require the
EU members to issue temporary residence permits in exchange for victims' cooperation with law enforcement authorities to investigate, prosecute and punish
traffickers. 175 The Trafficking Protocol only recommends that similar measures
are established. 76 Article 14 of the Protocol provides that the provisions on
repatriation of trafficking victims must not be applied without due regard for the
victims' entitlement to177non-refoulement under the refugee law or other existing
international standards.
The option of voluntary repatriation derives from the right of the individual to
freely return to his or her state of origin enshrined in international human rights
instruments

of

ICCPR, 178

ACHR, 179

CERD, 180

and

Migrant

Workers'

Convention. 181

If the victims wish to return, their repatriation must be facilitated
by all the states involved. Moreover, once returned the states of origin must ensure
that the victims are reintegrated into their society through programs of physical and
psychological
support, education and training, and protection from retaliation by
82
traffickers.

172.But see Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Naidenov v. Minister of Home Affairs,
[1995] (7) BCLR 891 (T) (S. Aft.) (providing examples of courts not meeting the proposed obligation).
173.Bensaid v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44599/98, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10, 34 (2001); Mohammed
Lemine Ould Barar v. Sweden, App. No. 42367/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 19, 1999) (unreported); Asylum
Applicant on Grounds of Non-state Sanctioned Slavery, Case Comment, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 330
(1999).
174.Victims, supra note 29, § 107.
175.Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (EC) No.
2002/629/JHA of July 19, 2002 O.J. (L 203) 1.
176.Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28, arts. 5-6.
177.Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal
Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1143, 1152 (2003).
See also Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28, art. 14.
178.ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 12.
179.American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 56, art. 22(5).
180.Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted By Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\I\Rev.6 at 211 (May 12, 2003).
181 .International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, at 263, 96th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).
182.U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, The Right to Restitution,
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62/Annex (Jan. 18,
2000) (prepared by M. Cherif Bassiouni).
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VI. COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES: SOLUTIONS TO THE RIDDLE
OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

As noted above, trafficking sequence involves two distinct but interdependent
phases: that of the act of trafficking and the subsequent exploitation such act
aspires. Both phases of the sequence involve grave violations of human rights that
evoke various obligations of the states in accordance with international customary
and treaty law, as well as general principles. Although the violations occurring
during each of the steps often overlap, they involve different sets of actors and
therefore remain distinctly different from each other.
The act of trafficking itself is the moment when coercion, deceit or use of
force is applied by the trafficker on a person in order to lure him or her into
trafficking. The actors at this stage are the trafficker or criminal enterprise of
traffickers, their victim, as well as the authorities of the state of origin, where the
'seduction' occurs. This stage is characterized by a set of legal obligations that the
state holds to (a) prevent the act of trafficking from occurring; (b) protect the most
vulnerable population by relieving the root-causes of trafficking such as poverty
and discrimination; and (c) ensure criminal responsibility of the perpetrators. The
states of potential destination also have a responsibility at this stage to assist the
source states in accomplishing their responsibilities to prevent the crime of
trafficking. They are also under an international obligation to ensure cooperation
on criminal matters that would ensure all persons involved in criminal trafficking
enterprise not to escape justice.
The remaining two stages of the trafficking sequence: (1) the transit of the
victims from the state of origin (2) through transit states (3) to the state of
destination, involve the same main actors: the trafficker and the victim.183 The
sequence as such is, however, aided by the (a) participation of corrupt officials in
source, transit and destination states who facilitate the process of trafficking
through necessary legal and immigration papers; (b) networks of potential
,employers' who either buy the traffickers' victims for exploitation or facilitate
their distribution; (c) the authorities of the state of transit and destination.1 8 4 In the
respect to the victims of trafficking, the second stage of the trafficking sequence
has traditionally focused on the criminal aspects of the states' obligations.185 The
states authorities have equated the trafficking victims with illegal migrants, and
while ignoring the traffickers' crimes and granting them
punished them as such,
186
complete impunity.
In order for anti-trafficking campaigns and programs to become effective, the
states' response to victims at the transit and final stages must shift from criminal to
human rights and victims' protection provided on the basis of already existent
obligations inherent in international human rights, criminal and refugee law. In

183. OBOKATA, supra note 77, at 124-125 (describing the various methods and processes of
trafficking).
184.Id. at 124-126.
185.Id. at 148.
186.Id at 22-23.
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other words, successful anti-trafficking strategy must be based on the differentiated
notions of states responsibilities and obligations, applicable in accordance with the
phases of trafficking process. Such responsibilities include obligations under the
human rights, criminal and refugee branches of international law.
A. Application ofRefugee Law
"International law does not recognize a general category of forced or
involuntary migrant," but a fairly elaborate regime has been established for the
international protection of refugees and for victims of torture.' 87 Under the 1984
Torture Convention, states commit themselves not to return a person to the country
of origin in cases where "there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture." '1 88 ICCPR Article 7 also contains an
implicit non-refoulement obligation for the persons facing torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.' 89 Similarly, the European
Human Rights Convention has been interpreted to prohibit the return of a person to
a state in cases when the real risk of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment
and punishment exists. 190 Allowing for the principle of non-refoulement to
become a part of the institutionalized response to human trafficking would
promote the victims to come forward and instigate proceedings against their
traffickers without fearing persecution by the local authorities for their nondocumented illegal status.
The Additional Protocol on Human Trafficking contains specific provisions
discussing the possibility of assigning a refugee status and consequent possible
naturalization of the victims of trafficking by the recipient states.191 It requires
parties to adopt measures to assist the victims, including, possibly, permitting them
to remain on their territory.' 92 By allowing for the possibility of non-repatriation,
the Protocol recognizes that there may be no option for the victim to return to the
state of origin, parallel to the provisions of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees of 195 1.193 Similar to the Refugee Convention, the Trafficking Protocol
is based on the premise that victims' protection must be provided by the state of
nationality or legal residence of the victims. Only unavailability of such protection
leads to the state obligation to consider granting victims asylum. 194

187,T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms and Migration: a Report, in MIGRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS, 10 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., T.M.C.
Asser 2003).
188.Torture, supra note 45, art. 3 (containing an absolute prohibition of refoulement).
189.ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 7.
190.Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 90-91 (1989); Chahal v. United
Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413, 454-55 (1996).
191 .Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28, art. 14.
192.Id. art. 7.
193.Id. art. 8; see also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 168, arts. 7-8.
194.Piotrowicz, supra note 167, at 162.
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According to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention a refugee is someone
who:
owing to a well-founded.fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.' 95
For the purposes of trafficking, the elements of well-founded fear,
membership of a particular social group and location outside the country of
nationality or permanent residence are especially pertinent. For returning victims
of trafficking with their past known to the society, the "fear of rejection or
ostracism may well amount to a fear of persecution, depending on the society from
which he or she originates."' 96 The triggering of the Refugee Convention in these
of their fear of
cases will solely depend on the severity and well-foundedness
197
experience.
trafficking
victim's
the
from
derived
persecution
Additionally, the Refugee Convention may apply to the victims of trafficking
through their membership of a particular social or political group: "A particular
social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than
their risk of being persecuted, and which sets them apart. The characteristic will
is innate, unchangeable or which is otherwise fundamental
ordinarily be one that 198
to human dignity.... "
It may be argued that trafficked persons, especially those trafficked for the
purposes of sexual exploitation, form a special social group ostracized by the
communities of their home states. This view has been supported by multiple cases
ruling that former sex trade workers constituted a particular social group on the
basis of them having been trafficked for social exploitation from a one given
state. 199
Some of the victims have become trafficked due to the widespread
discrimination against them on the basis of their race, religion, or nationality. In
cases where the applicant for international protection is a woman, "account shall
be taken of the fact that persecution, within the meaning of the Geneva

195.Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 168, art. 1(A)(2) (emphasis added).
196.Piotrowicz, supra note 167, at 167 (noting that upon her return, a victim of sex trafficking may
be ostracized by her family or community as the result of her involvement in sex trade).

197.1d.
198.United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Summary Conclusions: Membership of a
ParticularSocial Group, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 312-14 (Erika Feller et al.
eds., 2003) (emphasis added).
199.Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't and Ex Parte Shah, 2. A.C. 629, 652 (H.L. 1999)
(appeals taken from Court of Appeal); Immigration and Refugee Board Case, [1999] T98-06186 (Can.);
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Lyudmyla Dzhygun, App. No. CC-50627-99(00TH00728), April
13, 2000 (Immigration App. Trib. 2000); Appellant v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case No.
200 3
)(Immigration App. Trib. 2003); Petition of Olga Shimkova, Home
UKIAT 00023, 14 (July 7,
Department Letter of June 13, 2002, 62 (Outer House, Court of Session, Dec. 23, 2003).
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Convention, may be effected through sexual violence or other gender-specific
means." 200 In such situations, where women as a group are persecuted against, the
persecution ground "'membership of a particular social group' could apply,"
triggering the application of the Refugee Convention .20t
The identity of the trafficked persons, their gender and conditions under
which they have been trafficked and abused represent unchangeable facts that lead
to a strong possibility of their further persecution if returned home. Furthermore,
the membership of these women in the given social group of forcefully trafficked
for sexual exploitation women is not resulting from their voluntary decisions.
Their involuntary status is an innate and unchangeable condition that according to
UNHCR standards calls to the international responsibility for protection and nonrepatriation.
B. InternationalCriminalLaw Implications
Trafficking weakens the territorial integrity of states through violations of
criminal and immigration laws. It also undermines the rule of law and political
foundations through widespread violence and corruption employed by trafficking
groups. The Trafficking Protocol, its Framework Convention, as well as the
European Union, OSCE initiatives-and virtually all of the recently passed antitrafficking laws and directives-seek to strengthen the criminal justice response
through tighter crime and immigration control enhanced by larger states'
202
cooperation.
Availability and implementation of adequate laws to identify trafficking as a
criminal offence and prescribe realistic penalties is a necessary step towards the
establishment of workable anti-trafficking policies. Policy-makers concerned with
the immigration side of trafficking exclusively limit their anti-trafficking work to
amplification of repressive laws, while disregarding the necessity to instigate
preventative and protective measures and thereby failing to stop the proliferation
and spread of slavery and forced labor. Although strategies for communication
and co-operation between law-enforcement agencies of various countries are
important tools in combating trafficking, foreign assistance to the source countries
must involve more than exchanges among police agencies. It must, inter alia,
entail development strategies and substantial financial assistance for programs that
emphasize educational opportunities for girls and economic security for men and
women.
Furthermore, the work of international criminal tribunals may serve as an
additional deterrent for continuous spread of trafficking. Enslavement of persons
is a punishable criminal offense that evokes both individual and group criminal
liability under the statutes and jurisprudence of Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals

200. Commission Proposalfora Council Directive on Minimum Standardsfor the Qualificationand
Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise
Need InternationalProtection, at 15-16, COM (2001) 510 final (Sept. 12, 2001).
201.Id.
202.Tom Obokata, Trafficking of Human Beings as a Crime Against Humanity: Some Implications
for the International Community, 54 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 445,445 (2005).
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and the International Criminal Court. Moreover, it may also constitute a crime
against humanity. 20 3 However, in order to qualify as such, enslavement must not
only entail an ability to buy, sell or trade people.20 4 It is the continuous "duration
of the suspected exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership '' 205 as well
as evidence of "widespread and systematic,' 20 6 abuse that play a major role in
determining whether a particular case of enslavement can be regarded as a crime
against humanity and be consequently considered as a gravest punishable offense
under the international criminal law. In accordance with these parameters, the act
of trafficking may only be regarded as a crime against humanity if the traffickers
themselves directly exercise subsequent ownership of the victims; and if their
practices involve an organized widespread criminal enterprise specifically aimed at
'multiplicity of victims' who are members of civilian population.20 7 Although, the
threshold of gravity imposed by the ICC only permits the most atrocious situations
of human trafficking to potentially fall under its jurisdiction, such possibility (i)
confirms that trafficking is an international crime of atrocious proportions; (ii)
elevates the standing of the crime of trafficking vis-A-vis other human rights
violations; (iii) attracts attention of international community, assigning the antitrafficking strategies a primary role within national policy-making; and (iv) serves
as a deterrent for future perpetrators.
The threshold of gravity established by the international criminal tribunals is
indeed high and probably unreachable by the crimes of traffickers.
The
Trafficking Protocol and Council of Europe Trafficking Convention establish
much lower criminal thresholds that allow the smaller scale perpetrators, who may
not necessarily be a part of larger criminal enterprises and networks, to be tried by
national and international human rights courts.20 8 Their threshold is based on the
identification of criminal intent of the perpetrators to facilitate the exploitation.
The criminal intent element triggers the applicability of the Protocol and
Convention and is sufficient proof necessary to sustain criminal liability.20 9
However, in the absence of special judicial bodies created by the Protocol and
the CoE Convention to adjudicate on the violations of human trafficking, this role

203.See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Indictment IT-96-23, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, 542
(Feb. 22, 2001).
204.1d.
205.Id.
206.United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, June 15-July17, 1998, Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court,
art. 7(2)(c) U.N. Doc A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) ("Enslavement means the exercise of any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in
the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.").
207.See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment and Opinion, 648 (May 7, 1997);
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 206 (Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 580 (Sept. 2, 1998); International Law Commission [ILC], Report
of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session,
17-22, U.N. Doc.
A/51/10(Supp) (May 6-July 26, 1996) (illustrating that isolated acts committed by perpetrators do not
qualify as crimes against humanity).
208.See Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28; Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings and its Explanatory Report arts. 18-26, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. 197.
209.See Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28; Council of Europe, supra note 208.
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is delegated directly to the states. Under this obligation, the States Parties are
required to ensure full access to justice for victims of trafficking violations,
appropriate legislative reforms to ensure full accountability and transparency of the
trials, adequate charges and penalties, and cooperation and mainstreaming of
judicial procedures in trafficking cases. In fact, the progress achieved by
implementation of these measures is evident in documented substantial increases in
the numbers of alleged offenders facing trial. 210 The Special Monitoring Group
that will be created by the CoE Convention upon its entry into force may play an
important role in ensuring the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of states
policies in this regard.
VII. CONCLUSION

Trafficking in human beings is one of the most brutal violations of various
branches of international and national laws of various countries. Its tentacles
embrace the globe from every side. It is a truly international side effect of
globalization, which in turn demands a universal policy program, capable of
overturning the rate of ever-growing numbers of its victims.
Strikingly similar to the practice of slavery, trafficking requires international
measures similar to those once applied to eliminate the practice of slavery.
Elimination of legal justification of slavery by itself was an essential precursor to
further practical measures to prevent the future slavery-like practices. The failure
of the states to provide the rehabilitative measures to ensure the avoidance of
future perpetual dependence of the former slaves on their 'masters' left the victims
of slavery in limbo of dependence and resentment. 211 Therefore, the measures to
prevent such situation in case of modern forms of slavery need to include specific
provisions on: (a) the methods and the procedure for the actual release of the
enslaved; (b) sufficient economic autonomy of the liberated slaves; and (c) their
reintegration in the society as equal citizens.
"Only when comprehensive human rights background to trafficking is fully
understood, and states commit themselves to tackle human rights violations
occurring along the entire spectrum of the traffic chain, will we begin to see a
diminution in human trafficking. 2 In order to be successful, the international
response to trafficking needs to recognize the victims and their rights, and be more
reflective of the views of those most affected. Preventing and punishing
trafficking requires a multinational multi-level coordinated legal norm
development, aided by communication on criminal matters, mutual assistance in
law enforcement, provision of social services to the victims, harmonization of
labour, immigration and refugee laws, and economic development and women
21 Such norm development has to
empowerment programs. 213
be based on shared but
differentiated responsibilities of all the states of the world, derived from their
210.TIP REPORT, supranote 7, at 8.
211.David Ould, Trafficking and International Law, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW
SLAVERY 55, 72-73 (Christien van den Anker ed., 2003).
212.Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal
Frameworksfor Conceptualizingand Combating Trafficking, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1143, 1165 (2003).
213.Id. at 1145.
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international and regional human rights obligations and determined on the basis of
the role of each of the given states in the sequence of trafficking.
The human rights victims-centered approach must be complemented by the
measures of criminal law striving to achieve accountability for traffickers.
Intensified governmental cooperation in law enforcement, non-discriminative
immigration laws, substantial guarantees of non-impunity for traffickers, and
establishment of workable criteria distinguishing the victims of trafficking from
other migrants would give teeth to the human rights framework and ensure its
justiciability by assigning responsibility on all states to implement pertinent
legislative measures serving as both guarantee of human rights and deterrent for
future violations.
The integration of the non-refoulement principle of refugee law as the
deportation relief for the victims of trafficking would also allow for additional
transparency and willingness of the victims to seek justice with the authorities of
the recipient and transit states. Cooperation with law authorities, however, should
not be a prerequisite for the application of the principle, as its focus should remain
not with criminalization but with relief of threat and hardship facing the victim
upon return. It may also result in subsequent adjustment of the traits of behavior of
traffickers and illegal migrants and may lead to undesired consequences of
increased rates of trafficking and smuggling. To respond to this danger,
specifically tailored immigration policies need to establish criteria necessary to
minimize such consequences.
The Trafficking Protocol is a symbolic tool that embodies the direction that
the international community has taken in its fight against trafficking. It represents
the first fully international legal instrument that involved not only representatives
of governments and diplomats, but members of civil society, specialized agencies
of the United Nations and NGOs, whose presence allowed for a larger emphasis to
the human rights norms evident in its text. The Protocol, however lacks
universality in ratifications,2 14 and has a number of limitations such as addressing
trafficking only as a transnational offence,215 which slow its effectiveness down. A
valuable alternative to the Protocol is offered by the Council of Europe Convention
against Trafficking. A truly comprehensive international, albeit non-universal,
strategy encompassing all of the existent frameworks of criminal, human rights,
immigration and labor law, as well as elements of refugee protection and victims'
rights, represents the way forward for the international community in its fight
against trafficking. States-signatories of the Convention must ensure its rapid
entry into force and extended scope of application as the new strategy against
trafficking.

214.See Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28 (acknowledging that the Protocol currently has 113
state-parties with China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam,
Yemen, Zimbabwe still non-parties to the Protocol. For more information on ratification see:
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html).
215.Prevent Trafficking, supra note 28, art. 3(2) (recognizing that the definition of 'transnational'
in the Protocol is fairly wide).

STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
A CONCERTO FOR COURT, COUNCIL AND COMMITTEE
RACHAEL LORNA JOHNSTONE*

I. INTRODUCTION

The judgment in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention
case), released by the International Court of Justice (the Court) on 2 6 th February

2007, has thrown up a number of interesting issues to keep scholars of
international law entertained for some years.1 Amongst these are the rules of state
responsibility in international law. In the Genocide Convention Case, the Court
relied upon the narrow regime of state responsibility that they had introduced in
Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua)over

20 years previously, rejecting a stronger doctrine suggested by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadi6 case.2 The
Court's conservative interpretation of state responsibility does not immediately
appear to be in harmony with the regimes of state responsibility envisaged by other
United Nations institutions, notably, state responsibility for terrorist activities as
understood by the Security Council (the Council), and the tertiary scheme of state
responsibility for violations of human rights adopted and applied by the United
Nations human rights treaty bodies (treaty bodies).

* Rachael Loma Johnstone is assistant professor of law at the University of Akureyri, Iceland
where she has been based since 2003. She has studied at the University of Glasgow (LL.B.(Hons),
1999), the European Academy of Legal Theory, Brussels (LL.M., 2000) and the University of Toronto
(S.J.D., 2004). This article is the fruits of a research sabbatical hosted by the Raoul Wallenberg
Institute, Lund, Sweden and the DIGITA institute, University of Genoa, Italy. She would like to thank
the faculty and support staff at these institutions, in particular, Rolf Ring, Gu6mundur Alfredsson and
Habteab Tesfay (RWI) and Pierluigi Chiassoni (DIGITA). She would also like to thank the editorial
team at the Denver Journal of International and Comparative Law for their work in preparing and
finalizing this article for publication. All errors are the author's own.
I .Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 46 I.L.M. 188 (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Genocide Convention
case].
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua]; Prosecutor v. Tadi6, No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 1 131, 137 (July 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Tadi6].
3. For discussion of the tertiary framework of state responsibility as applied by human rights
treaty bodies see, for example, Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of
Women: A Complaints Procedurefor the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679, 711 (1996)
(identifying the three dimensions of state obligations relating to "any given human right" as the
obligation to respect, the obligation to protect, and the obligation to fulfill).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:1

After this short introduction, Part II will discuss the rules of state
responsibility applied by the Court in the Genocide Convention case, in light of the
International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility, Nicaragua
and Tadi6.4 Part III is devoted to an examination of resolutions of the Council
pertaining to terrorism, particularly following the terrorist attacks of September
2001, and the vision of state responsibility implicit therein. In Part IV, the author
will examine the adoption of the tertiary scheme of state responsibility for human
rights adopted by the treaty bodies which is illustrated in general comments,
concluding comments on state reports, and where appropriate, views on
communications. To conclude in Part V, the author will argue that the different
schemes of state responsibility can all be reconciled with the ILC Articles and that
the apparent differences between these three fields are in fact differences of
primary rules. The answer to the question "who is the state?" is the same in all
three cases.
The focus is exclusively on the institutions of the United Nations and, for that
reason, developments in the realm of state responsibility in other institutions, such
as the European Court of Human Rights or in broader counter-terrorism literature
will not be directly addressed.
II.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR

GENOCIDE

A. The InternationalCourt ofJustice

Formally at least, judicial decisions are binding only between the parties to
each dispute.5 They are formally considered only "subsidiary sources" of
international law, alongside legal commentaries. 6 Treaties, customary international
law, and legal principles of civilized nations are preferred. Nonetheless, the
Court's decisions are highly influential both on the academic study of international
law and state practice. Indeed Dupuy states: "everyone accepts that its judicial
interpretations are for the most part binding on all the subjects of international
law." 7 The Statute of the Court does not indicate any hierarchy amongst courts,8
referring only to "judicial decisions" without indicating any particular fora.
Nevertheless, the practice of the Court, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been to cite its
own decisions with a degree of gravitas that is perhaps not shared in its discussion
of decisions of other international tribunals or domestic courts. In the Genocide
Convention case, the Court clearly preferred its own 20 year old Nicaragua ruling

4. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its fifty-third
session, art. 6, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC
Articles].
5. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 [hereinafter Statute
of the Court].
6. Id. art. 38(1)(d).
7. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the "Fragmentation"
of InternationalLaw, EUR. J. LEGAL STUD., Apr. 2007, at 1, 5, http://www.ejls.eu/index.phpmode
=present&displayissue-2007-04 (follow hyperlink to Dupuy's article).
8. Statute of the Court, supra note 5, art. 38(l)(d).
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to the more recent Tadi6 decision of the ICTY. 9 It makes no reference to the
jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal despite its influence on the
0
development of the law of state responsibility.l
B. The Genocide Convention Case
Ultimately, in the Genocide Convention case, Serbia (formerly the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia) was not found to have any responsibility for the
commission of genocide, conspiracy or incitement to commit genocide, or
complicity in genocide. 1 It was, however, considered responsible for violating the
Genocide Convention to the extent that Serbia failed to prevent the genocide and
failed to cooperate adequately with the prosecution of individuals suspected of
involvement.12 It was also held to have failed to comply with the provisional
it specifically to "take all
measures of the Court, issued in 1993, which required
13
measures within its power to prevent genocide."'
Before approaching questions of state responsibility, it is important to note
that the only question before the Court was responsibility for genocide, not for any
other international wrongs, such as acts of aggression or violation of the duty not
to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. 14 The only matter for which
the Court determined that genocide had been proven to have been committed was
the massacre at Srebrenica. 15 Therefore, the question of state responsibility in the
case pivots on that sequence of events. A state can only commit genocide, or be
complicit in the commission of genocide, to the extent that genocide actually takes
place. 16 Serbian responsibility for any other atrocity during the conflict was not
assessed by the Court.
On the other hand, responsibility for conspiracy to commit genocide,
incitement to commit genocide, or attempting to commit genocide does not
necessarily require that genocide be successfully carried out. 17 Indeed, to the extent
9. Genocide Convention case, supranote 1, 1 405-07.
10. See generally David D. Caron, The Basis of Responsibility: Attribution and Other TransSubstantive Rules, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW

OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 109 (Richard B. Lillich & Daniel Barstow Magraw eds., 1998) [hereinafter
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL].

See also Jamison

Selby Borek, Other State

ResponsibilityIssues, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 303, supra.
11. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 11 471(2)-(4).
12. Id. 471(5)-(6).
13. Id. 471(7).
14. In their identification of the actus reus of genocide, a litany of atrocities is recited in the
Court's judgment. Although the Court could not rule on whether they constituted war crimes or crimes
against humanity, the detail in which they are recited in the judgment indicates that the Court wanted
them on public record. Sandesh Sivakumaran argues that: "[a]s jurisdiction was founded solely upon
the Genocide Convention, the Court could not characterise these atrocities as war crimes or crimes
against humanity, however, in practice, it came close to doing precisely that." Sandesh Sivakumaran,
Case Comment, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695, 698
(2007).
15. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 376.
16. Id.1431.
17. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
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that genocide is actually committed, there can be no charge of attempt on the same
Court contained its analysis of
facts.1 8 Nonetheless, even on these points, the
9
attribution largely to the events at Srebrenica.
All kinds of questions can be asked about the standing of the parties, 20 the
definition of genocide both in the Convention and in customary international law,21
imputation from non-disclosure by Serbia, 22 the burden of proof,23 the degree to
which the Court can make inferences from the circumstances when direct evidence
is almost impossible to obtain, 24 the limitations on the Court vis d vis factfinding,25 and the Court's reluctance to "put the pieces together, 26 but these
questions, interesting as they are, do not bear directly on the issue of attribution of
responsibility and so will not be addressed further.
It must be borne in mind that the wrong (i.e. the genocide) was committed not
in Serbia but in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) against Bosnian victims. Any
potential responsibility of Serbia for actions taking place at Srebrenica in 1995
cannot depend on some kind of territorial link, as it might have, had the genocide
occurred within the territory of Serbia.27 In this respect, the case can be
distinguished from questions of responsibility for "harboring terrorists" when those
terrorists are actually on the soil of the respondent state and from responsibility for
human rights violations committed by non-state actors when both the perpetrators
and victims are within a state's territory.28
C. State responsibilityfor genocide
Bosnia attempted to pre-empt the need for an investigation on the facts of
state responsibility by arguing that Serbia had acknowledged responsibility in a
statement by its Council of Ministers. 29 This was rejected by the Court as a
"political statement" rather than an admission of liability. 30 The Court was
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
18. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 380.
19. The Court briefly commented that there was no indication of genocide having been incited
elsewhere. See id 417. Bosnia did not make any claim for "attempt." See id 416. See infra text
accompanying note 66.
20. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
80-141.
21. Id. 142-201.
22. Id. 204-05.
23. Id. 209-210.
24. Id. 207. See also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu
Channel].
25. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
211-230.
26. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.),
42, 48 (Feb. 26, 2007) (dissenting opinion of Vice-President AlKhasawneh), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p 1=3&k=f4&case=91 &code=bhy&
p3 -4 [hereinafter AI-Khasawneh dissent].
27. But see Corfu Channel, supra note 24, at 18.
28. See infra Parts III, IV.
29. Ademola Abass, ProvingState Responsibilityfor Genocide: The ICJ in Bosnia v.Serbia and
the InternationalCommission of inquiryfor Darfur,31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 871, 902-03 (2008).
30. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
377-78. Al-Khasawneh disagreed. See AlKhasawneh dissent, supra note 26,
56-58.
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therefore obliged to consider both the law of state responsibility and the
application of that law to the facts of the case.31
The Court recognized the established principle that states bear responsibility
for acts or omissions of their own organs, de jure or de facto, or by non-state actors
operating under the "direction or control" of the state. 32 Articles 4 and 8 of the
ILC Articles were accepted as "customary international law" without further
discussion. 33 They are worth replicating in full:
Article 4
Conduct of organs of a State
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that
State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in
the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of
the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in
accordance with the internal law of the State.
Article 8
Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act
of the State under international law if the person or group of persons is
in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct.
Relying on the "customary international law" of state responsibility, the Court
rejected any notion that the rules of state responsibility for genocide were in any
way lex specialis. 34 Although the Genocide Convention creates treaty obligations,
the (secondary) rules of state responsibility for violating those obligations are the
general ones. No special scheme applies.35
The principle perpetrators recognized by the Court were not, under Serbia's
internal law, its "organs. ' 36 Straightforward attribution of responsibility according
to Article 4 was therefore precluded, notwithstanding Bosnia's protestations to the
contrary. Nonetheless, states may not hide behind their internal legal order to
evade international responsibility and the Court discussed at length whether or not
those involved were de facto agents of Serbia, relying on the Nicaragua test of
"complete dependence" in light of Article 4 of the ILC Articles.37
31. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 1 385-438.
32. Id. 1384.
33. Id.TT 385, 398.
34. Id. 401.
35. Id.
36. Id. 1 386-89.
37. Id. 1 391-92. See also Nicaragua, supra note 2, 109, at 62. Although not cited by the
Court, this is also in line with the findings of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. See generally THE IRANUNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, supra note 10. See also ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 4,
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The Court accepted on the facts that those involved had been recruited prior
to the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the Serbian government38
had provided military and financial support in the form of weapons and salaries.
Close ethnic, political and financial links existed between the perpetrators (de jure
organs of the39"non-State" entity of Republika Srpska in Bosnia) and the Belgrade
Government.
But the Court considered that, in light of Nicaragua:
[T]o equate persons or entities with State organs when they do not have
that status under internal law must be exceptional, for it requires proof
of a particularly great degree of State control over them, a relationship
which the Court's Judgment quoted above [Nicaragua] expressly
described as "complete dependence". It remains to be determined in the
present case whether, at the time in question, the persons or entities that
committed the acts of genocide at Srebrenica had such ties with the
FRY that they can be deemed to have been completely dependent on
4
it. 0

The Court went on to interpret "complete dependence" as meaning that the
perpetrators were "lacking any real autonomy. 41 Recognizing the Bosnian Serb's
"qualified, but real, margin of independence" on the one hand, and their reliance
on Serbian support "without which it could not have 'conduct[ed] its crucial or
most significant military and paramilitary activities,"' the Court determined that
the former factor was the key, and that, since the Bosnian Serb forces had some
modicum of autonomy, they were not to be considered organs of Serbia.42
Therefore, they would not be considered organs and as a result, their actions would
not automatically be attributable to Serbia.
The Court then turned to the question of whether, although not organs of
Serbia in general, the perpetrators were acting under Serbian "direction and
control" "in carrying out the conduct" in light of Article 8. The state will be
responsible for non-state actors to the extent that "they acted in accordance with
that [s]tate's instructions or under its effective control., 44 This responsibility
requires direction or control over specific, identifiable events, in this case, the
Srebrenican genocide. General control over the direction of operations is
inadequate; there must have been specific control over the international wrongful

11, at 91 (the use of "includes" in art. 4(2) clearly indicates that internal law is not exhaustive). See
also Paolo Palchetti, Comportamento di Organi di Fatto e Illecito Internazionale Nel Progetto di
Articoli Sulla Responsabilihi InternazionaleDegli Stati, in LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA RESPONSABILITA
INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI ALLA PROVA DE1 FATTi 3, 5-6 (Marina Spinedi et al. eds., 2006).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 11238-39, 388.
Id. 1 240, 422.
Id. 393.
Id. 394.
Id. 394 (quoting Nicaragua, supra note 2, 111, at 63).
Id. 398.
Id. 400.
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act.4 5 The Court explained that "[i]t must however be shown that this 'effective
control' was exercised, or that the [S]tate's instructions were given, in respect of
each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of
the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the
violations." 46 Serbia would still be responsible if it could be established that "the
physical acts constitutive of genocide that have been committed by organs or
persons other than the [S]tate's own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on
the instructions or directions of the [S]tate, or under its effective control. '' 7
The Court was forced to acknowledge the Tadi6 ruling of the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY in 1999, which had applied a less strict test of "overall
control., 48 The ICTY Appeals Chamber had determined that the test of state
responsibility for the actions of combatants was essential to the determination of
the character of the Bosnia conflict as "international" and, relying on its own
interpretation of the law of state responsibility, held that Serbia had sufficient
control over actors in the Bosnian conflict both to engage its own responsibility
and to render the conflict international in character. 49 The Appeals Chamber,
however, misread Nicaragua as introducing a double test of "complete
dependence" and "effective control" rather than two independent tests of
"complete dependence" or "effective control., 50 Nevertheless, it rejected the
Nicaraguatest (so understood) as unpersuasive and appealed both to the 1998 draft
of ILC Article 8 and judicial and state practice (predominantly jurisprudence from
outside of the Court).51 Instead, the Appeals Chamber held that the appropriate test
in military or paramilitary cases should be one of "overall control", rather than
"effective control.",52 It further defended this test by distinguishing between state
responsibility for individual actors and responsibility for the operations of
"organised and hierarchically structured group[s] such as a military unit" where
effective control may not be necessary to achieve the desired objectives.53 Given
45. Giulio Bartolini, Il Concetto di "Controllo" sulle Attivitci di Individui Quale Presupposto
Della Responsabilitei Dello Stato, in LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA RESPONSABILITA INTERNAZIONALE
DEGLI STATI ALLA PROVA DEI FATTI, supra note 37, at 25, 28.

46. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 400.
47. Id. 401.
48. Tadid, supra note 2,
98-145; Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
402-05. For
commentary on the Tadi6 case as it pertains to state responsibility, see, e.g., Andre J.J. De Hoogh,
Articles 4 and 8 of the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the Tadi6 case and attributionof acts
of Bosnian Serb Authorities to the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 72 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 255 (2001);
Bartolini, supra note 45; Leo Van Den Hole, Towards a Test of the InternationalCharacter of an
Armed Conflict: Nicaraguaand Tadi6, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 269, 276-85 (2005); Marko
Milanovi6, State Responsibility for Genocide, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 553, 576-81(2006); Sivakumaran,
supra note 14, at 701-03.
49. Tadi6, supra note 2,
104, 162.
50. Id. 112.
51. Id.
116-45. The 1998 draft art. 8 of the ILC Articles is identical to that finalized in the
second reading.
52. Id. 145.
53. Id. 120; Bartolini, supra note 45, at 30.
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this lower threshold of overall control, on the facts, it found that the test of "overall
army (i.e. de jure organ of Serbia) of Bosnian Serb
control" by the Yugoslav
54
forces had been met.
Nicaragua and Tadi6 could further have been distinguished on the facts, as
the links between the state and those violating international law seem considerably
closer in the latter case.55 The Presiding Trial Judge, although outvoted, argued56
that, on the facts, even the stricter test of effective control had been met.
Furthermore, although the Appeals Chamber did not apply the facts to the test of
effective control, its discussion of the facts certainly indicates a degree of control
considerably greater than that in Nicaragua.57
The Court chose to "distinguish" the Tadi6 judgment to the extent that it bears
on state responsibility, but it did so with barely concealed disdain, suggesting that
the ICTY had no business making assertions about "issues of general international
law which do not lie within the specific purview of its jurisdiction and, moreover,
the resolution of which is not always necessary for deciding the criminal cases
before it." 58 The Nicaragua test was thus confirmed as the correct one and is thus
further entrenched in international law.
It should be noted that Article 8 of the ILC Articles requires "direction or
control" but is silent as to the degree of control. 59 The commentary describes both
the Nicaragua tests and Tadi6 tests and does not explicitly indicate a preference.60
However, it implies that the "overall control" test in Tadi6 may not go to the heart
of the law of state responsibility since it was incidental to a finding on international
responsibility per se humanitarian law rather than a direct finding on state
61
jurisdiction.
its
of
outside
case
any
in
is
something that
D. Conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide
Bosnia did not claim that Serbia had "attempted" to commit genocide but,
nonetheless, the question of participation by conspiracy, incitement and complicity
still had to be considered by the Court. It dealt with conspiracy and incitement in
summary fashion, dedicating only one paragraph to both, to reject the possibility of
Serbian responsibility. 62 It considered only events at Srebrenica. The perpetrators
had been shown to be neither agents of Serbia, nor under its "effective control" and
the massacre is later in the judgment characterized as a somewhat spontaneous
action. 63 To the extent that the Court even accepted there had been much of a

54. Tadi6, supra note 2, 1156.
55. Van Den Hole, supra note 48, at 280-85; Bartolini, supra note 45, at 28-29.
56. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, McDonald Dissent, 1 34 (May 7, 1997).
57. Tadi6, supra note 2, 11 146-62.
58. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 403. See also Tadi6, supra note 2, 1 69-71
(argument of the prosecution); AI-Khasawneh dissent, supra note 26, 11 36-39.
59. ILC Articles, supra note 4, at 45.
60. Id. cmt. to art. 8,11 4-5, at 105-06.
61. Id.cmt. to art. 8, 5, at 106. See also Bartolini, supra note 45, at 30 (suggesting that the ILC
distanced itself from Tadi6).
62. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 1417.
63. Id.
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"conspiracy," rather than a spur of the moment decision, it rejected Serbian
involvement in it.64 Incitement was likewise rejected.65
The Court briefly added that there was no "precise and incontrovertible
evidence" that Serbia had "incited genocide" on any other occasion. 66 No such
general statement is made in the case of conspiracy. Conspiracy has its origins in
the common law and does not require that any (other) crime be committed or
attempted.67 It has no direct equivalent in the civil law systems under which
responsibility for planning criminal activities requires some "material element" to
have been committed.68 Focusing only on Srebrenica, the Court does not consider
the possibility that Serbia may have participated in an overall plan to commit
genocide in Bosnia, or to commit genocide on some other occasion. Incitement is
an offence at common law even in the absence of actus reus; in fact, if the actus
reus is fulfilled, the inciter (counselor) is instead considered as an accessory.6 9 In
70
the civil law, responsibility for incitement requires some attempt.
The Court stated that it considered, both for "conspiracy to commit genocide"
and "direct and public incitement to commit genocide" "as is appropriate, only the
events at Srebrenica. ' '71 If, indeed, this is appropriate, conspiracy and incitement
to genocide in international law are (now) only crimes to the extent that they are
successfully carried out.7 2 This will have major ramifications if it is carried over
into the realm of international criminal law and individual responsibility, to the
extent that conspiracies to commit genocide and incitement to genocide, in the
absence of any attempt, will not be considered crimes.
E. Complicity in genocide
Complicity in genocide (or any other crime) requires the crime actually have
occurred.73 The Court necessarily limited its consideration to Srebrenica and
found complicity to be synonymous with "aid or assistance., 74 The material
element, or actus reus, was established as:

64. The Court does not directly address the matter of whether there had been a conspiracy to
commit genocide at Srebrenica. One would imagine that such events require at least minimal
discussion and preparation (i.e. conspiracy); on the other hand, later in the case, the Court indicates that
the Srebrenican massacres were somewhat impulsive. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 423.
65. Id. 417.
66. Id.
67. Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45, § 1(1) (Eng., Wales, Scot., & N. Ir.).
68. CODE PENAL [C. PlN.], art. 450-1 (Fr.).

69. See Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 94, § 8 (Eng., Wales, & N. Ir.).
70. See MICHAEL ALLEN, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 212, 215-16, 219 (9th ed. 2007); CODE
PftNAL [C. PltN.], art. 121-4 TO 121-7(Fr.); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 127 § 26, availableat http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/56/
6f/b7295280cbb8cf24d08caa065790.pdf
71. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 417.
72. Id. 180.
73. Id.
74. Id. 419..
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[T]he quite substantial aid of a political, military and financial nature
provided by the FRY to the Republika Srpska and the VRS [Bosnian
Serb], beginning long before the tragic events of Srebrenica, continued
during those events. There is thus little doubt that the atrocities in
Srebrenica were committed, at least in part, with the resources which
the perpetrators of those acts possessed as a result of the general policy
of aid and assistance pursued towards them by the FRY.75

But the offence also requires a mental element, in this case, at a minimum,
"knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act" by an organ,
de jure or de facto of the Serbian state. 76 "Knowledge of the circumstances" in this
case meant knowledge of the genocidal intention of the perpetrators.77 A suspicion
would be inadequate; knowledge of mass killings would be inadequate. Only
supply of the material support, while "clearly aware" that "not only were
massacres about to be carried out or already under way, but that their perpetrators
had the specific intent characterizing genocide, namely, the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a human79 group, as such" would suffice. 78 This was not proven
"beyond any doubt" [sic].
F. Preventingandpunishinggenocide

Under the Court's vision of state responsibility, Serbia was thus found not to
be responsible for the genocide, or for assisting with it in any way. Those who
were responsible were not to be considered agents of Serbia; the organs of Serbia,
to the extent they were involved, were not considered to have the mens rea for
genocide, or at least, it was not so proven beyond reasonable doubt.80
But the Convention also mandates positive duties on states to prevent
decided that both of
genocide and to punish individual perpetrators. 81 The Court
82
these duties had been violated by the Serbian authorities.
The Court carefully distinguished the duty to prevent genocide from
complicity on both material and mental aspects. The material aspect of complicity
requires positive action; whereas responsibility to prevent genocide can be engaged
by omission. 83 Further, complicity requires a proven knowledge of the genocidal
intentions and actions of the primary perpetrators; the obligation to prevent can be
breached if the 84state knows only of a "serious danger that acts of genocide would
be committed.,

75. Id. 422. See also id 7241.

76. Id. 420.
77. Id. 421.
78. Id. 422.
79. Id.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. 1.
Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 425-50.
Id. 432.

84. Id.
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Positive assistance, in the form of substantial military and financial aid, had
already been established;85 thus, the Court was not required to address in depth the
question of what particular positive duties might be entailed by the Convention to
prevent genocide. Responsibility pivoted on the degree of knowledge of Serbian
86
organs of the risk of genocide.
The evidence included the two provisional Orders of the Court from 1993
requiring that Serbia ensure that
military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or
supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be
subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of

public
genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and
87
incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide.
This is clearly a much wider category than those over whom Serbia exercises
"effective control." 88 The Court also recognized Serbia's "position of influence"
over the Bosnian Serbs involved at Srebrenica, relying on the Secretary-General's
report to the General Assembly The Fall of Srebrenica and evidence that lead the
ICTY to determine that "it must have been clear that there was a serious risk of
genocide in Srebrenica." 89 The failure to intervene, and indeed the continued
support offered, given this degree of knowledge, demonstrated90 a violation of the
obligation under the Genocide Convention to prevent genocide.
The Court in so deciding also managed to characterize Serbia as a special case
because of its relationship with the Bosnian Serbs, avoiding broader questions91 of
the duty to prevent genocide by other state parties to the Genocide Convention.
The duty to prevent is an obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result
(obligation de comportement et non de r~sultat).92 An obligation of conduct
85. Id. 422.
86. Id.
434-38.
87. Id. 435.
88. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 3, 24
(Apr. 8). See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v Serb. & Mont.), Further Requests for Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J.
325, 349-50 (Sept. 13); Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 435. Serbia was found separately to
453-56.
have breached these orders. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
89. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 434-38. See The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-GeneralPursuantto GeneralAssembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, 494-97,
at 106-07, delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999).

90. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 438.
91. See id. 429-30. On the rights and duties of humanitarian intervention more broadly, see
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], The Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the InternationalCommission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 3.1-3.41 (2001).
92. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 430. The French text is here included to
distinguish the French concept of obligation de moyens. On the potential for confusion, see PierreMarie Dupuy, Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago's Classification of Obligations of
Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 371 (1999).
The distinction was dropped from the text of the second reading but is still important, see JAMES
CRAWFORD,

THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW

COMMISSION'S

ARTICLES

ON

STATE RESPONSIBILITY:

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:1

requires the state to take particular steps regardless of whether or not they would
have been likely to achieve a particular outcome. 93 Ultimately, the Court does not
find it proven to a "sufficient degree of certainty" that even had Serbia intervened
to attempt to prevent the genocide, it would have been successful. 9 4 Serbia acted
95
wrongfully, but causation is insufficiently proven to award any material remedy.
The Genocide Convention finally requires states to ensure the punishment of
genocide, either through domestic tribunals or at an "international penal
tribunal., 96 Since the genocide was committed outside of Serbia, there was no duty
to try suspects in its domestic courts. 97 However, given the establishment of the
ICTY as a suitable "international penal tribunal" Serbian cooperation was required
but lacking.98
The positive obligations to prevent and punish genocide are subject to the
standard of due diligence. 99 The exact requirements of due diligence vary
according to the primary rules at stake, but in all cases it is a standard of
international law - the degree of care a state takes in its own domestic affairs is not
a relevant factor. l00 The degree of care to be exercised also varies depending on the
primary obligation. Pisillo-Mazzeschi explains that in some cases, the standard
will be that of a "civilised" or "well-organized" state but in others, performance
must be excellent, such as in the care of foreign dignitaries. ° l
Responsibility for breach of positive obligations does not depend on fault
attributable to any particular state organ, but is rather an objective standard, which
must be based on the actions and omissions of the state taken as a whole." 2 To the
extent that positive obligations are breached, there is no need to identify a state
organ or agent of the state to be held accountable. 0 3 The point is not that some
organ or agent has acted in such a way as to violate international law, but rather
that no organ or agent has acted, when one ought to have done so. It need not be
the case that some particular organ can be considered at fault; the fault might even
be that there is no appropriate organ when there ought to be. 10 4 Pisillo-Mazzeschi
explains:

INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 21 (2002).

93. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 430.
94. Id. 462.
95. Id. 460-62.
96. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. 6.
97. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 442.
98. Id.
445-49.
99. Id. 430.
100. Id. 429; see also Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the
InternationalResponsibility of States, 35 GERMAN YB INT'L L. 9,41-42 (1992).
101. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 44-45; see also Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
429-30.
102. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 179.
103. Id. 182.
104. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 26.
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The practice, in fact, clearly indicates that it is enough to have, for
purposes of responsibility, a general insufficiency of "governmental
action" or a general lack of diligence on the part of the State authorities
considered as a whole, as regards the international standard; and that it
is not necessary instead to carry out an investigation to establish each
time the subjective fault of the single individuals acting as State organs.
105

G. Who is the State? Entrenching Nicaragua

The Court has thus given the Nicaragua test of state responsibility fresh
impetus 20 years after it originally formulated the same. States bear responsibility
only for the actions of their de jure organs, de facto organs by virtue of complete
dependence or agents by virtue of effective control in individual operations. A
veneer of independence will continue to shield states from responsibility for the
actions of those who do not display governmental insignia. 06
Positive obligations to prevent and punish genocide are recognized, subject to
the due diligence standard. It is an obligation that falls on the state machinery.
However, even where due diligence is manifestly lacking, such as in the present
case, in the absence of a clear causal link to any resulting harm (dommage), i.e.
absence of undisputable evidence that intervention would have successfully
prevented the harm, there will be no remedy beyond the metaphorical slap on the
wrist. 107
III.

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR

TERRORISM

A. Terrorism in InternationalLaw
h
The attacks on 1l1
September 2001 on the United States created an
international shockwave by virtue of the scale of destruction and death, the lack of
prior warning and the targeting of civilians of the professional classes. The
response of the international community was unprecedented as United Nations
organs and states, including states with which the United States had antagonistic
relations, immediately expressed their sympathies. 10 8 The Security Council, on the

105. Id. at 43. On fault and its role in some, but not all primary rules, see CRAWFORD, supra note
92, at 13.
106. In the context of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, David Caron has suggested that this creates a
kind of "fortuity of proof' as responsibility depends on being able to establish that, inter alia, he "wore
a Revolutionary Guards' armband." Caron, supra note 10, at 109, 151.
107. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 463.
108. G.A. Res. 56/1, 2, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/1 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C.
Res. 1368,
1-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). As well as predictable allies such as Israel
and the United Kingdom, the leaders of states that had perhaps less than friendly relations with the
United States, such as Cuba, Iran, Syria and the Taleban in Afghanistan also expressed their disapproval
and sympathies. Only the Iraqi administration openly celebrated. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 13th plen.
mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.13 (Oct. 1, 2001); U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 15th plen. mtg., at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/56/PV.15 (Oct. 2, 2001); U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 16th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.16
(Oct. 3, 2001); Susan Hall, Suzanne Goldenberg & John Hooper, Palestinian Joy, Global
Condemnation, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2001; Suzanne Goldenberg, Rory McCarthy & Brian
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suggestion of the French President, forewent the conventional show of hands to
pass their resolution in favor of voting "by standing, in a show of unity in the face
of the scourge of terrorism."' 0 9

To the rest of the world and the Council, indeed even to the United States,
terrorism was not a new threat, even if the attacks on September the 1 1 th
demonstrated a degree of organization and destruction that seemed to reach a new
level. Beginning with the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft in 1963 there are now no less than thirteen United
Nations Conventions and Protocols on terrorism, twelve of which preceded
2001.110

Despite this glut of treaty law, terrorism has yet to be unequivocally defined,
and as long as the conventions each focus on distinct manifestations, such as
hijacking,"1 bombings,' 12 hostage taking, 13 proliferation and use of nuclear

Whitaker, Iraq stands alone as Arab world offers sympathy and regrets, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 13,

2001.
109. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (Sept. 12, 2001).
110. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963,
20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Aircraft Convention 1963]; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter Seizures of Aircraft Convention 1970]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T.564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Civil
Aviation Convention 1971]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Diplomatic Agents Convention 1973]; International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostages
Convention 1979]; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter Protection of Nuclear Material Convention 1980]; Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb.
24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627 [hereinafter Unlawful Acts of Violence Protocol 1988]; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M.
668, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Maritime Navigation Convention 1988]; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 685, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter Continental Shelf Protocol 1988];
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
721 (1991) [hereinafter Plastic Explosives Convention 1991]; International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 249, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 (1998)
[hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention 1988]; International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) [hereinafter Terrorism Financing
Convention 1999]; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13,
2005, 44 I.L.M. 815 (2005) [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005].
111. Aircraft Convention 1963, supra note 110; Seizures of Aircraft Convention 1970, supra note
110; Maritime Navigation Convention 1988, supra note 110; Continental Shelf Protocol 1988, supra
note 110.

112. Civil Aviation Convention 1971, supra note 110; Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997, supra
note 110; Continental Shelf Protocol 1988, supra note 110; Plastic Explosives Convention 1991, supra
note 110; Unlawful Acts of Violence Protocol 1988, supra note 110; Maritime Navigation Convention
1988, supra note 110.
113. Diplomatic Agents Convention 1973, supra note 110; Hostages Convention 1979, supra note
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material,1 14 and financing, 115 states can avoid the thorny matter of affirming a
comprehensive definition that might tie their hands at a later stage. The closest
defintion is found in Article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, which suggests that terrorism is defined as (a)
anything covered by 9 other conventions and protocols" 6 or
(b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities
in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act. 117
Notwithstanding copious resolutions on terrorism, the Security Council has
never promulgated a definition, instead referring to the same "international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism." 118 Ambassador Greenstock, as
Chair of the Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) solved the problem of
definition as follows: "[f]or the Committee, terrorism is what the members of the
Committee decide unanimously is terrorism." ' 1 9 To crudely paraphrase: "terrorism
is what we say it is."
Fortunately, it is not crucial for the purposes of this paper that the present
author provide the definition that every state can agree upon; one that has to date
eluded 192 members of the United Nations and tens of thousands of scholars of
international law. Since the rules of state responsibility are, according to the ILC,
matters of secondary rules, it should not be necessary, for their examination, to
provide a precise and conclusive definition of the primary rules to which they
20
attach. 1
B. The Council's Counter-TerrorismResolutions and State Responsibility
The authority of the Council and the status of its resolutions vis d vis other
sources of international law has been extensively debated, with a particular flurry

114. Protection of Nuclear Material Convention 1980, supra note 110; Nuclear Terrorism
Convention 2005, supra note 110.
115. Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110.
116. Id. art. 2, annex. Excluded are the Aircraft Convention 1963, supra note 110; Plastic
Explosives Convention 1991, supra note 110; Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005, supra note 110.
117. Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110, art 2. For a review of various
definitions to be found in international instruments and their strengths and weaknesses, see HELEN
DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-29 (2005); see also

Antonio Cassese, Terrorism as an International Crime, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS
AGAINST TERRORISM 213,214,219 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004).
118. E.g., S.C. Res. 1566, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 1982).
119. Andrew Clapham, Terrorism, National Measures and International Supervision, in
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 117, at 283, 296-97.
120. On the distinction between primary and secondary rules, see Robert Ago, Second Report on
State Responsibility: The Origin ofInternationalResponsibility, 7, delivered to the International Law
Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, reprintedin [1970] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 177, 178, U.N. Doc.

A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add. 1 [hereinafter Ago: Second Report 1970]; see also infra text accompanying
notes 384-90.
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of literature discussing the anti-terrorism resolutions that followed the attacks of
2001 .121 The debate need not detain us here and for the purposes of this article, it
shall be assumed that the Council's counter-terrorism resolutions, taken under
Chapter VII, are binding on all United Nations member states. 122 The delicate
matter of respect for customary international law and the principles and purposes
of the Charter need not be further discussed as it is not necessary in order to
evaluate the Council's vision of state responsibility per se. 123 Indeed this must be
one of few articles to examine Council anti-terrorism measures and international
human rights law without investigating the potential for tensions between the
124

two.

121. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901
(2002) (discussing Resolution 1370 as a possible harbinger of the Security Council's willingness to take
on a more commanding legislative role); Jos6 E. Alvarez, Hegemonic InternationalLaw Revisited, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (2003) (focusing on the negative aspects of the Security Council's recent legislative
actions in three areas of international law); Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the
Constitution of the United Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 593 (2003) (positing that the Security Council,
in passing Resolution 1373, acted beyond the scope of its designated authority); Roberto Lavalle, A
Novel, ifAwkward, Exercise in InternationalLaw-Making: Security Council Resolution 1540, 51 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 411 (2004) (comparing the legislative qualities of Resolution 1540 against its legislative
predecessor, Resolution 1373); Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 537 (2004) (discussing the impact of the Council's Resolutions on the role of states as the
major source of protection against terrorism); Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global
Legislator": Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 542 (2005) (arguing that the
Council's legislative resolutions are innovative, within the ambit of the U.N. Charter's grant of power
to the Security Council, and they are necessary tools to combat modern terrorism); TARCISIO GAZztNI,
THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-14 (2005) (discussing broadly

the legal bases for Security Council resolutions and the extent of their authority); Andrea Bianchi,
Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council's Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for
Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 881 (2006) (evaluating the correlation between the
perceived legitimacy of the measures and the extent to which states have implemented them). For a pre2001 review of the "law-making" authority of the Council, see Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Security
Council's "Law-Making ", 83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 609 (2000).

122. On the legal force of the resolutions, see U.N. Charter arts. 24-25, 103; Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 53-54 (June 21) [hereinafter
Namibia Advisory Opinion]; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126 (Apr. 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of
the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 3, 14-15 (Apr. 14); GAZZINI, supra note 121, at
14; PETER J.VAN KRIEKEN, TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 111-12 (2002);
Happold, supra note 121, at 597; Rosand, supra note 121, at 574. For arguments that the legal force of
the Resolutions has been improperly expanded, see Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra, at 291-95, 33940 (dissenting opinions of Judge Fitzmaurice and Judge Gros); Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, at 70811.
123. See U.N. Charter, art. 24,
2; E.J. Flynn, The Security Council's Counter-Terrorism
Committee and Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 371, 374-76 (2007) (referencing adherence to
human rights norms as one of the principles and purposes of the Charter that reinforces the strength of
anti-terrorism resolutions). See generally Rosemary Foot, The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and
Human Rights: InstitutionalAdaptationand Embedded Ideas, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 489 (2007).
124. For a recent examination of this topic, see generally SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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The distinct issues of state responsibility for terrorist attacks and the right to
use self-defense against such attacks ought not to be conflated. 125 The legality of
intervention in Afghanistan following the attacks of September 1 1th should not be
confused26 with the matter of whether Afghanistan is "responsible" for those
attacks. 1

One can envisage circumstances were state responsibility is not in question
(for example, de jure state agents have committed a "terrorist-like" attack), but the
right to use of force in self-defense does not automatically follow. There is no
right to resort to force, for example, if the gravity of the attack is not sufficiently
serious to reach the threshold of an "armed attack.' ' 127 Further, there will be no
legitimate self-defense in the absence of an ongoing imminent threat of further
attacks. 128 Further, even in simple cases of self-defense against an armed attack by
one state against another, the limitations of proportionality and necessity remain
crucial. 129 A no-holds-barred saturation bombing campaign would be unlikely to
meet the tests of necessity and proportionality and thus be illegal. Simply put, a
"terrorist" attack, even by a state, does not provide carte blanche for all and any
measures of self-defense.
On the other hand, there is considerable debate about whether state
responsibility is a pre-requisite for the legality of self-defense measures against
purported terrorists residing in another state's territory (a host state). There is no
textual reason to suggest that an "armed attack" in the sense of Article 51 must be
by a state. On the other hand, state practice and opinio juris, particularly prior to
the September 1 1 th attacks, point to the opinion that state responsibility is a prerequisite for the legality of any incursion on the territory of the sovereign host
state. The arguments for and against each view will not be repeated here. 13°
(Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007) (containing a collection of essays scrutinizing the
relationship between security and human rights from a multidisciplinary perspective). See also Bianchi,
supra note 121, at 885-87, 905-14.
125. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 375 (1963).

126. See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
InternationalLaw, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 999 (2001).
127. Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 103-04.
128. Armed "reprisals" are precluded; see Declaration on the Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, para. 6 (1st princ.), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc.
A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]. Gazzini provides examples of
measures that appear like reprisals in the counter-terrorism context. However, in these cases, the states
all claim some other legal justification for their action, and thus there is no opinio juris to support a
change in customary international law. See GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 203-04; see also CHRISTINE
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 163-64 (2d ed. 2004).

129. Carsten Stahn, Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001): What They Say and
What They Do Not Say, EUR. J. INT'L L. DISCUSSION FORUM: THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE

CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES 13-16 (Oct. 12, 2001), http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:
GEsWRgr99D4J:www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-stahn.pdf+Carsten+Stahn+AND+Security+Council+
Resolution+ 1368+(200 1)+and+I 373+(2001 ):+What+They+Say+and+What+They+Do+Not+Say
(last
visited Sept. 21,2008). See also GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 192-94; GRAY, supra note 128, at 167.
130. For an excellent and concise discussion of the competing arguments with evidence of
customary international law and commentators in support of each, see TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND
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The Council did nothing to help clarify the matter in its hastily agreed
Resolution 1368 of September 12 th 2001.131 Whilst in the preamble "recognizing
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the
Charter," nowhere do they use the term "armed attack" which, "in accordance with
the Charter," is an essential prerequisite to self-defense., 32 The terrorist attacks of
September 1 1 th are instead "regard[ed]... like any act of international terrorism, as a
threat to international peace and security.' ' 133 Threats to international peace and
security, of course, justify invocation of Chapter VII powers, even to the extent of
using force in the absence of any actual or purported violation of international law
by the target state. 134 They do not automatically authorize the use of force
absent
135
Security Council approval; under the Charter, only an "armed attack" can.

THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 158-62 (2006). Those maintaining the

view that state responsibility is a sine qua non for the legality of the use of force in self-defense include
Cassese, supra note 126, at 996-97; Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense was There an "'ArmedAttack"? EUR.
J. INT'L L. DISCUSSION FORUM: THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES, at

http://www.ejil.org/forumWTC/ny-gaja.html (visited Aug. 7, 2007); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Law
After the Destruction of the Twin Towers, EUR. J. INT'L L. DISCUSSION FORUM: THE ATTACK ON THE
WORLD TRADE CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES, at http://www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-dupuy.html
(visited Aug. 23, 2007).
See generally Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State
Responsibility and the Use of Military Force, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 97 (2003); lain Scobbie, Words my
Mother Never Taught Me_ "In Defense of the International Court," 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 76 (2005). They
find support in, inter alia, Nicaragua, supra note 2; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter
Palestinian Wall opinion]. Arguing for the right to use force in self-defense against terrorists regardless
of state responsibility are BROWNLIE, supra note 125, at 375; Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the
Right ofSelf-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839, 840 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJAdvisory Opinion
on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 52, 58 (2005). These
authors defend their argument with references to, inter alia, recent practice of the Council, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, and opinio juris in support of Israel
following the Palestinian Wall opinion. See also BECKER, supra, at 159-62; GRAY, supra note 128, at
159. Gazzini takes the view that prior to September 11th, the former view prevailed. Since then, the
real issue has become, not the legality of self-defense against non-state terrorist actors per se, but the
restrictions and conditions to be placed on the exercise of self-defense once a state has determined to
pursue such a course. See GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 139, 190-97. Gray agrees that prior to
September 11th use of force in self-defense was only justified to the extent that the host state was
responsible. However, she does not consider there to be enough evidence to decide that customary
international law has since evolved to definitively allow self-defense against actors whose actions are
disconnected from the state in which they reside. See GRAY, supra note 128, at 164-67; see also
Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the InternationalLegal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 589, 60203 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
131. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
132. See id. See also U.N. Charter art. 51; Derek Jinks, State Responsibilityfor the Acts of Private
Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 83, 85 n.8 (noting that in previous Resolutions, the Council has
explicitly referred to an "armed attack" when invoking the right of self-defense).
133. S. C. Res. 1368, supra note 131, 1.
134. GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 7-8; Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, at 632.
135. U.N. Charter art. 51; but see GAZZINI, supra note 121, at 123-24 (arguing that there is a new,
post-Charter customary law on the use of force with a threshold for self-defense below that of an armed
attack).

2008

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

Acts of terrorism had been recognized as potential threats to international
peace and security and triggering Chapter VII powers in previous resolutions on
terrorism, with reference to Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan. 136 However, none of
these made reference to self-defense. At best, Chapter VI Res. 731 on Libya
affirms a state's right "to protect their nationals from acts of international terrorism
'1 37
that constitute threats to international peace and security."
The Council recognized in Resolution 748 the Charter preclusion of the threat
or use of force which indicates that: "every State has the duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force. 138
Any state assisting terrorists or "'acquiescing" to terrorist activities will hence
be in violation of Article 2(4)."' But in Resolution 1368 the Security Council
seems to go further and "[c]alls on all States to work together urgently to bring to
justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and
stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable. 14 °
"Those responsible" appears in the French text as the rather less concise "ceux
que portent la responsabilit" with "held accountable" appearing as "rendre des
comptes". 141 There is a hint of tautology in Resolution 1368's insistence that
"those responsible [for aiding, supporting or harboring terrorists]... will be held
accountable." It is not specified for what exactly harboring states shall be held
accountable - whether solely for their actions in harboring the terrorists or whether
for any resulting terrorist attacks. The latter would leave them open, should a
terrorist attack reach the threshold of an "armed attack," to lawful use of force in
self-defense against their own institutions. Furthermore, the use of "those" is
broad enough to be interpreted as referring to non-state actors who shall be held
accountable by states in domestic judicial process. At the time this Resolution was
passed, it should be recalled that it was far from clear who was behind the attacks.
The Council, in the heat of September 12 th , also "[e]xpresse[d] its readiness to
take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
136. S.C. Res. 748, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992); S.C. Res. 1054, pmbl. paras. 811, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1054 (Apr. 26, 1996); S.C. Res. 1070, pmbl. paras. 7,10,
12, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1070 (Aug. 16, 1996); S.C. Res. 1267, pmbl., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C.
Res. 1333, pmbl.,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); see also Chapter VI resolutions
including S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992); S.C. Res. 1044, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1044
(Jan. 31, 1996); S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999).
137. S.C. Res. 731, supra note 136, pmbl. para. 2.
138. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 136, pmbl. para. 6. See also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Friendly
Relations Declaration, supra note 128, para. 6 (1st princ.); Corfu Channel, supra note 24, at 22;
Nicaragua case, supra note 2, 195, at 104.
139. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
140. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 131, 3.
141. R~solution du Conseil de s~curit6 1368,
3, Nations Unies Document S/RES/1368 (12
Septembre 2001), availableat http://www.un.org/french/ga/search/viewdoc.asp?symbo=S/RES/1368
(2001).
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and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under
the Charter of the United Nations. 142
"All necessary steps" is well known code for the use of force. However, with
a little over two weeks to allow the initial shock to subside and during which to
bear witness to the US-led coalition's preparations for war in Afghanistan, the
Council in Resolution 1373 demonstrates a little less "readiness" to take its own
measures. 143 The preamble reaffirms "the need to combat by all means... in
accordance with the Charter" international terrorism, but the Council stops short of
indicating that it is willing to take all necessary steps to that end. It is, however,
prepared to take "all necessary steps" to ensure compliance with the Resolution, a
quite extraordinary statement given the extensive demands on all United Nations
member states contained within. 144
The "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" is again alluded
to in the preamble of the Resolution, but no explicit authorization is given for the
attacks that followed against Afghanistan, even though by this time they were a
foregone conclusion. 145 Nowhere does the term "armed attack" appear, as had been
the case in other resolutions authorizing the use of force, nor is Afghanistan named
as an appropriate target.146 It certainly does not preclude the use of force by the
US and its allies and, of course, such a thing would have been unthinkable given
the veto powers of the United States and its loyal ally, the United Kingdom. The
ambiguity can be explained in at least two ways: on the one hand, it may be that
some states were uncomfortable with the implications for the rules of attribution
and state responsibility of giving the terrorist attacks the status of "armed attacks"
and indicating Afghan responsibility for the same. 147 On the other hand, and at
least as probable, is that the United States and its allies on the Council did not wish
to be limited in their response to only Afghanistan. Should it transpire that other
states were engaged in some way in the attacks or were planning or sheltering the
planners of future attacks, the coalition would not have to obtain further Council
authorization for action against those states. In any case, the verbatim record is
manifestly unhelpful as the meeting lasted an astonishing five minutes, with time
only for the unanimous vote and no state remarks. 148 Whatever discussions were
held between the Council members were held off-the-record.
Resolution 1373 has been described as "legislative" and indeed, it
demonstrates features normally associated with legislation. 49 Most significantly,

142 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 131, 5.
143. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
144. Id 8.
145. Id. pmbl. para. 4.
146. See Jinks, supra note 132, at 85 n.8.
147. See Stahn, supra note 129, at 4-8.
148. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4385 (Sept. 28, 2001).
149. E.g., Szasz, supra note 121, at 905; Alvarez, supra note 121, at 874; Happold, supra note 121,
at 595; Lavalle, supra note 121, at 414-15; Rosand, supra note 121, at 552. See also Eric Rosand,
Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 333,334 (2003).
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it is addressed to every member state of the United Nations and concerns itself
with a whole genre of behavior, rather than a specifically identified threat. It is
thus a general prescription of conduct to all member states, rather than a
specifically targeted executive order directed to a particularly mischievous state
that is thought to pose a threat to international peace and security. Further, it is
without limit of time.
In its generality it thus differs significantly from the pre-September 2001
efforts to deter the Taliban, the purported but largely unrecognized Government of
Afghanistan, from "sheltering and training" terrorists.1 50 The Council had
instituted sanctions against the regime, monitored by a dedicated committee
(commonly known as the 1267 committee), to try to bring pressure on the Taliban
to extradite Usama Bin Laden. 151 Resolution 1267 and its follow-ups place
obligations on all member states to respect the sanctions, but they are aimed at1 52a
specific threat, a specific manifestation of terrorism, not terrorism in general.
By contrast, Resolution 1269 is directed against terrorism more generally, but,
taken under153 Chapter VI, it contains only recommendations, not binding
obligations.

The operative paragraphs of Resolution 1373 introduce a number of
obligations for states and create the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)54
consisting of one representative of each Council member to monitor compliance. 1
The Council "[d]ecides that states shall" prevent the funding of terrorism by
criminalizing provision or collection of funds, freezing existing funds and
prohibiting the donation of funds. 155 Further, "all states shall" refrain from giving
any support, "active or passive," to terrorist groups; suppress recruitment and arms
transfers to terrorists; 156 share information, including giving "early warnings" to
other states; "[d]eny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens"; prevent the same from operating in their
territories; ensure adequate criminal law and its application against terrorists, their
financiers and supporters; cooperate in exchange of intelligence to this end; and
prevent their free movement. 157
States are requested ("call[ed] upon") to exchange pertinent information, to
cooperate in matters of criminal justice, to ensure that asylum systems are not
abused by participants in terrorism and to ratify pertinent Conventions, in
particular, the Terrorism Financing Convention.1 58 The Council "[n]otes with
concern" connections between international terrorism and other international

150. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 136, pmbl. para. 6.
151. Id. 6.
152. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 136, pmbl. paras. 10-14; S.C. Res. 1377, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
153. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 136.
154. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 6.
155. Id. 11.
156. Compare Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 128, para. 6 (1st princ.).
157. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 2.
158. Id. 3; see Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110.
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crimes, such as illegal trafficking in drugs, arms and nuclear material (though not
persons), and money laundering, and 59although emphasizing the need for
cooperation, does not actually mandate it. 1
The subject matter does not differ radically from Resolution 1269 of October
1999, and Peter J. Van Krieken has argued that Resolution 1373 is a natural
progression from the earlier resolution, rather than indicative of a change in
direction by the Council.160 However, Resolution 1269 is a non-binding Chapter
VI resolution which "calls upon" states to "consider" ratification of anti-terrorism
conventions, as well as applying fully those to which they are party.' 61 They are
asked to take "appropriate steps" to: cooperate with one another to prevent and
suppress terrorism, including by limiting preparation and financing of activities;
deny "safe haven" and ensure prosecution and extradition of those involved; take
"appropriate measures" to limit asylum to terrorists; and exchange information that
can help prevent terrorist acts being committed. 62 This is considerably milder than
Chapter VII Resolution 1373 by virtue of which the Council "decides" that states
"shall" take a number of measures. The suggested measures are given much less
detail in the former resolution, allowing states a broader discretion in their
implementation as well as a choice as to whether they will implement the
recommendations at all.
Resolution 1373's focus on financing of terrorism might have appeared
strange had it not been for the earlier International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism. 163 This meant that the Council members had some
ready-prepared provisions that could be easily adopted, enabling the Council to act
quickly. 164 Nevertheless, in September 2001, that Convention was far from being
in force, having as parties only Botswana, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom and
Uzbekistan. 165 Moreover, whilst introducing, indeed mandating, the counterterrorism provisions of this treaty for all member states, despite the fact that only
one Council member had ratified it, they also neglected to include the safety-net
provisions in the Convention for the benefit of suspects. 166 The "alleged offender"
of the Convention loses the presumption, or at least possibility, of innocence to
become simply the "person[] involved in terrorist acts" in the Council
67
Resolution. 1

159. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 4.
160. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 136; VAN KRIEKEN, supra note 122, at 144.
161. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 136, 2.
162. Id.14.
163. Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110.
164. Compare id. art. 2(1), with S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 11(b). Compare id. art. 8(1), with
S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 1(c). Compare id art. 14, with S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143,
3(g).
165. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Appendix Xll: U. N. Conventions on
Terrorism, INVENTORY OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIMES 2002,

at 358-63 (Nov. 19, 2007), http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/apmunter.pdf.
166. Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110, arts. 9(3)-(6), 17; see also Bianchi,
supra note 121, at 914-15; Alvarez, supra note 121, at 875-78.
167. Compare Terrorism Financing Convention 1999, supra note 110, art. 3, with S.C. Res. 1373,
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Lavalle reminds us that whatever the contents and authority of the norms of
Council 1373, it is not a treaty and, therefore, the customary law of treaty
68
interpretation, including the Vienna Convention, does not apply.'
The overwhelming majority of states, perhaps apprehensive from events
earlier that month, silently accepted the Resolution. Compliance, at least formally,
has since been extraordinary, with every United Nations member state submitting
the requisite initial report (an achievement that must be greatly envied by the
human rights treaty bodies) and scrambling to ratify the relevant treaties) 69 Cuba
was a rare voice at the General Assembly expressing concern about the
constitutional implications of the Council's "lawmaking:"
The Security Council has been pushed to give its legal support to the
hegemonic and arbitrary decisions of the dominant Power. Those
decisions violate the Charter and international law and encroach upon
the sovereignty of all States. In this, the Council is once again usurping
the functions of the General Assembly, which is the only organ whose
universal membership and democratic format could legitimize such farreaching decisions. The Council uses the unusual method of imposing
on all States some of the provisions found in the conventions against
terrorism, to which individual States have the right to decide whether or
70
not they wish to be signatories.1
Resolution 1373 introduces for all states obligations of conduct rather than
obligations of result. 171 States are required to take certain, quite specific measures.
If they fail to do so, they will be responsible for their failure; to the extent that the
Council even threatens to take "'all necessary steps" against them.1 72 If a state
should take these measures and some funds still reach terrorists within its
jurisdiction, the state will have satisfied the requirements of due diligence and will
not engage responsibility as it will not have committed any "wrongful act., 1 73 On

supra note 143, 1 2(a). The CTC, having early on declared that human rights concerns were outside its
mandate, later proved more cooperative, and the Council introduced requirements that counter-terrorism
measures be respectful of human rights and humanitarian law in later resolutions. E.g., S.C. Res. 1456,
1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003); S.C. Res. 1624, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14,
2005). At the end of 2006, a system was introduced for delisting innocent persons from the sanctions
regime of the 1267 Committee. S.C. Res. 1735, IT 13-14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006). See
also BECKER, supra note 130, at 127-29. For a review of the CTC's engagement with human rights, see
Flynn, supra note 123.
168. Lavalle, supra note 121, at 418.
169. David Cortright, A Critical Evaluation of the U.N. Counter-Terrorism Program:
Accomplishments and Challenges 5-6, http://www.tni.org/crime-docs/cortright.pdf (last visited Sept.
20, 2008); see U.N. Secretariat, Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Concept Paper on the
High Commissioner'sProposalfor a Unified Standing Treaty Body, at 19, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2
(Mar. 22, 2006).
170. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 13th plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.13 (Oct. 1, 2001) (speech
by Mr. Rodriguez Parrilla of Cuba).
171. See supra text accompanying note 92.
172. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 18.
173. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 46 I.L.M. 188, 1 430, at 294-95 (Feb. 26, 2007)
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the other hand, if a state fails to take these measures, even if no terrorist funding
does
occurs, it will still technically be in breach of the obligation. Responsibility
74
terrorism.
of
act
any
alone
let
financing,
terrorist
actual
on
not depend
The ministerial level meeting of the 1 2th of November 2001, resulting in
Resolution 1377, reinforced the obligations of Resolution 1373.75 It also
empowered the CTC to consider ways to assist states in complying with the earlier
resolution.1 76 A number of resolutions follow relating to the 1267 sanctions
regime, variously extending the sanctions to be applied, reporting requirements to
the 1267 committee, and improving cooperation with the CTC. 177 Sanctions are
modestly eased in Resolution 1452 with regard to basic necessities and to pay
debts. 178 In January 2003, states, whilst reminded of their obligations, including
reporting obligations, are also advised to ensure compliance with international law,
including human rights. 179 Under pressure from some European states, a system
for "delisting" innocent persons from the sanctions regime of 1267 was finally
introduced in December 2006.18°
The Madrid bombings in 2004 were followed by the disastrous Resolution
1530 which, under pressure from the Spanish Government, explicitly attributed
181
blame to ETA, despite a paucity of evidence indicating their involvement.
The
82
later.'
months
16
bombings
mistake was not repeated after the London
The CTC was restructured and strengthened by Resolution 1535 and this
move was followed by another "legislative" effort of the Council in Resolution
1540, this time introducing obligations on states to deny assistance to any non-state
actors attempting to develop or otherwise obtain biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons.1 3 States are also required to review and, if necessary, amend or enforce
their domestic laws to prevent non-state actors handling such weapons.' 84 Nonproliferation measures must be increased (also, it would appear, in respect of
states) regardless of member states' ratification of or accession to relevant non-

[hereinafter Genocide Convention case].
174. See Ago: Second Report 1970, supra note 120, at 194-95. Damage will be relevant to the
availability of remedies, in particular, in identifying an "injured state" in light of ILC Articles 42 and
48. ILC Articles, supra note 4, arts. 42, 48, at 54, 56.
175. S.C. Res. 1377, supra note 152.
176. Id. annex paras. 13-15.
177. S.C. Res. 1390, 77 I to 2(a)-(c), U.N. Doe. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455, 77 1,
3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1526, 77 1-3, 10, 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526
(Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1617, 71 1, 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1735, supra
note 167, 7 1,29.
178. S.C. Res. 1452, 77 1-2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002).
179. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 167, 1 6.
180. S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 167,I 13-14.
181. S.C. Res. 1530,
1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1530 (Mar. 11, 2004); see also Therese O'Donnell,
Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004), 17 EUR. J.INT'L L.
945, 946 (2007).
182. S.C. Res. 1611, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1611 (July 7, 2005).
183. S.C. Res. 1535, IT 1-3, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1535 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1540, 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); see also Lavalle, supra note 121, at 416.
184. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183, 7 2.
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proliferation treaties. 185 Another committee was established, which will receive
mandatory reports from states on compliance. 186 The Council has become a little
less belligerent since Resolution 1373 and, rather than "express[ing] its
determination to take all necessary steps," this time more modestly "expresses its
intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at 87the
appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end."'1
This time, the constitutional issues did not go unremarked and a number of
states expressed concerns about the propriety of the Council taking this kind of
action.1 88 Nevertheless, after the fact, they complied. 189
The CTC is authorized to make state visits, with state consent, in Resolution
1566.190 This Resolution is also worth considering for its reiteration of the
Council's interpretation of state obligations vis d vis terrorism, as it:
Calls upon States to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism,
especially with those States where or against whose citizens terrorist
acts are committed, in accordance with their obligations under
international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice,
on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who
supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the
financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or
191
provides safe havens.
September 2005 witnessed Resolution 1624's expansion of the counterterrorism mission to preventing the "glorification of terrorist acts" and, albeit with
a nod to human rights, in particular the right of free speech, calls upon states to
prohibit and prevent "incitement" to terrorism.1 92 States are also called upon to
improve passenger screening in international transport.' 93 The Council again seeks
to establish an international norm for the entire international community, although,
by "calling upon" rather than "deciding.. .that States shall," there is not the same
legislative air - the Council is "asking nicely" rather than demanding compliance
from states.
C. Who is the State? Counter-terrorismObligationsand Responsibility of States
The Council's counter-terrorism resolutions do not provide an unambiguous
view of state responsibility. Not for the first time, precision is a casualty of the
veto power. There are, however, at least three possible interpretations that can be
drawn from the post-2001 resolutions. The first is uncontroversial; the second, in

185. Id. 3; but see U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 2-5, U.N. Doe. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28,
2004) (speech by Mr. Akram of Pakistan regarding the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540).
186. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183,74.
187. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 8; S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183, 11.
188. Lavalle, supra note 121, at 426-28.
189. Id.at 428.
190. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 118, 8.
191. Id. 2.
192. S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 167, pmbl. paras. 5, 7, 1.

193. Id 2.
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this author's opinion, engages little controversy; the third is sufficiently
controversial to remain unproven.
1. States must refrain from interference with the sovereign affairs of other
states, including by supporting, inter alia, terrorist actors
The obligation of states to respect the sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity of one another is a central pillar of international law. This
principle can be found in the Charter1 94 and in the Friendly Relations Declaration:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging
the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including
mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
acts referred to in the
towards the commission of such acts, when the 195
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
Today, widely accepted as a description of customary international law, the
second of these paragraphs was replicated with approval in the Preambles to

Council Resolutions 748 and 1373.196

According to the classical understanding, the state is thus responsible for
providing any assistance or support to terrorists, but not for any resulting terrorists
attacks themselves. Responsibility depends on the dependence and control tests of
ILC Articles 4 & 8, Nicaragua, and now the Genocide Convention case.

The

international wrong is the positive action of the state in providing support; this
may, depending on the circumstances, reach the threshold of "indirect aggression",
but it will not constitute an "armed attack." As a negative obligation, i.e. a duty to
abstain, due diligence is irrelevant; it is nonsense to talk about doing one's best not
to do something. States must simply not do it.197 The question of whether the
Council has instigated a stronger doctrine of responsibility, that is, responsibility
for the terrorist acts themselves, will be addressed shortly.
2. States must exercise due diligence to prevent terrorism and protect others
Breaches of positive obligations are recognized as giving rise to responsibility
in ILC Article 12.198 According to this, it is irrelevant whether the obligation
emanates from treaty, customary international law, or even Council resolution. In
the commentary to this article, Council resolutions are not amidst the examples
proffered by the ILC. 199 However, the ILC did not purport to provide an
200
exhaustive list.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 128, paras. 8-9 (1st princ.).
S.C. Res. 748, supra note 136; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143.
Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 31-33.
ILC Articles, supranote 4, art. 12, at 46.
Id. cmit. to art. 12 3, at 126.
Id.
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Long recognized is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States," as held in the
first judgment of the post-Charter Court. 20 1 Therefore, the state has a positive
obligation to prevent terrorist activities being organized within its territory. This
obligation is subject to the requirements of due diligence. 20 2 Ago explains that
where the state does not act with due diligence:
the Government of that State will be accused of having failed to fulfil
its international obligations with respect to vigilance, protection and
control, of having failed in its specific duty not to tolerate the
preparation in its territory of actions which are directed against a
foreign Government or which might endanger the latter's security, and
so on.

20 3

As already noted, the degree of diligence due, or the
standard of care, expected of a
20 4
play.
in
rule
primary
the
on
depending
state varies
The Council's resolutions, in particular 1373, 1540, and 1566 would indicate
that the standards of care, that is, the degree of diligence due, are higher for
terrorism today than prior to 2001.205 There has, therefore, been a change in the
primary rules, without necessarily indicating a change in the secondary rules of
attributability. The state (still identified per Nicaragua) remains responsible for
failing to take adequate measures to prevent terrorist acts, but the measures
expected of the state are more stringent than before. A failure to meet these
(higher) standards would constitute a separate delict and it is for this delict, rather
than the terrorist attack itself, that the state is responsible. Furthermore, by
introducing obligations of (diligent) conduct, state responsibility depends solely on
the state's action or inaction and does not require any actual terrorist attack.20 6
Ago's 1970 report explains that:
There have been innumerable cases in which States have been held
responsible for damage caused by individuals. As will be shown later,
these alleged cases of State responsibility for the acts of individuals are
really cases of responsibility of the State for omissions by its organs: the
State is responsible for having failed20 to
take appropriate measures to
7
prevent or punish the individual's act.
This is to say that the state has not been held responsible for the actions of the
individuals as though they were the state's own; the non-state behavior is not
attributed to the state. The state instead is only responsible for its separate delict

201. Corfu Channel, supra note 24, at 22.
202. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 34-36.
203. Roberto Ago, FourthReport on State Responsibility, [1972] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 70, 120
135, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
205. Compare S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 3, and S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183, 1-3, and
S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 118, 2, with S.C. Res. 748, supra note 136, 4-6.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
207. Ago: Second Report 1970, supra note 120, 35, at 188.
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(the omission of its organs). As in genocide, where omission is the basis for
responsibility, there is no need to identify a state organ or agent according to
Nicaraguaor any other standard.2 °8
Pisillo-Mazzeschi confirmed this interpretation in 1992. "[T]he conduct of
tolerance is not an act of aggression but only a breach of the autonomous rule of
customary law, which binds the State20 9to prevent, in its territory, the organization of
acts of force against foreign States.,
delict, 210
State responsibility in Corfu Channel hinged on such a separate
specifically, the failure to warn shippers of the dangers of which Albania was
deemed to have been aware.211
It thus appears that the primary rules determining the degree of due diligence
to prevent terrorism have changed. But it remains possible that the secondary rules
of attribution have also changed and that Ago's and Pisillo-Mazzeschi's views
have been superceded. This latter possibility will now be considered.
3. States bear responsibility for injuries caused by non-state terroristactors
Some recent scholarship has argued both descriptively and prescriptively that
states should be held accountable, i.e. engage full international responsibility, for
the acts of terrorists whom they support or harbor without the need to establish a
connection meeting the Nicaragua test, but depending on a causation test or even
strict liability.212 Savarese has argued more modestly that the failure of due
diligence in the context of terrorism, when followed by a specific terrorist attack,
could be characterized as "complicity" albeit in a non-technical sense ("complicita;
213

sia pure solo in senso atecnico").

However, this would not square with the

Court's reading of complicity, which it considered equivalent to "aid or assistance
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act" and requiring some positive
214
The arguments in support of these
action on the part of state organs or agents.
positions are not based solely on the Council resolutions that have been the focus
of this paper, but also engage with other evidence of usus and opinio juris, in
particular, the invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. It should thus be
recalled that the Council has been considerably less forthright than the hegemonic
power in its exposition of the rules of attribution. The President of the United
States of America, immediately following the terrorist attacks on that country, but
208. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
209. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 36.
210. "Separate delict" is equivalent to "different wrongful act" as used by Pisillo-Mazzeschi, id. at
26.
211. Corfu Channel, supra note 24, at 22.
212. E.g., BECKER, supra note 130, chs. 8-9; Alvarez, supra note 121, at 879; Vincent-Jodl Proulx,
Babysitting Terrorists: Should States be Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 615 (2005).
213. Eduardo Savarese, Fatti di Privati e Responsabiliti dello Stato tra Organo di Fatto e
complicita" alla luce di Recenti Tendenze della Prassi Internazionale, in LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA
RESPONSABILITA INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI ALLA PROVA DE FATTi., supra note 37, at 53, 66.

214. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
16, at 47.

419-21; see also ILC Articles, supra note 4, art.
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before the identification of any likely perpetrators, insisted that the country would
make "no distinction between the terrorists who committed the attacks and those
who harbor them." 215 The paucity of international responses to this incredible
statement must at least in part be attributed to the political atmosphere of the
moment and a reluctance to appear in any way apologetic for the thousands killed.
It would be dangerous, in this author's view, to read too much into one
example of intervention in Afghanistan by a group of strong states against a very
216
weak state at an emotionally and politically charged moment in World history.
It might also prove short-sighted to depend too heavily on any opinio juris of states
in that now notorious second week of September 2001. The Council resolutions,
on the other hand, particularly 1373 and 1540 creating, as they do, obligations on
states without limit of time, create a more lasting legacy. These resolutions might
be interpreted to support a theory of state responsibility for acts of terrorism by
non-state actors; at least they do not exclude such an interpretation. However,
such an interpretation is by no means the only reasonable one.
Resolution 1368 can certainly be reasonably interpreted as indicating an
explicit assertion of state responsibility for harboring terrorists. 21217 But it is
inadequate to determine whether responsibility is engaged for the terrorist acts
themselves or for some lesser wrong of wrongful interference. Invocation of the
collective right to self-defense, in Resolutions 1368 and 1373 can also be
understood as implicitly indicating state responsibility, at least if one takes the
view that only a state can commit an "armed attack" and that the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001 was accordingly lawful.
On the other hand, the preamble to Resolution 1373 repeats only the
customary norm that states must "refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in terrorist acts... or acquiescing" in such in its territory. Operative
paragraph 2, which details examples of what this means in practice, does not go
any further in indicating direct state responsibility for the results of failure.2 18
Even the Council's threat of "all necessary steps" to ensure compliance does not
logically require state responsibility of any particular form, since the Council's
considerable powers to take measures to ensure international peace and security do
not depend on any actual violation of international law.219
Resolution 1540 indicates a number of positive obligations upon states, but all
of these can be considered within the context of a duty to take measures to prevent
injuries caused by terrorism to the standards of due diligence.22 °
State
responsibility would thus be based on a separate delict - taking inadequate
215. President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation, (Sept. 11,
2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html; see also U.N. SCOR,
56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (Sept. 12, 2001).
216. C.f Nicaragua, supra note 2,
186 (noting that customary international law has room for
exceptions).
217. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 131, 3.
218. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 143, 2.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
220. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 183, 3.
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measures - rather than for any terrorist attack. Therefore, the identity of the actors
as organs or agents is irrelevant.
The Resolutions, taken together, are insufficient to determine a change in the
secondary rules of state responsibility. It is one possible interpretation, but the
more plausible interpretation is that they do not.
D. The Impact of the Council on State Responsibilityfor Terrorism
The Council is clearly purporting to
whether it be primary or secondary rules.
authorized to change both. There is no
international law should differ depending
are at stake.

change the norms of international law,
If it is authorized to change either, it is
reason why the "rules of change" in
on whether primary or secondary rules

If we agree only that states permitting terrorists to operate in their territory
violate a separate (positive) obligation, then there is no change to the secondary
rules of international law; instead, only the standard of due diligence has been
strengthened, that is, the content of the primary rules. On the other hand, if it is to
be accepted that states harboring terrorists are to be considered responsible for the
results of terrorist activities, even in the absence of a de jure connection, complete
dependence, or effective control, then we must accept that the secondary rules of
international law have been amended as far as responsibility for terrorism is
concerned. This would indicate that responsibility for terrorism is lex specialis, as
facilitated by Article 55 of the ILC Articles.
In this latter case we are then lead back to the broader question of whether the
Council has the authority to create such a derogation in the pursuit of international
peace and security. If the Council can, should, and does create international law
binding on every member state, what are the implications of this for the consensual
basis of international law? These questions have been addressed elsewhere and
views range across the spectrum. Eric Rosand claims that the Council certainly
does have this authority and, moreover, there is no contradiction with the
consensual theory of international law as member states have consented to this
power by virtue of the Charter. 22 1 By contrast, Happold argues that legislative
behavior in the Council is both ultra vires and most undesirable,
undermining as it
222
does "sovereign equality" of states and the Charter principles.
The Charter is both treaty and constitution of the United Nations. As the
latter, it is a living document and its norms may be subject to modification by
customary international law.223 In this context, it is possible that the broad
acceptance by states of the Council's "legislative" behavior indicates a shift in
customary international law. The evidence is inconclusive. At best, compliance
with the legislative features of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 indicate adequate state
221. Rosand, supra note 121, at 574; see U.N. Charter arts. 24, 25, 48, 103; see also Bianchi, supra

note 121, at 888-92 (arguing in favor of the Council's "legislative" actions on the basis of a kind of
international state of emergency); Szasz, supra note 121, at 901.
222. Happold, supra note 121, at 607-10; see also Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, at 690.
223. Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
607, 614-15 (2003); Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 121, 689-91.
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practice and opinio juris, albeit with Cuba as persistent objector.224 However, this
is probably too bold a claim, given the concerns raised by other states, including
examples from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, prior to the acceptance of
Resolution 1540.225 Certainly, it is too early to suggest that such a customary
international norm has yet crystallized, and further examples of both Council's
"legislation" and state acceptance of the same will be necessary before such a
determination can confidently be made.
On the other hand, the overwhelming acceptance of the primary norms on
counter-terrorism, originating in the Council's resolutions, indicate that customary
international law pertaining to state obligations regarding terrorism has now
changed, notwithstanding doubts over the authority of the Council to promulgate
such norms. In this latter case, it is not the authority of the Council that creates the
binding norm, but rather its later endorsement by states, in the form of usus and
opinio juris that creates the norm. This would imply not that the Council has the
power to make law, but only that it is has a strong influence on the development of
customary international law; its ultimate formation will depend on states'
behavior. 6
IV.

THE

UNITED

NATIONS

HUMAN

RIGHTS

TREATY

BODIES

AND

STATE

RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT, PROTECT AND FULFILL HUMAN RIGHTS

A. The Treaty Bodies
The seven human rights treaty bodies are as follows: the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), monitoring the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR); 227 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR), monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR); 228 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (Race Committee), monitoring the Convention for the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD); 229 the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (Women's Committee), monitoring the
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW);23 ° the Committee Against Torture (Torture Committee), monitoring the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

224. See supra text accompanying note 170; see also U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 13th plen. mtg. at
14-16, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.13 (Oct. 1, 2001) (speech by Mr. Rodriguez Parrilla of Cuba).
225. See supra notes 188-89; see generally Lavalle, supra note 121.
226. See Arangio-Ruiz, supranote 121, at 693.
227. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
228. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter ICESCRI. The monitoring Committee is not an original part of the Covenant, but was
established later by ECOSOC Res. 1985/17. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 1985/17,
7-8, 18, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1985/17 (May 28, 1985).
229. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 5 I.L.M. 352, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
230. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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Punishment (CAT); 231 the Committee on the Rights of the Child (Children's
Committee), monitoring the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its
Optional Protocols 232 and the Committee on Migrant Workers (Migrant Workers'
Committee), monitoring the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (MWC). 233 Each of these receives and
considers reports of state parties and gives concluding comments or observations
following discussion with state representatives. They also make general comments
or general recommendations addressed to all states, with some committees being
considerably more prolific than others.234 The HRC, Race Committee, Women's
Committee and Torture Committee permit, subject to state consent, individual
communications, with the HRC receiving by far the bulk of these.235 The Migrant
Workers' Committee will also be able to hear communications once 10 states
accede to the procedure; as of September 2007, of 37 state parties, none had made
the requisite declaration.236
CAT contains provisions for state focused inquiries 237 and the recently
established Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment will be authorized to make regular visits to
state parties to monitor conditions in detention of consenting state parties. 238 The
CEDAW Committee can also now undertake inquiries under its Optional
Protocol. 239 The Race Committee is not explicitly authorized by treaty to
undertake inquiries, but does have an early warning and urgent procedure, whereby
231. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
232. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC];
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000);
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000).
233. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, May 2, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1517 [hereinafter MWC]. One new body has be en
established by its convention, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006,
46 I.L.M. 443, and another new body will be created once its convention comes into force, the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res.
61/177, Annex, U.N. Doc. AIRES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006).
234. See U.N. Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/l/Rev.8 (May 8, 2006) [hereinafter
Compilation of General Comments].
235. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter OP-ICCPR]; CAT, supra note 231, art. 13; CERD, supra note
229, art. 14; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter OP-CEDAW].
236. MWC, supra note 233, art. 77.
237. CAT, supra note 231, art. 20. At the time of writing this procedure had been used on five
occasions.
238. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 11, Dec. 18, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 26.
239. See OP-CEDAW, supra note 235, arts. 8-10.
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they make decisions and send letters to states when they have4 immediate concerns
that cannot wait until the timetabling of the next state report.2 0
CAT, the MWC, CERD and the ICCPR provide the opportunity for state
parties to complain to the respective monitoring treaty bodies about the poor
compliance of another state party.2 4' In the former two cases, the treaty body
considers the complaint; in the latter two, it should create an ad hoc Conciliation
Commission.2 42 CAT, CEDAW and the MWC also explicitly provide for
negotiation, followed by arbitration, to resolve disputes as to "interpretation or
application" of the Conventions and, failing to reach agreement, states can bring a
case before the International Court of Justice. 243 These inter-state complaint
procedures had never, as of November 2007, been exercised by state parties. 244
The treaty bodies are in a peculiar position. They are created principally to
receive the state reports on which they are authorized to make "suggestions",
"general comments" or "general recommendations" in their annual reports to the
General Assembly and, in later treaties, also directly to state parties.2 45 They are
authorized to interpret the conventions and to identify violations.2 46 Even in the
individual communications procedures, they are authorized only to transmit
"views," not "opinions" or "judgments".247 Nevertheless, the interpretations of the
committees have had considerable influence on the understanding and application
of the conventions. 248
240. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on the Elimination of
Racial
Discrimination,
Early-Warning
Measures
and
Urgent
Procedures,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/early-warning.htm#about (last visited Sept. 19, 2008)
(stating that the mechanism was adopted in 1993).
241. CAT, supra note 231, art. 21; MWC, supra note 233, art. 76; CERD, supra note 229, art. 11;
ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 41.
242. CAT, supra note 231, art. 21; MWC, supra note 233, art. 76; CERD, supra note 229, art. 12;
ICCPR, supra note 227, arts. 42-43.
243. CAT, supra note 231, art. 30; CEDAW, supra note 230, art. 29; MWC, supra note 233, art.
92. It should also be noted that under the Statute of the Court, any question of treaty interpretation or
purported failure of implementation can be brought before the Court, subject to general provisions on
state consent to its jurisdiction. Statute of the Court, supra note 5, art. 36.
244. Felice D. Gaer, A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body
System, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 109, 118 n.43 (2007); see also Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner
for
Human
Rights,
Human
Rights
Bodies
Complaints
Procedures,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm#interstate (last visited Oct. 2, 2008).
245. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 40(4); CERD, supra note 229, art. 9(2); CEDAW, supra note 230,
art. 21; CAT, supra note 231, art. 19; CRC, supra note 241, art. 45(d); MWC, supra note 233, art.
74(1).
246. See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights
Bodies, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last visited Oct. 6,
2008).
247. CAT, supra note 231, art. 22(7); MWC, supra note 233, art. 77(7); OP-ICCPR, supra note
235, art. 5(3); OP-CEDAW, supra note 235, art. 7(3). The Race Committee is authorized to give
"suggestions and recommendations." CERD, supra note 229, art. 14(7)(b). The HRC now issues
"views" and CEDAW has taken to issuing "decisions," the latter suggesting a more legal process.
248. See Int'l L. Assoc., Comm. on Int'l Human Rights L. & Practice, Final Report on the Impact
of Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Berlin Conference 2004, 1 175-182
(2004), http://web.abo.fi/instut/imr/research/seminars/ILA/Report.pdf.
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With reference to state responsibility regimes under these treaties the first
thing that must be noted is that they are, in fact, treaties. As such, to the extent that
that indicate particular modes of state
the treaties themselves contain provisions
2 49
responsibility, they are lex specialis
Nevertheless, international human rights law, to which the treaty bodies are
major contributors, and the general rules of state responsibility in international law
do not exist in parallel universes. Article 50(1)(b) of the ILC Articles requires that
counter-measures do not compromise "obligations for the protection of
fundamental human rights," and the commentary to this Article cites both the
ICCPR and the ICESCR as examples of "elements of general international law" as
well as making reference to the CESCR's General Comment No. 8.250 The ILC
refers also to the ICCPR, with reference to articles 14, 15, 20 and 30, as well as
The HRC responded to
citing communications of the HRC in its commentary.2
the ILC Articles with a general comment dedicated to explaining their relevance
and application to the ICCPR.252 The treaty bodies' regimes are not self-contained
regimes in all respects.253
B. State Responsibility in the Eyes of the Treaty Bodies
It serves to examine some of the recent work of the treaty bodies to consider
the predominant visions of state responsibility that they have applied. What has
become apparent is an increasing reliance on the tertiary model of state
responsibility for human rights, that is, responsibility to respect human rights (do
no harm), to protect human rights (prevent harm by non-state actors) and to fulfill
human rights (guarantee minimums of wellbeing).25 4

249. ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 55 at 58.
250. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 50, T 7, at 335; ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, (Dec. 4, 1997), reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 51. See also Malcolm D. Evans, State
Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights: Role and Realm, in ISSUES OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 139, 142 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice &
Dan Sarooshi eds., 2004).
251. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to arts. 14, 1 11; 15, 1 6 n.276; 20, 10 n.349, 30 1 13 n.476.
252. U.N. Hum. Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2lRev.1/Add.13 (May 29,
2004), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 233 [hereinafter HRC
General Comment No. 31].
253. See ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 55, 5, at 358; Int'l L. Comm'n, Fragmentationof
InternationalLaw: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law:
Report of the Study Group of the InternationalLaw Commission, 1 174-93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi); Dominic McGoldrick, State Responsibility and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 161, 165, supra note 250; but see Evans, supra note 250, at
160 (arguing that state responsibility in human rights, per the European Court of Human Rights and
state responsibility in the ILC Articles are best considered "as operating in altogether different
realm[s]"). The arguments relating to the European regime are not, as will be argued, equally applicable
to the U.N. treaty bodies.
254. See Byrnes & Connors, supra note 3.
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This model traces its origins to Henry Shue and Asbjorn Eide in the mid
1980s. 255 The extent to which each of the seven bodies engages with it varies and
can be seen most explicitly in the operation of the CESCR. The Torture
Committee, no doubt feeling the constraints of its text which clearly prioritizes

"state" torture, traditionally confined its concerns to the duty to respect. However,
in recent years, it has expanded its gaze to the duty to protect but has not seen
scope to consider duties to fulfill. 25 6 The reasons for this shall be explored
below.257

Given the enormous volume of work of the treaty bodies, a workload with
which even they struggle to keep up, a select review of the treaty bodies' work
shall be provided to demonstrate their engagement with the tertiary model.258
The CESCR explicitly relied upon this scheme in 1999 to frame General
Comment No. 12 and it has appeared in every general comment issued by that
committee since.259 Moreover, the concluding comments on state reports clearly
34-36, 112255. Special Rapporteur, Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right,
15, 167-81, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7,
1987). This tertiary system is followed by the African Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights. See,
e.g., Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. [SERAC] v. Nig., African Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights,
Commc'n. No. 155/96 (2001), available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr-doc/serac.pdf. The European
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognize positive duties
principally at the level of protection. See, e.g., X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 235, 239-40 (1985); A v. UK, App. No. 25599/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1998); Femandes v.
56
Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev.
(2001); Morales v. Guatemala, 1999 Inter-Am. C.H.R. Series C, No. 63, TT 144, 191 (Nov. 19, 1999),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_63_ing.pdf. In this latter case, the
court bordered on recognizing a duty to fulfill the right to life to ensure one would "not be prevented
from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence."
256. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 21 (Kathleen E. Mahoney &
Paul Mahoney eds., 1993); Kathleen Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives on Women's Human Rights
and Strategiesfor their Implementation, 21 BROOK J. INT'L L. 799, 847-48 (1996); see also Christine
Chinkin, A Critiqueof the Public/PrivateDimension, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 387, 390 (1999).
257. See infra text accompanying notes 327-29.
258. On volume of work, see Rachael Loma Johnstone, Cynical Savings or Reasonable Reform?
Reflections on a Single Unified U.N. Human Rights Treaty Body, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173, 178-81
(2007). A more thorough examination of the tertiary scheme in practice can be found in Rachael Loma
Johnstone, Feminist Influences on the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 28 HUM. RTS. Q.
148, 154-80 (2006) [hereinafter Johnstone: Feminist Influences].
259. ECOSOC, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequatefood (art. 11), 14, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 63,
66. See also ECOSOC, General Comment No. 13: The right to education (art. 13), 46, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/10 (Aug. 12, 1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at
71, 80; ECOSOC, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standardof health
33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999), reprinted in Compilation of General
(art. 12),
Comments, supra note 234, at 86, 94; ECOSOC, GeneralComment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11
and 12 of the Covenant), 25, U.N. Doc. 3/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003), reprintedin Compilation of
General Comments, supra note 234, at 105, 111; ECOSOC, General Comment No. 16: The equal right
17-21, U.N.
of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and culturalrights (art. 3),
Doc. E/C. 12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005), reprintedin Compilation of General Comments, supra note 2344,
at 122, 125-26; ECOSOC, General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the
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indicate that state parties are obliged to ensure human rights on all three levels.260
To give recent examples, concerns have been expressed about: the level of the
minimum wage, the impact of privatization on workers' rights, and discrimination
between families of war victims,

261

which can be considered pertinent to duties to

respect human rights; gender stereotypes, domestic violence, human trafficking
and racial prejudice,262 all of which can be seen as matters of protecting human
rights; and finally unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, consumption of illegal
drugs, HIV/AIDS, housing and the education of Romani children, 63 which
envisage state duties to fulfill human rights, even where neither state nor private
delict can be said to be the cause of the human rights failure.
The duty to respect, protect and fulfill economic, social and cultural rights
was entrenched in the Maastricht guidelines on violations of economic, social and
cultural rights.264 Although these guidelines are not strictly limited to the ICESCR,
they are clearly influenced by the work of the CESCR and are intended to provide
further clarification of what is required of states to fulfill their treaty obligations
under the Covenant. The tertiary framework is explicitly introduced with the
comment that "[l]ike civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights
impose three different types of obligations on States: the obligations to respect,
protect and fulfill.

' 265

It is significant that the tertiary framework is not considered

some special characteristic of economic, social and cultural rights, but in fact
pervades the whole range of international human rights. 66
Obligations of conduct and result are distinguished in the Maastricht
Guidelines, although more in line with the French understanding of obligation de
moyens (obligation to act to a professional standard) and obligation de r~sultat
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he or she is the author (art. 15), 71 28-34, 44-46, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan.
12, 2006), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 131, 137-39, 142-43;
ECOSOC, General Comment No. 18: The right to work (art. 6), 77 22-28, 33-36, U.N. Doe.
E/C. 12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006), reprintedin Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 148,
153-54, 156-57.
260. See, e.g., infra notes 262-64.
261. ECOSOC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Uzbekistan,
15, 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/UZB/CO/1 (Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter CESCR
Uzbekistan 2005]; ECOSOC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 15, 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BIH/CO/1 (Nov. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter CESCR Bosnia 2005].
262. CESCR Uzbekistan 2005, supra note 261, 17 24-25; CESCR Bosnia 2005, supra note 261, 1
21-22; ECOSOC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights,
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1 12, 14, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/LYB/CO/2 (Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter CESCR
Libya 2005].
263. CESCR Uzbekistan 2005, supra note 261, 77 17, 27, 31-33; CESCR Bosnia 2005, supra note
261, 17 13, 23, 24, 29; CESCR Libya 2005, supra note 262, 17 15, 17, 19.
264. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 20 HUM.
RTS. Q. 691 (1998) [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines].
265. Id.at 693.
266. See, e.g., ECOSOC, General Comment No. 12, supra note 259,
15, at 66; ECOSOC,
General Comment No. 15, supra note 259, 20, at 110 (applying the tertiary framework "like [for] any
other human right.").
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(obligation to achieve a particular end), rather than the distinction introduced by
Ago in the first reading of the ILC Articles between obligations of conduct
(obligations to do something specific) and obligations of result (obligations to
achieve a particular end, with discretion as to means).267 The Maastricht guidelines
indicate a degree of discretion for obligations of conduct in determining which
particular measures should be taken ("measures reasonably calculated", or "all
appropriate means") that does not fit with Ago's understanding. 268
A chapter on state responsibility for violations (whether from failure to
respect, protect or fulfill, from action or omission) is contained in the Maastricht
guidelines.2 69 It is based on territorial control, prima facie jurisdiction, but in the
case of alien domination or occupation, also "effective control. '270 In this context,
"effective control" is intended to mean effective control of a physical location or
over individual potential victims, not control over perpetrators in the Nicaragua
sense. 271 The intention is to ensure that where states operate outside of their own
territory (such as in situations of military occupation or peacekeeping), state actors
must respect the human rights of all those over whom they exercise authority and
also exercise due diligence to protect the human rights of those persons. 272 The
duty of due diligence in control of private entities, "including transnational
corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction" to guarantee ICESCR rights is
specified.2 73 States are also reminded of their responsibility for acts of international
organizations of which they are members and should ensure they too conform to
the Covenant.274
Violations of the ICESCR "are in principle imputable to the State within
whose jurisdiction they occur., 275 However, from the examples given, it is quite
clear violations are violations by state organs or agents, or omissions where the
state had a duty to act.276 To the extent private violations of human rights occur,
277
state responsibility, under the Maastricht guidelines, depends on due diligence.
State responsibility, therefore, is not engaged every time someone's rights are
apparently infringed; responsibility of the state will depend on a separate delict,
most commonly in the form of an omission, but also possibly in the form of
tolerance or a cover-up on the part of the state, e.g. in disappearances or domestic
violence cases. Responsibility is not for the injury, but for the state's tolerance or
attempt to cover-up. As long as minimum core obligations are satisfied, such as
access to basic food and healthcare, the state will have a defense of having taking
267. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 264, at 694; on possible confusion arising from the
terminology, see supra note 92.
268. MaastrichtGuidelines, supra note 264, at 694; ICESCR, supra note 228, art. 2(1).
269. Id. at 698.
270. Id.
115 at 65.
271. Id.; see Nicaragua, supra note 2,
272. See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 264, at 698.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id at 696-97.
277. Id.
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"all appropriate means" within the context of its own condition of economic
development to prevent or redress the private wrong or to ensure that the rights
278
under the ICESCR have been fulfilled.
In case it be thought that the ICESCR is a special case of mandating positive
rights, the work of the HRC should also be examined. Again, the concluding
comments on state reports demonstrate that the HRC considers state parties
responsible for respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights contained in
the ICCPR. 27 9 Their work demonstrates an emphatic rejection of the purported
division of positive and negative rights between the two covenants, this distinction
28°
having long been rubbished in academic commentary.
As early as 1981, the HRC expressed the view that it was inadequate for state
parties to "respect" human rights, but that they must also take positive measures to
guarantee their full enjoyment for all inhabitants:
The Committee considers it necessary to draw the attention of States
parties to the fact that the obligation under the Covenant is not confined
to the respect of human rights, but that States parties have also
undertaken to ensure the enjoyment of these rights to all individuals
this undertaking relates to all
under their jurisdiction... in principle
281
rights set forth in the Covenant.
This comment was superseded in 2004 by General Comment No. 31, issued in
response to the ILC Articles.282 Like its predecessor, it emphasizes the positive
duties that state parties to the ICCPR have accepted and specifically explains that
although there is no direct horizontal effect (i.e. individuals do not have obligations
under the Convention), states must "exercise due diligence to prevent, punish,
investigate or redress" violations by private persons or entities.283 The beneficiaries
of the obligations are human beings, but not only citizens; instead, all persons
within the "effective control" of the state must be protected. 284 Although the HRC
could not have been unaware of the meaning of "effective control" in Nicaragua,
in the General Comment it does not refer to "effective control" of the actors, but

278. Id. at 695.
279. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], Report of the Human Rights Committee on the
Eighty-fifth, Eighty-sixth & Eighty-seventh Sessions Vol. 1, 67, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 40,
U.N. Doc. A/61/40, (2006) [hereinafter HRC 2006 Report].
280. Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, ConstitutionalRopes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?
Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46, 71 (1992); C~cile Fabre,
ConstitutionalisingSocial Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263, 268-70 (1998); HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 180-86 (2d ed.

2000).
281. HRC, General Comment No. 3: Article 2 (Implementation at the national level), 1, reprinted
in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 164.
282. HRC, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
State Partiesto the Covenant, supra note 252, 1.
283. Id. 8, at 235.
284. Id. 10, at236.
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rather "effective control" of "territory and jurisdiction." 285 This use is comparable
to that found in the Maastricht guidelines.286
Although not following the terminology of duties to respect, to protect and to
fulfill, recognition of state responsibility at all three levels is implicit in the HRC's
output as can be seen from the example of General Comment No. 28 on gender
equality. 287 Duties to respect human rights in this Comment include review of
domestic law to ensure women do not face direct discrimination, for example, with
regard to regulations on women's clothing, women's freedom to travel, access to
judicial process, marriage and its dissolution, and social security law.288 States
should also report on conditions for women in prison.289 However, the need for
"positive measures in all areas so as to achieve the effective and equal
empowerment of women" makes it quite clear that the duty to respect is not the
beginning and end of state responsibility. 290 State parties must protect women and
girls from murder and infanticide within the family, domestic violence and other
violence including rape and female genital mutilation, trafficking and forced
prostitution, and discrimination in employment. 291 Furthermore, states should
report on their efforts to fulfill women's rights to the same degree as those of men
by providing information on maternal and infant mortality, poverty and deprivation
amongst women, and "must...take effective and positive measure" to promote
women's292 equal participation in public life, "including appropriate affirmative
action."
Concluding observations from recent state reports also demonstrate
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.293 Examples of concerns
about respect of human rights include the conduct of law enforcement personnel,
conditions of suspects in the "war on terror," deportation to face the risk of torture,
women in prison, especially mothers, and de jure discrimination against native
women and their children.294 Duties to protect human rights are evident in the
HRC's interest in domestic violence, the high rate of violent death amongst native
women, slavery and human trafficking, hate speech, violence and hate crime
against gays and lesbians, and gender discrimination in employment.295
Responsibility to fulfill human rights is apparent where the HRC considers the
285. Id; Cf ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 2(1) (requiring states to "respect and ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant").
286. See supra text accompanying note 270; see also HRC 2006 Report, supra note 279, 84(10).
But see Bankovi6 v. Belgium, (Admissibility) (No. 52207/99), 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335; Evans,
supra note 250, at 152 (indicating a different approach in the European Court of Human Rights).
287. HRC, General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The equality of rights between men and women),
reprintedin Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 218.
288. Id.
13, 16, 18, 25-26, 31, at 220-24.
289. Id. 115, at 220-21.
290. Id 3, at 218.
291. Id. 10-12, 31, at 220, 224.
10, 29 at 220, 224.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., HRC 2006 Report, supra note 279,
76(15), 78(12), 79(10)-(11), 81(16), 84.
294. Id.
295. Id. 76(23), 78, 79(9), 81(12), 84(28).
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conditions of life for street children, Roma, and the unequal racial impact of
homelessness and natural disasters.296
The majority of communications considered by the HRC pertain to purported
violations by state organs, i.e. violations of the duty to respect human rights which
would engage liability within the Nicaraguaparadigm. 97
State responsibility for a failure to respect human rights will depend on
attribution to a state organ or agent identified per Nicaragua. As under the
ICESCR, state responsibility is not automatic for every private delict but will
always depend on evidence of a separate delict on the part of the state, as will
responsibility for failure to fulfill human rights. 298 Responsibility for failing to
protect or fulfill the rights of the ICCPR will depend on evidence that the state has
not taken the (positive) measures that it should have, i.e. it has not acted with due
diligence.299
The texts of CEDAW, the CRC and MWC all indicate an explicit acceptance
by state parties of positive obligations and, unsurprisingly, their respective treaty

bodies support the tertiary model of state responsibility.3 °0

With reference to

296. Id.71 78, 79(22), 84(26).
297. See id TT 107-226 (summarizing cases by issue, including procedural matters from 107-43,
substantive matters from 144-202, and remedies from 203-26).
298. See Nicaragua, supra note 2, 269.
299. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 2(2).
300. CEDAW, supra note 230, arts. 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14; CRC, supra note 232, arts. 11, 19, 20,
23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32-36, 39; MWC, supra note 233, arts. 25, 28, 30, 31, 43, 45, 68. Duties at all three
levels are ubiquitous in the concluding comments of the Women's Committee and the Children's
Committee. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the
Committee on the Elimination of DiscriminationAgainst Women, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No.
38, U.N. Doc. A/61/38 (2006); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observationsof the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Kazakhstan, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/KAZ/CO/3 (June 19, 2007); U.N.
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child. Uruguay, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/URY/CO/2 (July 5, 2007); U.N. Comm. on the Rights
of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Maldives, 45th
Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/MDV/CO/3 (July 13, 2007); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Slovakia, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/SVK/CO/2 (July 19, 2007). At the time of writing, the Migrant Workers' Committee had
reviewed only three state reports, but, as well as duties on state actors to respect human rights, duties to
protect and fulfill are also illustrated. For example, duties to protect are illustrated in concerns about
discrimination against migrant workers, human trafficking, violence and exploitation facing migrant
workers, especially domestic workers, and the vulnerability of unaccompanied minors to abuse and
exploitation. Additionally, duties to fulfill are illustrated in concerns about access to school for migrant
workers' children and access to medical care. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Protection of the Rights ofAll Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families:Mali, 71 22-23, U.N.
Doc. CMW/C/MLI/CO/l (May 31, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Protection
of the Rights ofAll Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: Mexico, 11 24, 27, 29, 33, 39, 41,
U.N. Doc. CMW/C/MEX/CO/1 (Dec. 20, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the Prot. of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: Egypt, 1 20, 36, 38, 50, U.N.
Doc. CMW/C/EGY/CO/l (Dec. 20, 2006).
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broader norms of state responsibility, the Women's Committee reminds state
parties in General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women: "[u]nder
general international law and specific human rights covenants, States may also be
responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing
3 2
0
compensation." 301 The tertiary model is employed in later general comments.
Of the few communications to date considered by the Women's Committee,
three stand out as "classic" examples of state failure to protect human rights, each
being concerned with domestic violence. The first, A. T. v Hungary, is perhaps a
paradigm of the discourse between treaty body and state party envisaged by the
drafters of the Protocol. 30 3

In this case, the communications system brings a

problem to the attention of a state party, the state acknowledges that its legal
system and institutions are inadequate, promises to take measures to improve
protection even before the inevitable finding of a violation of CEDAW, and
further, at least according to the state party, these measures have largely now been
introduced. 3° The other two communications, Goekce v Austria3°5 and Yildirim v
° , warrant less optimism, not the least of which because by the time of the
Austria306
communication, the victims had already been murdered by violent partners, but
also because of the adversarial and defensive response of the state party which
insisted that its institutions had not failed either victim and that, in the former case
at least, the victim herself bore responsibility for having failed to leave, implying
301. U.N. Comm.on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, GeneralRecommendation
No. 19: Violence against women, 7 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/38, reprinted in Compilation of General
Comments, supra note 234, at 303.
302. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, GeneralRecommendation
No. 24: Article 12 of the convention (women and health), 77 13-17, A/54/38Rev.1, reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 332-33; U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 25: Article 4, paragraph 1, of the
Convention (temporary special measures), 4, A/54/38Rev.1, reprinted in Compilation of General
Comments, supra note 234, at 337.
303. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3 of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Communication No. 2/2003, Ms. A. T. v. Hungary, in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/60/38(Part I) Annex III 77 9.3-9.7 [hereinafter AT. v
Hungary].
304. Id.7 5.6-5.10. See also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Sixth PeriodicReport ofthe Republic of Hungary to the United Nations on the Elimination ofAll Forms
of DiscriminationAgainst Women, arts. 1-4, 16, U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/HUN/6 (June 15, 2006).
305. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Communication No. 5/2005, Goekce v. Austria, Annex, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (Aug. 6,
2007) [hereinafter Goekce v. Austria].
306. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Communication No. 6/2005, Yildirim v. Austria, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (Oct. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter Yildirim v. Austria].
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that the violence that marred the relationship was attributable equally to the victim
and even playing a cultural relativism card, suggesting that the perpetrator's
(Turkish) explains and justifies his "harsh statements" (i.e. death"background"
3 7
threats).
The Women's Committee's approach in all three cases is to recognize the
duty of "due diligence," with particular reference to General Recommendation
19.308 This has been violated by both state parties, but in subtly different manner.
In the Austrian cases, there are laws and institutions in place which should provide
protection to the standard required by CEDAW. However, there has been a
manifest failure by the state organs to apply them to the necessary extent. This is
the separate delict. By contrast, Hungary simply lacked the necessary mechanisms
altogether. There was no single state organ that could be said to have failed to
exercise due diligence because no single state organ had the power to take the
requisite action to protect A.T. Instead, the fault, the separate delict, attaches to
for not ensuring a system of
the "state authorities considered as a 3whole"
09
protection to meet its primary obligations.
Where the Women's Committee's analysis departs from that of the Court in
the Genocide Convention case is in the former's lack of concern with the matter of
causation. 3 10 In cases of non-state perpetrators of human rights violations, it can
perhaps never be conclusively established that even had the state taken all
appropriate measures, the violation would have been prevented. This is especially
so with regard to cases of domestic violence; in the most progressive states with
extensive legal and social protection for victims of domestic violence and
dedicated efforts to change cultural norms that perpetuate the acceptability of such
violence, domestic violence still occurs, even to the extent of homicide.
It must also be recalled that the principles for reparation to an injuredstate for
failing to prevent genocide as considered by the Court need not be equivalent to
the principles for reparation to injured human persons under human rights treaties.
Causation is briefly mentioned as necessary to establish a right to reparation in the
second reading of the ILC Articles, but is drafted in view of injuries to other states,
not injuries to human persons. 311 It is also made clear in the commentary that the
principles of causation are an aspect of primary, not secondary, rules and hence,
312
there is no standard of causation common to all primary rules.
The Women's Committee, furthermore, has not hindered itself to the same
extent as the Court in the Genocide Convention case with an insurmountable
307. Goekce v. Austria, supra note 305, T 8.8. See also id TT 4.2-4.5, 8.4-8.6, 8.14.
308. A.T v. Hungary, supra note 303, 1 9.2; Goekce v. Austria, supra note 305, 1 12.1.1, 12.3;
Yildirim v. Austria, supra note 306, 1 12.1.1.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
310. See supra text accompanying note 94.
311. See ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 31, at 223; see also Benedetto Conforti, Exploring the
Strasbourg Case-Law: Reflections on State Responsibility for the Breach of Positive Obligations, in
ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 250, at

129, 135-36.
312. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 31,

10, at 227-28.

2008

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

burden of proof;313 instead, to the extent that the communications process can be
considered a kind of legal proceeding, it is of a civil nature and therefore a balance
of probabilities/preponderance of evidence test is adequate. 314 The Women's
Committee does not belabor the point, and the parties do not argue it, but it can be
assumed that if these two violent men had been in prison, they could not have
committed murder; if one man were not permitted access to the family home, he
would find it considerably harder to beat his ex-partner. Furthermore, the vast
majority of the remedies suggested by the Women's Committee are "forwardlooking." Only with regard to A.T. is compensation indicated (it being of little
comfort to the two deceased or their survivors in the Austrian cases) and the other
case-specific remedies are concrete suggestions as to how the state can meet the
requirements of due diligence in the particular case, namely by providing a home,
child support and legal assistance to enable A.T. to live free from violence.315 In
all three cases, systemic changes are recommended which, if implemented, would
satisfy the positive obligations of the states under CEDAW with regard to
eliminating, or at least reducing, domestic violence. 316 If these are implemented
and, notwithstanding such efforts, domestic violence continues to occur, the states
will not be easily said to bear responsibility as there will be no separate delict.
The Race Committee was ambivalent through the 1990s concerning the extent
of state obligations to protect and fulfill the rights under CERD. However, a
change of direction occurred in 1999 and was brought to the fore the following
year in General Recommendation No. XXV: Gender Related Dimensions of Racial
Discrimination. 3 17 The later General Recommendation pertaining to non-citizens
318
also indicates the need for respect, protection and fulfillment of human rights.
For example, state parties should eliminate discrimination in legislation and
immigration policy, and ensure law enforcement agents do not ill-treat or
discriminate against non-citizens in order to respect human rights. 31 9 They must
also protect persons from hate speech and racial violence and discrimination in
employment. 320 Rights must also be fulfilled to ensure "equal enjoyment of the
right to adequate housing" and adequate physical and mental health.321

313.
314.
315.
316.

See supra note 65; see also supra text accompanying note 76.
9.3-9.6.
See A. T v Hungary,supra note 303, at
Id. 19.6(I).
Id. 1 9.6(11); Goekce v. Austria, supra note 305, 1 12.3; Yildirim v. Austria, supra note 306,

12.3.
317. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXV on
gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination,TT 1-6, A/55/18, Annex V at 152 (2000), reprinted

in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234, at 258-59; see also Johnstone: Feminist
Influences, supra note 258, at 171.
318. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, GeneralRecommendation XXX on
discrimination against non-citizens, CERD/C/59/Misc.16/Rev.3 (2001), reprinted in Compilation of

General Comments, supra note 234, at 276-77.
319. Id. 1 6,9, 13-17,21, at 274-76.
320. Id. 1 11-12, 18, 22-24 & 33-34, at 276-77.
321. Id. 132, 36, at 277.
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As for the Covenants, states are responsible for actions by their organs that
fail to respect human rights.322 Responsibility for failing to protect and fulfill
rights will depend on a separate delict, usually an omission.
The Torture Committee, as referred to previously, is bound to a definition of
torture that presupposes fairly direct attributability to the state. Torture is
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
3 23

capacity.

However, the state party also undertakes to prevent
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts
are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.

3 24

This can conceivably apply to punishment at the hands of actors who cannot, in the
Nicaragua sense, be considered state actors to the extent that the state does not
take adequate measures to protect, i.e. it effectively acquiesces in the treatment.
This still requires a separate delict on the part of some state actor, i.e. by virtue of
instigation, consent or acquiescence.
The Torture Committee in its early work focused predominantly on the duty
of states to refrain from torture or inhuman, cruel or degrading punishment, i.e. the
duty of state parties to respect human rights. However, in recent years, they have
taken a greater interest in state responsibility to protect.
The majority of communications to the Torture Committee protest threatened
or actual refoulement to face the risk of torture, which is prohibited by Article 3.325
The second most common type of complaint concerns purported failures to
investigate allegations of torture, in violation of Article 12.326 Article 3 prohibits
only refoulement "to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Refoulement to
lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is not
322. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 231, arts. 1, 5, 16.
323. Id. art. 1(1).
324. Id. art. 16; see also Andrew Byrnes, The Convention Against Torture, in 2 WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 183, 187 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig, eds., 2000).
325. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, Thirty-fifth &
Thirty-sixth Sessions, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 44, 79, tbl. at 88-123, U.N. Doc. A/61/44
(May 19, 2006) [hereinafter Torture Committee 2006 Report].
326. Id.
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explicitly precluded. Refoulement cases where the threat of mistreatment is not
directly attributable to the state are more likely to reach the HRC, since the ICCPR
also excludes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.32 7
Any application of the responsibility to fulfill is difficult to reconcile with the
subject matter of the treaty: how can one be "tortured" or subject to "punishment"
without any culpability either at the hands of a state or private actor? One could
theoretically conceive of certain chronic and painful health conditions which lead
to extensive suffering in the absence of palliative care, but to define these as
torture or as treatment or punishment would be to stretch the text, not to mention
the object and purpose, of CAT. Article I requires that torture be inflicted
"intentionally." Article 16 refers to other "acts" which are "committed" and
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Inertia on the
part of the state in the face of suffering which has no human cause is not covered
by CAT. Thus, we must be content to witness the Torture Committee engage in
twin duties to respect and protect human rights.
Concern about the behavior of state organs has constituted the bulk of the
Torture Committee's work until recently. Examples include violence against
prisoners, the conduct of police officers, investigation and remedies for alleged
victims of torture, the use of evidence obtained from torture, and intimidation and
harassment of human rights activists and legal professionals.32 8 More, recently,
however, CAT has expressed considerable interest in states' duties to protect their
inhabitants, querying, inter alia, caste discrimination, violence and discrimination
against Roma and foreigners, domestic violence and sexual violence against
women, trafficking in persons, protection of domestic workers, violence against
abandoned children, child abduction by non-state armed groups, and inter-prisoner
violence.329 State responsibility for these private wrongs exists by virtue of, and
327. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 7; see, e.g., HRC, Decision of the Human Rights Committee under
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication
4.3, 4.7 (April 3, 2007). The
1234/2003, P.K. v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1234/2003,
Canadian response in this communication indicated that in that state's view, there must be a separate
delict on the part of the receiving state, i.e. inadequate due diligence in providing protection. As the
communication was determined inadmissible, the HRC did not comment on this argument.
328. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, Nineteenth &
Twentieth Sessions, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 44, 7 49, 60-61, 64-65, 90, 116, 133, 143, 163,
176, 186, U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (Sept. 16, 1998) (considering reports issued by Cyprus, Arg., Switz.,
Cuba, Spain, Fr., Guat., N.Z., and F.R.G.); U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee
Against Torture, Twenty-first & Twenty-second Sessions, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 44, 45,
U.N. Doc. A/54/44 (1999); U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture,
179, U.N. Doc.
Twenty-third & Twenty-fourth Session, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 44,
A/55/44 (2000).
329. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, Thirty-third Session
& Thirty-fourth Session, 7 39(g), 46(a), 46(a)(v), 47(c), 47(j), 47(k), 48(1), 83(o), 84(o), 93(h), 97(o),
108(m), 109(k), U.N. Doc. A/60/44 (2005) (considering reports issued by Arg., Greece, Alb., Uganda,
and Bahr.); Torture Committee 2006 Report, supra note 325, 77 26(12), 26(14), 27(17), 29(26), 29(32)
(considering reports from Dem. Rep. Congo, Ecuador, and Nepal); U.N. Comm. Against Torture,
Considerationof Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions
and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, Italy, 7 21-23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/ITA/CO/4
(July 16, 2007); U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties
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only in the event of, inadequate efforts by the state to prevent, investigate
and
330
obligations.
positive
its
satisfy
to
failing
punish, i.e. a separate delict of
C. Who is the State?

The various human rights treaties may award rights to individuals, but the
obligations to guarantee those rights fall solely on states. The treaties, and their
treaty bodies, do not inform us about the direct accountability of non-state
actors.331 Similarly, the ILC Articles are focused on state responsibility, to the
exclusion of individual responsibility or, for that matter, responsibility of
international organizations. 332 From the other side, in the event of a breach of a
primary rule of international law (by a state), the ILC Articles advise us only of the
remedies that other states may have.333 Although the mandate of the ILC did not
explicitly preclude the possibility of considering state responsibility to individuals
or international organizations, it decided to concentrate only on state responsibility
vis Avis other states.334
D. Obligationsto whom?

Human rights are usually understood as obligations owed by states to
individuals. The idea of "state responsibility" for human rights is usually thought
of as state responsibility to the individuals with whom it interacts. Malcolm Evans
argues that this is not really state responsibility at all, at least not in the proper
international law sense. 335 Instead it is state responsibility "in the layman's sense"
and as such "has little - if anything - to do with state responsibility as an aspect of
international law and as now reflected in the ILC's Articles on State
Responsibility." 336 This, he argues, is hardly surprising, since the whole notion of
human rights is an anomaly in the Westphalian model on which the principles of
state responsibility are founded.337 Evans goes so far as to argue that human rights
might be more "aspirational" or "ethical" as opposed to "legal" claims in
international law and that this (in part) explains the modest mechanisms designed
and encouraging
to monitor their implementation-centering on assisting 338
compliance rather than enforcing or penalizing non-compliance.
under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against
Torture, Japan, 24, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/JPN/CO/1 (Aug. 3, 2007).
330. Evans, supra note 250, at 150-51.
331. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 32 (2006)

(discussing objections to the concept that non-state actors have duties under human rights laws).
332. See ILC Articles, supra note 4.
333. Id.art. 42, at 54.
5, 22, 23, at 178, 184.
334. Id.art. 33(2), at 51; see Ago: Second Report 1970, supra note 120,
See generally Daniel Bodansky, John R. Crook & Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in
the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 809-11 (2002) (questioning the wisdom of the scope
of the ILC Articles); Daniel Bodansky, John R. Crook & James Crawford, The ILC's Articles on
Responsibility of Statesfor Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 874, 886-88
(2002) (reply by the authors).
335. Evans, supra note 250, at 139.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 140.
338. Id. at 146-49; but see Theodor Meron, State Responsibilityfor Violations ofHuman Rights, 83
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State responsibility to individuals is undoubtedly a central element of human
rights law, but it is one which is quite outside the ILC Articles, which indicates
only that the Articles are "without prejudice" to such responsibility.3 39 Similarly,
as to the recourse that might be had by other states to
the Articles only advise 34us
0
violations.
rights
human
What is immediately apparent with regard to the human rights treaties is that
it will be very rare indeed for another state to be "injured" by a violation. Thus the
rules of recourse for injured states under the ILC Articles will seldom be
relevant. 341 Unfortunately, although recognizing the interests of third states (noninjured states), the ILC Articles were left deliberately vague with regard to what
circumstances they might invoke responsibility and what they might do about it.
Article 48 of the ILC Articles advises us that "[a]ny State other than an injured
State" can invoke responsibility if: "(a) The obligation breached is owed to a group
of States including that State and is established for the protection of a collective
interest of the group; or342(b) The obligation breached is owed to the international
community as a whole."
The two subsections indicate the difference between (a) obligations erga
omnes partes and (b) obligations erga omnes. In the former case, one would have
to argue that human rights are the "collective interest" of all parties to the human
rights treaty concerned, i.e. each state party has a relevant interest in compliance
by every other state.343 The latter indicates an erga omnes obligation, an obligation
owed to the entire international community. The deliberate use by the ILC of
"international community" rather than "international community of states" should
be noted. But an obligation erga omnes (as opposed to erga omnes partes) is a
matter of customary international law. 344 Some human rights obligations may well
be customary international law, even erga omnes, and these may have their origins
in the human rights treaties. However, if a state wishes to rely on the erga omnes
character of a norm, then it is in fact relying on the customary international law
nature of that norm, not the treaty from which that norm originally emanated.
norm
State invocation of the responsibility of another state for violation of a treaty
345
must depend on the obligation being characterized as erga omnes partes.

AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 372,372-73 (1989).
339. ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 33(2), at 51.
340. Id. art. 48, at 56.
341. Id. art. 42, at 54.
342. Id. art. 48, at 56; see also id. art. 54, at 58. See generally Bodansky, Crook & Weiss, supra
note 334, at 799-805 (discussing the differences between ILC Articles 42 and 48).
343. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 48 7, at 320-21. A "common interest" is sufficient;
there need not be a direct benefit for the invoking state; regional human rights treaties are provided by
way of example.
344. Id. cmt. to art. 48 6, at 320. Obligations erga omnes partes can also arise from customary
international law, but are possible from treaty.
345. See Nicaragua, supra note 2, 178, at 95.
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General Comment No. 31 of the HRC is unclear about this:
While article 2 is couched in terms of the obligations of State parties
towards individuals as the right-holders under the Covenant, every State
party has a legal interest in the performance by every other State party
of its obligations. This follows from the fact that the "rules concerning
the basic rights of the human person" are erga omnes obligations and
that, as indicated in the fourth preambular paragraph of the Covenant,
there is a United Nations Charter obligation to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The Committee immediately adds: "Furthermore, the contractual dimension of the
to every other State party
treaty involves any State party to a treaty being obligated
346
to comply with its undertakings under the treaty."
In the first extract, the HRC must be referring to customary international law
and, of course, the Charter. To this extent, it is not actually a matter for the HRC
at all because it is not a question of supervision of the treaty. The second extract
indicates that the HRC views the ICCPR as creating obligations erga omnes
partes. Article 41, which allows for states to raise concerns regarding the (non-)
performance by other state parties, must only apply to the latter.
Under ILC Article 48, states can seek limited remedies, namely, (a) cessation
of the breach and assurances of non-repetition; and (b) reparation in the interests of
the injured state or other beneficiary (e.g. individual whose human rights have
34 7
been violated). They cannot seek compensation as they have not suffered loss.
The section on counter-measures in the ILC Articles was one of the most
controversial and the vagueness to be found therein is evidently the result of trying
to reach a text that the maximum number of experts - and states - could agree
upon. The rights of non-injured states to take countermeasures are not explained.
Only states' rights to take "lawful measures" are explained, although the content of
"lawful measures" is not otherwise defined.348 Practice is described by the ILC as
349
"limited and rather embryonic.,
Nevertheless, the answer to the question: "has state X breached its obligation
under Treaty Y?" does not depend upon to whom the obligation is owed. The
obligation (a primary rule) has either been breached or it has not. The person,
injured state, or non-injured state seeking redress will be relevant to the available
remedies, but does not change the answer to the question of whether the primary
rule has been respected or not.

346. HRC, General Comment No. 31, supra note 252, 4 2 at 233.
347. ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 48, at 56 (a state suffering loss is instead an "injured state").
348. Id. art. 54, at 58. See CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 49, 56. See generally Bodansky, Crook &
Crawford, supra note 334, at 884-85. On the use of the term "measures" rather than "countermeasures", see Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral
Dimension of the Relations of InternationalResponsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1127, 1143; Xue Hanqin,
The State of State Responsibility, 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC., 172, 172-76 (2002) (remarks by the
author discussing the danger of vagueness).
349. ILC Articles. supra note 4, cmt. to art. 54, 3, at 351.
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However, the identification of the state remains a matter of secondary rules;
for whose conduct (or omissions) is the state responsible? The answer to this
question, according to the treaty bodies, is compatible with the ILC Articles 4 and
8, and the findings of the Court in Nicaraguaand the Genocide Convention case.
E. Who is the State that must "respect,protect andfulfill"?
The obligation to respect, protect and fulfill human rights falls, according to
the treaty bodies, on states and not on private actors. State responsibility to respect
human rights is engaged where a state actor - identifiable in accordance with
Nicaragua has behaved in such a way as to violate an enumerated human right.
Responsibility to protect and fulfill human rights may be triggered by the actions
of some non-state actors, but the responsibility of the state depends always on a
separate delict - i.e. something done or, more commonly, not done by the state, as
classically defined.3 5 °
The treaties impose positive obligations on states; refraining from action is
inadequate for their implementation. Those positive obligations are subject to the
standards of due diligence. 351 The actual requirements on states, that is, the degree
of diligence due, is a matter of the primary rules, not the secondary rules of state
responsibility which only come into play once it can be established that the
primary rules have been breached. That is to say, the rules of state responsibility
are relevant once it can be said that the state has not acted with due diligence.
Related, and also pertaining to the primary rules, is the matter of fault.3 2 In
some cases, particularly cases of negative obligations (such as obligations to
respect human rights), a state actor must be identified as having been at fault.353
On the other hand, in cases of positive obligations (such as obligations to protect
and to fulfill), responsibility does not depend on identifying any particular state
organ or agent that acted or failed to act in a particular way (i.e. subjective fault),
but depends on an overall failure (i.e. objective fault).354
In all cases, it is not enough that an individual not enjoy their human rights for
the state to be held responsible under the treaties. A woman may be beaten by her
partner, but the state only bears responsibility if it has an inadequate police and
criminal justice response or if it tolerates and makes no effort to reform a cultural
environment that considers spousal abuse a right of men. She may die in childbirth
but the state is only in violation of her right to life or right to health if it has not, in
light of its degree of economic development, provided adequate antenatal, birth
and post-partum services.
Theodor Meron has described the law of state responsibility as terra incognita
for human rights lawyers, a theme that Dominic McGoldrick adopts to review

350. Evans, supra note 250, at 150-51.
351. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 100, at 44-45.
352. ILC Articles, supra note 4, cmt. to art. 2, 113, 10, at 69-70, 73; see CRAW-ORD, supra note
92, at 13.
353. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi. supra note 100, at 26.
354 See supra text accompanying notes 10 1-05.
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whether or not the HRC applies state responsibility in the classical sense.355
McGoldrick's conclusion is that "[i]ntemational human rights lawyers.. .have
356
really been operationalising the principles of State responsibility all of the time.,
The application by the treaty bodies, some wittingly, some impliedly, of the
tertiary model is in harmony with the classical doctrine.
The content of the obligations whether to respect or whether to protect or
fulfill, and if so, to what extent - is a matter of the primary rules; but the act or
omission which gives rise to responsibility of the state is an act or omission of a
state organ as traditionally understood. There is no implied guarantee of the
conduct of non-state actors; 357 instead there is only an explicit guarantee that the
state will take particular steps, the content of which is defined and refined by the
work of the treaty bodies.
The treaty bodies could perhaps assist clarity in this matter with a more
concerted focus on what they mean by "responsibility" so as to reduce confusion.
It must be recalled that membership of the treaty bodies is not restricted to those
with a legal education, and less still, specialists in international law. Nor is it even
desirable that membership be so restricted: legal fluency should not be prioritized
over, for example, experience of children's welfare, psychology and development
in the Children's Committee; nor should experts in the psychology and physiology
of torture victims be precluded from the Torture Committee in favor of more
lawyers. Nevertheless, lawyers are on the treaty bodies, and they might encourage
358
a more legalistic use of the language of responsibility.
V. CHORALE OR CACOPHONY

This paper is specifically about state responsibility, so the author has not
inquired about the direct international responsibility of non-state actors, such as
genocidaires, terrorists or private violators of human rights. Rules of personal
accountability in international law do not alter the question of state responsibility,
as both can exist together.
A. Who is the State?
The Court, the Council and the treaty bodies all operate relatively
autonomously of one another in the broader institutional framework of the United
Nations. Nevertheless, state responsibility in all three cases depends on the
identification of the organs and agents of the state for whose actions and omissions
the state can be held accountable.
Under the Genocide Convention, state parties have mostly negative duties:
duties to refrain from committing genocide, conspiring to commit genocide,
inciting genocide, attempting to commit genocide and being complicit in

355. Meron, supranote 338, at 372; McGoldrick, supra note 253, at 162.
356. McGoldrick, supranote 253, at 199.
357. See Caron, supranote 10, at 127; see also infra text accompanying note 392.
358. Lawyers, around half of whom are specialists in international law, make up the vast majority
of the HRC, but do not enjoy the same dominance in the other treaty bodies. All the treaty bodies,
however, have some experts in international law.
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genocide. 359 State responsibility for any of these actions will depend upon evidence
of them having been undertaken by an agent of the state; either a de jure organ or
an organ de facto, by virtue of complete dependence; or a person or group
considered an agent by virtue of effective control over the relevant operation.3 60
States also have positive obligations under the Genocide Convention to
prevent and punish genocide. 361 For the state to be considered in breach of these
obligations it is not necessary to show that any particular state organ or agent has
failed, but just that there has been an overall failure. 362 The relevant point is that
no state organ or agent has taken the required steps. They have not exercised due
diligence. The state will not be held responsible for any genocide or attempted
genocide that follows their inaction or ineptitude, but only for the separate delict of
their failure to intervene.363
Counter-terrorism obligations on states likewise have positive and negative
A state must refrain from "organizing, instigating, assisting or
aspects.
participating" in terrorism outside of its own borders.364 State responsibility will
once more depend upon the attribution of any of these behaviors to the state
identified per Nicaragua as de jure organs, de facto organs or agents by virtue of
effective control over specific operations. 365 The state is responsible for any attack
it undertakes itself. Its responsibility for organizing, instigating or assisting is,
however, responsibility for its participation, not for the terrorist attacks that may
result. This responsibility is engaged even if no terrorist attack follows.
States also have positive duties to prevent terrorism and, following the 2001
attacks, these are stricter and more precise. 366 Responsibility, similarly to the duty
to prevent and punish genocide, hinges upon a separate delict - the inadequacy of
the state's efforts, or efforts below the threshold of due diligence. No state organ
has taken adequate measures. The state is responsible for its failure, for its
separate delict, but not for the terrorist attacks that follow and will be responsible
even in the absence of an actual terrorist attack.
There is an argument that can be made that states taking inadequate measures,
i.e. not meeting the requirements of due diligence, should be held directly
responsible for any resulting terrorist attacks. This would indicate a dramatic shift
in some
in the secondary rules of state responsibility and whilst it may be reflected
367
resolutions.
Council
the
from
established
be
recent opinio juris, it cannot
International human rights law imposes both positive and negative obligations
on states. They have negative duties to refrain from certain behaviors to ensure
359. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 30-79.
361. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. 1.
362. Genocide Convention case, supra note 1, 430-3 1, at 294-95.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 80-104.
364. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 128, paras. 8-9 (1st princ.).
365. See supra text accompanying note 196-97; see also supra text accompanying notes 32-34; see
385-93.
also Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
366. See supra text accompanying notes 201-11.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 212-19.
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respect for human rights. State parties to the relevant treaties may not, for
example, torture, detain indefinitely without trial, forbid women from paid
368
State responsibility for violation of these
employment or execute minors.
involvement of a person or organ considered an organ of
obligations requires the 369
the state per Nicaragua.
State responsibility for violation of positive duties, on the other hand, does not
require the identification of a particular state organ at fault; it is the fact that no
370
These are obligations
state organ has taken the requisite steps that is pertinent.
of due diligence. Infringement may depend on the actions of a non-state actor,
371
On the
such as the duty to prevent violence within the family or trafficking.
any
demonstrate
to
necessary
be
not
will
it
violations
some
for
hand,
other
maternal
of
rates
high
for
responsible
be
can
state
The
individual wrongdoer.
mortality, extensive unemployment, low rates of formal education, and even
anorexia.372 State responsibility is not for the injury itself, but for its failure to
exercise due care and attention in its prevention, and/or inquiry and punishment
into its violation. In the case of anorexia, it is not the illness itself for which the
state is responsible but for its separate delict in not taking adequate measures to
by educating young persons and monitoring
reduce its incidence, for example,
373
media and cultural influence.
In all three examples of positive measures, pertaining to genocide, counterterrorism and human rights, state responsibility depends upon a separate delict and
that separate delict can be most simply understood as "not trying hard enough."
The determination of what constitutes "trying hard enough" is a matter of the
primary rules.
One further point to note is that positive obligations can be contracted out.
The state need not do everything itself. It is important that they are fulfilled; it is
less important by whom. In each example considered here, with admittedly greater
and lesser probability, the state could engage a private contractor to undertake the
duties. A state could hire a private force to arrest persons suspected of
involvement in genocide; it might pay a for-profit company to create and enforce
rules for financial institutions to reduce the likelihood of funds reaching terrorists;
it can similarly pay corporations to provide healthcare services. If these private
contractors fail, responsibility will fall back upon the state for not having obtained
368. CAT, supra note 231, arts. 1, 2; ICCPR, supra note 227, arts. 6(5), 7, 9; ICESCR, supra note
228, arts. 3, 6-7; CEDAW, supra note 230, art. 11; CRC, supra note 232, art. 37.
369. See supra text accompanying note 350.
370. See supra text accompanying note 102; see also Genocide Convention case, supra note 1,
429.
371. ICCPR, supra note 227, arts. 8, 12, 23; ICESCR, supra note 228, art. 12; CAT, supra note
231, art. 16; CRC, supra note 232, arts. 11, 19, 32, 34-35; MWC, supra note 233, arts. 11, 16.
372. ICESCR, supra note 228, arts. 6, 12-14; CRC, supra note 232, arts. 24, 28-29; MWC, supra
note 233, art. 30; see also U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Report of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, Twenty-seventh Session, 68, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/i 08 (July 23, 2001); U.N. Comm.
on the Rights of the Child, Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Twenty-fourth Session,
245, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/97 (July 17, 2000).
373. CRC, supra note 232, art. 17.

2008

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

more able contractors or not undertaking the tasks itself, the state's positive
obligations have not been fulfilled. On the other hand, should the contractors
violate negative obligations (such as the duty to respect human rights or to refrain
from violating the sovereignty of another state), states will bear responsibility,
even in the absence of effective control, if the contractors exercise "elements of
governmental authority." The ILC acknowledges the imprecision of this latter
term and considers it a somewhat contextual standard which will vary between
states.
B. What Does This Meanfor State Responsibility?
This has assumed so far that the positive or negative aspect of states' duties
can be easily identified. In practice, however, as has long been recognized in the
realm of human rights law, the distinction between positive and negative
obligations is not straightforward. 375 This can be illustrated by the example of the
right to life. The ICCPR informs us that "[e]very human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life. 3 76 Textual, contextual or object and purpose interpretations
of this article all yield the same conclusion: state parties have both negative and
positive obligations under this article. The negative duties include refraining from
arbitrary execution or reckless killing by state organs or agents and restraint in the
use of the death penalty within the criminal justice system. 377 The positive duties
3 78
(to protect) include operating a functional legal system to prevent private killing
and duties to fulfill the right to life for vulnerable members.379 In this latter
context, the HRC considers it "desirable for States parties to take all possible
measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy... ,380
Responsibility will be engaged in the event of failure by the appropriate
institutions. 381 This might include tolerance of domestic murders displayed by
poor investigation and lower sentencing of offenders, or a refusal to investigate
fully allegations of murder and disappearances of political activists which have
taken place without proven links to state organs. 382 Responsibility can also be
engaged if the state simply does not maintain the necessary institutions, such as
police services, prosecutors and court officials to provide the requisite level of

374. See ILC Articles, supra note 4, art. 5. cmt. to art. 5 11 5-6, at 92, 94; see also Marina Spinedi,
La Responsabilitt) dello Stato per Comportamenti di Private Contractors, in LA CODIFICAZIONE DELLA
RESPONSABILITA 1NTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI ALIA PROVA DEI FATT, supra note 37, at 67,99-103.

375, Sce supra text accompanying note 280.
376. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 6.
377,

i.: see also HRC, General Comment No, 6: Article 6 (Right to life)

3, 6-7, reprinted in

Compilation of General Comments. supra note 234, at 167.
378, ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 6.
'79. See. eg.. MWC, supra note 233, pmbl., arts. 9-10; see also CRC, supra note 232. pmbl., arts.
2,6.
380, HRC. General Comment No. 6, supra note 377, 5, at 167,
81. See ECOSOC. General Comment No. 3: The nature ofStates parties' obligations (art. 2. para.

1. ofthe Covenant) IM 1-6. 10, reprinted in Compilation of General Comments, supra note 234. at 1517.
382. HRC, General Comment No. 6, supra note 377,14, at 167.
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protection, or inadequate or non-existent health services and guarantees of
nutrition for the poorest members of the state.383
The character of an obligation as positive or negative is part of the primary
rules and thus not part of the law of state responsibility. However, as the
discussion above demonstrates, the characterization of an obligation as positive or
negative has a crucial impact on the rules of state responsibility, in particular,
whether an organ or agent of the state needs to be identified at all.
These three distinct areas of international law examined, and the institutions
that have worked with them, contain very different primary rules, in particular,
very different expectations about the positive obligations of states. The standards
required, or the degree of diligence due, depend on primary rules. However,
ultimately, the secondary rules of state responsibility are the same.
The distinction between primary and secondary rules was introduced by Ago
and is defended by Crawford, the rapporteur who saw the conclusion of the ILC
Articles as "provid[ing] the key to their completion as well as their scope. It may
be supported by a number of reasons, principled as well as pragmatic."3 84 He
describes this distinction as "indispensable" to the conclusion of the ILC's project
because primary rules, including rules about the content of obligations and
requirements of fault, are in a constant state of flux and negotiation. 385 The pace at
which the primary obligations of states pertaining to counter-terrorism have
changed bears out this concern. The ILC's concentration on state responsibility is
an exposition of the "underlying structures," which are "less fluid, more
durable." 386 Indeed, the ILC would have come in for considerable criticism if,
after decades of laborious negotiations, they had concluded a draft which would
become obsolete in a few years. The distinction between primary and secondary
rules was also recognized
by the Court, even before the conclusion of the ILC's
387
second reading.
Nevertheless, the distinction between primary and secondary rules has not
been without its critics. For example, Bodansky and Crook argue that the
distinction is artificial and potentially misleading. 388 David Caron laments the
resulting abstract nature of secondary rules which makes it "quite complex to
translate these articles to the real world of dispute resolution., 389 Crawford
acknowledges that it is a rare dispute that concerns only secondary rules in which

383. For further discussion of this and other examples, see Scott & Macklem, supra note 280, 4871.
384. Bodansky, Crook & Crawford, supranote 334, at 877.
385. CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 15.
386. Id
387. See Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, T 47, at 38 (Sept. 25);
Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, The ILC's State Responsibility Articles: Introductionand Overview,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773, 773-74 (2002).
388. Bodansky & Crook, supra note 387, at 780-81.
389. David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship
between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 870-72 (2002).
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breach of the primary rules is acknowledged; instead, real world disputes contain
elements of both.390
The three examples considered do seem to suggest that whilst state
responsibility can be understood in the abstract as an academic concept, its
application (and hence, perhaps, its usefulness) will require an extensive
examination of the primary rules in every case. This becomes even more
problematic when the difficulties of distinguishing positive and negative
obligations are taken into account.
Crawford explains the status quo thus:
Whatever the range of state obligation in international law, the ways of
identifying the state for the purposes of determining breach appear to be
common... Rarely (and never, as far as I am aware, by implication) is
the state taken to have guaranteed the conduct of its nationals or of
other persons on its territory, even when it has entered into obligations
in completely general terms. The rules of attribution are thus an
implicit basis of all international obligations so far as the state is
concerned.391

David Caron warns against extending the responsibility of the state to make it
a guarantor for all operations within its territory:
If the State were responsible [for all wrongful acts within its
jurisdiction], then it would assume the position of insurer of the victim
in a myriad of cases. If the State were responsible, the rule would
encourage greater control by the State of persons and entities within its
39 2
jurisdiction - a possibility we should consider with care.

In fact, despite Derek Jinks' concerns to the contrary, it appears that the
secondary rules of international have held fast. 39 3 The state does not "insure"
potential victims against the behavior of the persons, natural and legal, operating
within its jurisdiction. Even where primary rules change, by slow evolution in the
case of human rights or by a sudden jolt in the case of counter-terrorism, the rules
of state responsibility remain the same. States may accept positive duties, by
virtue of treaty, through acquiescence to developments in customary international
law, or, more controversially, by acceptance of Council resolutions. The coming
years may bear witness to further stresses on these norms, particularly in the area
of counter-terrorism, but for now, the ILC Articles accurately describe the
applicable framework. Ultimately, these three institutions, the Court, the Council
and the committees, connected to one another by the loosest of threads, are
performing in the same key.

390.
391.
392.
393.

CRAWFORD, supra note 92, at 9.
Bodansky, Crook & Crawford, supra note 334, at 878-79.
Caron, supra note 10, at 127.
Jinks, supra note 132, at 83-84.

SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE - HOLDING PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS ACCOUNTABLE: THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
AND ITS POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO ABTAN, ETAL. V.
BLACKWA TER LODGE AND TRAINING CENTER, INC., ET AL.

Matthew C. Dahl'
Private security contractors play a prominent role in modem military
operations. Of course the use of paid forces is not a new concept. Militaries
utilized paid forces for hundreds of years, but technological advances have
increased the mobility and firepower of private security contractors.2 The United
States now relies heavily on the private military industry in conducting its
worldwide military operations.3 The U.S. used private security contractors to
conduct narcotics intervention operations in Columbia in the 1990's. 4 During the
conflict in the Balkans, the U.S. used a private security contractor to train Croat
troops to conduct operations against Serbian troops. 5 Contracting out these
operations allowed the U.S. to decrease its footprint in these conflicts, or leave no
footprint at all. Today the U.S. has as many as 30,000 private security contractors
in Iraq.6 However, repeated reports of misconduct by private security contractors
are making the industry endure a level of scrutiny never encountered before. This
note will focus on the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) as a civil remedy to the
misconduct by private security contractors overseas and how the case law
regarding the ATCA will affect the recent lawsuit brought in the case of Abtan v.
Blackwater.7
I. THE TREND

TOWARD USING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

Governments use private security contractors for both practical and political
reasons. Private military companies provide a wide range of services from training

I J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law; B.A., History,
2004, Wake Forest University.
2. E.L. Gaston, Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and
its Implicationsfor International HumanitarianLaw Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 221, 23435 (2008).
3. JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY

ARMY xxi-xxii (Nation Books 2007) (discussing the rising size and reliance on private contractors and
the government's inability to monitor them).
4. Gaston, supra note 2, at 235-36.
5. Id. at 236.
6. Steve Fainaru, Iraq ContractorsFace Growing Parallel War, WASH POST, June 16, 2007, at
Al.
7. Abtan v. Blackwater, No. 1:07-cv-01831 (D.D.C. second amended complaint filed Mar. 28,
2008) availableat http://ccrjustice.org/files/3.28.08%20Abtan%20Second/ 20Amended /20
Complaint.pdf.
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to post-conflict/reconstruction support to direct military support. On the practical
side, using private security contractors allows the military to delegate certain
functions it would normally have to perform on its own. This delegation allows
9
From a political
the military to focus its forces on higher priority issues.
to circumvent
countries
allows
contractors
security
perspective, using private
°
governmental regulations on how many troops they can send into a conflict area.
Governments also benefit politically by utilizing private security contractors
because public opinion is less affected by the injury or death of a contractor than
an enlisted soldier."

Private security contractors are used in conflicts of all sizes. Governments all
around the world are trending towards outsourcing military and security functions
to these private security contractors.1 2 Today, several hundred private security
firms exist around the world and have a combined annual revenue of $100
billion. 13 Countries in Africa used them in small scale regional conflicts. For
example, the government of Sierra Leone hired the South African private security
firm Executive Outcomes to conduct direct military operations against a rebel
group that took control of major diamond mines in the country.14
The U.S. continues to use them in the larger scale conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.' 5 Approximately 100,000 contractors are present in Iraq and a
significant number of them are security contractors. 16 This number is ten times the
number of contractors used by the U.S. in the first Persian Gulf War, and is almost
equal to the number of active duty military personnel in Iraq.17
The U.S. is growing increasingly more reliant on private security contractors
in its operations in Iraq. A 2007 House of Representatives memorandum noted
that as of March 2006, 181 private security firms operated in Iraq, employing

8. See,
e.g.,
MPRI,
International
Security
Sector
Training
and
Education,
http://www.mpri.com/main/intemationalsecuritysectort.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) and Blackwater
Worldwide, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/company-profile/comp-history.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2008).
9. Bryan Terry, Note, Private Attorneys General v. "War Profiteers": Applying the False
Claims Act to Private Security Contractorsin Iraq, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 819 (2007).
10. Gaston, supra note 2, at 235-36 (discussing how the United States used Private security
contractors in Colombia to stay under congressionally set troop limits).
11. Id. at 235.
12. Id. at 224.
13. Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the Government
Contract Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
Civ. LIBERTIES 365, 371 (2006).
14. Id. at 369.
15. Gaston, supra note 2, at 223.
16. Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractorsin Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2006, at Dl.
See also Rakowsky, supra note 13, at 370.
17. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM, 1 10TH CONG., MEMORANDUM,
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR HEARING ON PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS, at 2 (Feb. 7, 2007),

available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070207112331-22533.pdf.
SECURITY CONTRACTORS MEMORANDUM]

[hereinafter PRIVATE
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48,000 employees. 18 During the reconstruction period in Iraq, the U.S. has spent
$3.8 billion on security contractors. 19 Salaries for employees of these contractors
can get as high as $33,000 a month.20 These numbers account for 12.5% of U.S.
government spending on reconstruction in Iraq.2 1 Notwithstanding this large
government expenditure on private security contractors, numerous reports of
contractors' misconduct have surfaced while no legal restraints exist to control
them.22

II. BLACKWATER
While hundreds of private security contractors are operating today, this article
focuses on just one - Blackwater Worldwide ("Blackwater"). Blackwater is a
major private security contractor used by the United States in Iraq, yet it remains
controversial due to reports of misconduct by its employees. 23 Blackwater's
alleged misconduct in Baghdad in 2007 led to the lawsuit Abtan v. Blackwater.24
Blackwater was founded by Erik Prince - a former Navy SEAL - on
December 26, 1996.25 The idea arose from of a perceived need to offer privatized
training for military and law enforcement.2 6 In an effort to fulfill this need, Prince
purchased 5,000 acres of land in eastern North Carolina for approximately $1.3
27
Through its first few years
million to create the Blackwater campus.
Blackwater's business and reputation grew rapidly as a facility offering tactical
training for all kinds of government officials. 28 However, the September 11 th
attacks and the subsequent "War on Terror" changed Blackwater into a major
player in the private security industry when it received $5.4 million to guard the
CIA's station in Kabul, Afghanistan. 29 Blackwater's role30continued to grow and it
now has more than $500 million in government contracts.
Blackwater's operations as a government contractor came under intense
scrutiny after an incident at al-Nisoor Square in Baghdad on September 16, 2007.31
While investigations are still ongoing, the allegations are that unprovoked

18. Id. There were 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq in 2006 and 100,000 contractors. Of the major
security contractors there were 1,500 from DynCorp, 1,000 from Blackwater, 500 from MPRI, and
6,500 from Titan. Merle, supra note 16.
19. PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS MEMORANDUM, supra note 17, at 2
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3.
23. See, e.g., Gaston, supra note 2, at 229-30.
24. Abtan v. Blackwater, No. 1:07-cv-01831 (D.D.C. second amended complaint filed Mar. 28,

2008).
25. SCAHILL, supra note 3, at 32.

26. Id. at 25-26.
27. Id. at 32.
28. Id. at 34.

29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at xix.
31. Mark Apuzzo and Lara Jakes Jordan, FBI FindsBlackwater Trucks Patched,ABC NEWS, Jan.
13, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/WireStory?id=4125132&page=l (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
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The attack prompted a full governmental investigation into the actions of
Blackwater and other security contractors employed by the U.S. government. A
memorandum sent out to the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform reported that internal reports from Blackwater documented 437 incidents
in which Blackwater contractors fired their weapons. 34 The reports showed that
from January 1 to September 12, 2005, Blackwater engaged in 195 shooting
incidents and 163 of those times, Blackwater personnel were the ones who fired
first.35 The reports suggested that the incidents resulted in 16 Iraqi civilian
casualties and 162 incidents in which property of Iraqi civilians was damaged.36

III. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT (ATCA)

The Alien Tort Claims Act was passed in 1789 as a means by which citizens
of other countries could bring tort actions in the federal district courts of the United
States.37 While the ATCA was passed over two hundred years ago, its use was
limited until around 1980.38 In 1980, the Second Circuit handed down its decision
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and reintroduced the ATCA as a way to hold actors
responsible for their actions even though those actions may have taken place on
foreign soil. 3 9 The Filartigadecision recognized a three-part test - 1) an alien 2)
must allege a tort 3) committed in violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty in order to bring a suit based on the ATCA.40 The Second Circuit found for the
plaintiffs in Filartigaand held that the ATCA grants jurisdiction for U.S. federal
courts over torts identified under international law.41
The Filartiga decision marked the beginning of the federal courts'
interpretation and expansion of the reach of the ATCA. Courts later held that
individuals, not just sovereign states, could be liable under the ATCA.42 The
courts expressed willingness to construe the ATCA so that: 1) individuals could be
held liable under the ATCA for crimes that they commit in furtherance of genocide
or war crimes; 43 2) groups of individuals who are not States, but nonetheless

32. Abtan, No. 1:07-cv-01831 at 3.
33. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM, 110TH CONG., MEMORANDUM,
ADDITIONAL NFORMATION ABOUT BLACKWATER USA, at 6 (OCT. 1, 2007), available at:
http:/oversight.house.gov/documents/20071001121609.pdf [hereinafter BLACK\WATER MEMORANDUM]
34. Id.

35. ld.
36. Id. at 7.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
38. Tina Garmon, Comment. Domesticating International Coiporate Responsibiliti: Holding
Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, I1 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325,
339 (2003).
39. Filartiga N. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
40. Garmon, supra note 38, at 339 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887).
41. Id. at 340 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885).
42. Id. at 340-43.
43 Id. at 341-42 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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violate international laws; 44 and 3) corporations that work with States to violate
international law. 45 The courts also recognized secondary liability as a mechanism
to bring parties under the umbrella of the ATCA. 46 This secondary liability theory
implicates any actor that "knowingly" aids others by "directly and substantially
affecting the commission of [a] crime [violating international law]., 47 Another
theory upheld by federal courts that imputes liability under the ATCA is the "joint
action" theory. 48 The Southern District of New York said ATCA liability existed
under the "'joint action" theory if the plaintiff could prove that an individual
willfully participated in actions with a State actor to violate international law.49
Federal courts recognize ATCA liability under the theories listed above. In
the next section the facts and law of four cases will be analyzed to show how the
federal courts construe liability under the ATCA. After that the analyses of those
cases will be applied to show how the ATCA can be used in the pending case of
4btan v. Blackwater and in potential future cases.
A. Filartigav. Pena-Irala:The Modern Interpretationof the ATCA
The suit in Filartigawas brought by a doctor in Paraguay whose son was
tortured and killed because Dr. Filartiga was a political activist who opposed the
government in Paraguay at the time. 50 Following unsuccessful attempts to
prosecute Pena-Irala (the man alleged to have tortured and killed Dr. Filartiga's
son) in Paraguay, Dr. Filartiga's daughter, Dolly, found Pena-Irala living in New
York City and had him arrested by the INS." While Pena-Irala was being held in
the United States, the Filartigas filed a complaint in federal court alleging wrongful
death and seeking damages in the amount of $10,000,000.52 The federal court for
the Eastern District of New York dismissed the case based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld jurisdiction
based on the ATCA.53
The court analyzed the question of whether the ATCA applied to this suit on
two levels. At the first level the court asked whether Pena-Irala's actions violated
the "law of nations." A violation of the "law of nations" is a requirement to trigger
application of the ATCA.54 The court answered this question by finding that
torture is unequivocally banned by international law; therefore, Pena-Irala's
actions fell under the ATCA. 55 At the second level, the court analyzed whether a
44. Id. at 342 (citing Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
45. Id. at 342-43 (citing Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999)).
46. Id. at 345-49.
47. Id. at 346 (citing Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002)).
48. Id. at 349-50.
49. Id. at 349-50 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293
(S.D.N.Y Feb. 28. 2002)).
50. Filariga, 630 F.2d at 878.
51. Id. at 878-7 9 .
52. Id. at 879.
53. Id. at 880.
54, Id. at 880 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
s5 /d. at 881. It is important to note that the court considered Pena-Irala's actions to be actions
by the state of Paraguay and not as an individual. (The Second Circuit mentions the states "'power to
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court in the United States was constitutionally authorized to hear a case based on
the violation of international law.56
The Second Circuit noted that the actions complained of in this suit did not
violate a treaty of the United States,57 but that in the absence of a violation of a
treaty the court must also look to the "customs and usages of civilized nations" in
determining what actions may violate the law of nations. 58 Furthermore, the law
that is broken must be universally condemned by civilized nations and not simply
one which one country may find immoral.59 Without that distinction, countries
could try to impose their own moral standards on other countries when the
standards of those other countries are merely different and not necessarily
universally abhorrent. However, the court quickly distinguished torture as
universally condemned by the international community. 60 Given that Pena-Irala
was charged with torture, and the court determined torture to be universally
condemned by the international community, Pena-Irala's actions constituted a
breach of the law of nations which triggered the use of the ATCA in his case.
Next, the court analyzed whether a court in the United States was
constitutionally authorized to hear a case based on the violation of international
law. The court pointed out that the first Judiciary Act of 178961 conferred federal
jurisdiction to cases involving aliens bringing claims alleging violation of
international law.62 Additionally, the court reasoned that the common law of the
United States was based partly on international law and thus incorporated
international law into the national common law. 63 At one point, Pena-Irala made
an argument that the law of nations is only a part of the law of the United States
insofar as Congress has explicitly defined it.64 However, at this point, the court
made its clearest statement regarding the scope and meaning of the ATCA: "we
believe it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new
rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the

torture persons held in its custody" and the state's "treatment of its own citizens.")
56. Id. at 885 (Pena-Irala argued that Article III did not confer federal jurisdiction to violations of

international law).
57. Id. at 880.
58. Id. at 880-81 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)).
59. Id. at 881 (discussing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (in Banco
Nacional the Supreme Court decided not to exercise jurisdiction over the case because the wrong in the
case merely represented the differing views of capitalist and socialist nations and not necessarily an act
that was condemned by civilized nations)).
60. Id. at 881-85; See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
61. Id. at 885.
62. Id.

63. Id. at 886 ("The law of nations forms an integral part of the common law, and a review of the
history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution demonstrates that it became a part of the common
law of the United States upon the adoption of the Constitution.")
64. Id.
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rights already recognized by international law. 65 With that statement, the Second
Circuit recognized the ATCA could be used by aliens to redress any wrong by a
state actor that violated established international law.
Filartigaushered in the federal courts' modem view on international law and
how it could be applied in the United States judicial system. The Second Circuit's
decision in Filartigareflected a belief that international law had a place in federal
jurisprudence because international law formed a basis of this country's common
law. With that belief, the court held that federal courts could deem States
responsible for their actions when those actions violated international law.
Subsequent decisions would further clarify how the ATCA could form the basis for
lawsuits in the United States.
B. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.: The Liability ofPrivate Entities Under the A TCA
The dispute in Iwanowa arose out of crimes committed during World War II.
During that time, Ford Motor Company had a plant in Germany operated by its
German subsidiary, Ford Werke. 66 The complaint alleged that during the war the
67
Nazis confiscated the Ford Werke plant and used it to produce military vehicles.
In order to operate the plant at a high capacity, the Nazis used forced labor.68 This
forced labor contingent consisted of prisoners taken by the Nazis during their
military operations. The Nazis sold some of these prisoners to Ford Werke to
work in its plant.69
The Nazis took Plaintiff Iwanowa captive in Rostov, Russia in 1942.70 Ford
Werke purchased her and transported her to Ford Werke's plant in Cologne.7 1
Once there, she and others were forced to perform heavy labor, for no pay, while
periodically being beaten by security officials.72 Iwanowa and the rest of the
workers were freed by Allied Forces in 1945. Iwanowa brought a class action suit
7
against Ford Werke and its parent company, Ford Motor Co., in 1998. 1
Specifically, Iwanowa sought damages for restitution of unjust enrichment and
damages for the pain and suffering caused by the working conditions.74
During litigation of the suit, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
United States federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.75
Iwanowa argued that the ATCA granted subject matter jurisdiction over her claim
76
because Defendants' actions during World War II violated the law of nations.

65. Id. at 887.
66. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 432-33.
70. Id. at 433.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 434.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 437-38. Defendants filed a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the claim and the court treated it
as a factual attack on the pleadings rather than a facial attack.
76. Id. at 438-39 (Discussing that if Iwanowa had claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:1

Defendants challenged the use of the ATCA by saying that Congress did not intend
it to be a private cause of action and also that the ATCA applied only to State
actors and not private actors.77 In response, the court looked to case law and
congressional action, and found that the ATCA did provide for a private right of
action. Following a previous Second Circuit case, the court reasoned that, after
Filartiga, Congress had a golden opportunity to amend the ATCA when it passed
the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 78 but chose not to do SO.79 The court
emphasized the fact that Congress chose not to address the issue of a private cause
of action under the ATCA even though it could have addressed the issue using the
TVPA. 80 The court also drew attention to the fact that the Eleventh Circuit
recognized the ATCA as creating a private right of action after Filartiga.81 Given
the tacit support of other court decisions and the implicit support of Congress, the
court in Iwanowa recognized the ATCA as granting a private right of action.
The court next considered whether the ATCA could apply to a non-state
actor. In reaching its conclusion on this issue the Iwanowa court relied on the
Second Circuit's opinion in Kadic v. Karadzic.83 The Kadic decision recognized
that individuals could be held liable for certain violations of international law,
which included slave labor.84 Turning to numerous sources of international law
and U.S. case law, the court in Iwanowa held that forced or slave labor was a clear
85
violation of the law of nations.
The Iwanowa court recognized that forced labor or slave labor violated jus
cogens norms. 8 6 The court explained, "Jus cogens norms are a narrow subset of
the norms recognized as customary international law. 87 Jus cogens violations are
determined by looking at the treaties and commentary regarding international law
to determine whether the international community recognizes a norm to be so
fundamental as to make it nonderogable. 88 If a private entity commits a violation
of jus cogens norms then it can be held liable as a private entity without being

Geneva or Hague Conventions, her claim would have been dismissed because the ATCA only applies
to self-executing treaties. However, because Iwanowa claimed a violation under the "law of nations"
her suit was able to go forward. Iwanowa met the first requirement of the ATCA (that the person
bringing the suit be an alien) because she was a citizen of Belgium.)
77. Id. at 441.
78. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
79. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43 (citing Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 363 (D.N.J.
1998)).
80. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 443. (discussing how the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA") was passed after Filartiga as an amendment to the ATCA, which would have given
Congress the perfect opportunity to address any concerns it had with the ATCA.)
81. Id. (citing Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1 Ith Cir. 1996)).
82. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
83. Id. at 445 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
84. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
85. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 439-41.
86. Id. at 441.
87. Id.at 441 n.18 (citing Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
88. lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 441 n. 18.
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involved in the action with a State actor. 89 The Iwanowa court explained that
90
Kadic recognized liability for private entities for violations ofjus cogens norms.
According to the court, Kadic represented the most recent view of international
law, and since international law is in a constant state of flux, Kadic carried greater
weight than other earlier opinions because it more closely reflected the current
state of international law. 91 Given the reasoning in Kadic, the Iwanowa court
accepted the view that private entities could be held liable - 92outside of state action
- for violations ofjus cogens norms under international law.
In the end, Defendants in the Iwanowa case were successful in obtaining a
dismissal because the suit was barred due to the running of the statute of
limitations, treaties made at the conclusion of World War II, and the political
question doctrine. 93 While Plaintiff may have lost, the court in Iwanowa added to
the potential reach of the ATCA by supporting liability solely for private entities
for violations ofjus cogens norms.
C. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The "JointAction" Theory
The injuries claimed in Wiwa were brought about by a corporation using a
local military to support its operations.9 4 Plaintiffs brought this case against the
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company, its
subsidiaries, the Shell Petroleum Company and Shell Development Company of
Nigeria, Ltd. (collectively "Royal Dutch"), and the president of the Nigeria
subsidiary, Brian Anderson. 95 The crimes alleged in Wiwa occurred during the
1990's when Royal Dutch was engaged in extracting oil from land belonging to the
Ogoni people in Nigeria. 96 Plaintiffs claimed that Royal Dutch used the Nigerian

89. Although Iwanowa recognized liability for private entities based onjus cogens, it is important
to note thatjus cogens violations merely negate the state action requirement for private entities to be
liable under the ATCA. Private entities can still be liable under the ATCA outside ofjus cogens
violations if their actions are intertwined with a State's, but there must be a showing of state action to
make the case. See id. at 441 ("jus cogens norms are a narrow subset of the norms recognized as
customary international law.") (citing Reagan, 859 F.2d at 940) and id. at 443 ("[i]nstead, we hold that
certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the
auspices of a state or only as private individuals.")(emphasis added) (quoting Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239).
90. "The Kadic court concluded that the inclusion of'slave trade' within both sections 702 and 404
of the Restatement demonstrates that this in an offense of 'universal concern' for which non-state actors
may be liable." Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (quoting Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240).
91. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992)).
92. "No logical reason exists for allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability
for universally condemned violations of international law merely because they were not acting under
color of law." Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445. The court in Iwanowa accepted the view that private
individuals could be held accountable for violations of international law, but the court did not find a
basis for invoking the ATCA because it felt that Plaintiff proved that Defendants were de facto State
actors. Id.
93. Id. at 491.
94. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *1.
95. Id. at *1-2.
96. Id. at *2.
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military and police to support and protect its oil excavation operations in the area.
The complaint claimed that Plaintiffs and other Ogoni residents were tortured,
raped, and murdered by the police and military who provided support to Royal
Dutch.98
The court decided that in order for Plaintiffs to move forward with their
99
The court
ATCA claims they would have to prove state action by Defendants.
reasoned that the crimes enumerated in the complaint fell short of the narrow set of
10 0
crimes that do not require a showing of state action (jus cogens violations).
Because the Plaintiffs had to show state action, the court determined that the
proper test to apply in determining state action was the "joint action" test. 10 1
Under the "joint action" test, private entities are found to be state actors - thus
state action exists - if those private entities willfully participate in joint action with
a State. 10 2 Defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that Royal
10 3
Dutch collaborated with the Nigerian government to violate international law.
The court found otherwise
and decided that Plaintiffs did have a cause of action
10 4
under the ATCA.
The complaint cited numerous instances in which Royal Dutch cooperated
with, and directed, the Nigerian police and military. Plaintiffs alleged that Royal
Dutch purchased weapons for the Nigerian police, helped plan raids against the
Ogonis, provided materiel to the military and police, and even ordered violent
responses against any kind of anti-Royal Dutch activities.10 5 The court also held
that the claims against Brian Anderson as a private individual were actionable
under the ATCA for the same reasons they were actionable against Royal Dutch as
a corporation. 10 6 Defendants attempted to argue that Plaintiffs had to produce
evidence showing collaboration between Royal Dutch and the Nigerian
government for each alleged act.10 7 The court disagreed with this argument saying
that §1983 - which the court used to evaluate what state action meant - did not

97. Id.
98. Id. The complaint contained 12 different claims including claims of negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and RICO, but the other claims are not pertinent to the analysis of the
ATCA.
99. Id. at *12-13.
State action is defined as "Anything done by a government; esp., in
constitutional law, an intrusion on a person's rights (esp. civil rights) either by a governmental entity or
by a private requirement that can be enforced only by governmental action (such as a racially restrictive
covenant, which requires judicial action for enforcement)." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 672 (3rd Pocket
ed. 2006).
100. Id. at *12. Even though some of the incidents complained of involved summary execution and
torture, the court found that Plaintiffs had to show state action since those violations were not
committed in the course of genocide or war crimes (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243).
101. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *13; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The Wiwa court looked to §
1983 as the standard by which private actors act under color of law with respect to the ATCA.
102. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *13.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at*14-15.
107. Id. at *14.
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require a showing of concerted action for each specific act." °8 Because Plaintiffs
demonstrated sufficient collaboration to show state action they did not have to
109
make individual showings of collaboration for each act.
The Wiwa opinion represents the recognition of an avenue by which state
action can be proven under the ATCA. This allows for the application of the
ATCA to private entities for crimes outside of the limited set of jus cogens
violations. As long as plaintiffs can show a substantial collaboration between a
private entity and a government to violate international law then they can bring
claims redressing their resulting injuries under the ATCA.
D. Doe v. Unocal.-Aiding and Abetting Under the A TCA
In this case, Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Unocal and others on
behalf of "tens of thousands" of people Plaintiffs said were injured by the actions
of Unocal.' 1 Unocal arose out of conduct similar to that in Wiwa. The injuries in
the case occurred because of a Unocal project to extract natural gas from Myanmar
and transport it via pipeline through Thailand where it could be shipped across the
world."' At this time Myanmar was controlled by the military and the military
"provided security and other services" to Unocal's project." 2 During the project,
local villagers living near project areas alleged that the "security detail" engaged in
numerous human rights violations including: murder, rape, torture, and forced
labor.'" 3 Plaintiffs brought claims under the ATCA, alleging that Unocal worked
with the military junta controlling Myanmar at the time to perpetrate these crimes
4
and further the business interests of Unocal.'
Defendants in this case tried to argue that, as a private entity, they could not
be held liable under the ATCA because their conduct did not equate to state
action. 15 The court held that Unocal's conduct violated jus cogens norms, and
therefore, Plaintiffs did not have to prove state action." 6 The crimes obviating the
need for state action included murder, rape, torture, and forced labor.17

108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). Unocal purchased 28% of a project in
Myanmar from the French company, Total S.A. Unocal also owned the Union Oil Company of
California which is actually the company that purchased the interest in the project from Total S.A. Id.
at 937.
111. Id. at 936-37.
112. Id. at 937-38. According to a Unocal memorandum, four battalions of 600 men each were
assigned to protect the pipeline corridor and each survey team had a security detail of 50 soldiers each.
Id. at 938.
113. Id. at 939. Reports alleged that the Myanmar military forced villagers to work on the project
and those that refused or tried to escape were tortured and/or killed. The military also allegedly raped
villagers as well. Id. at 939-40.
114. Id. at 942-44.
115. Id. at 945-46. The court admits that in most instances, in order to bring a claim under the
ATCA, the crimes committed must rise to the level of "state action.7"
116. Id.; see also Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
117. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 946 (citing Kadic, 17 F.3d at 243-44).
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Plaintiffs argued that Defendants were liable under the ATCA because they
aided and abetted the Myanmar military in perpetrating violations of international
law.' 8 While aiding and abetting was a new argument under the ATCA, the court
found it persuasive. Itreasoned that the standard for aiding and abetting under the
ATCA was "knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime."" 9 The Unocal court based this standard
on aiding and abetting standards set by the International Criminal Tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.120 Furthermore, the court held that the mens rea required
for the crime of aiding and abetting
was that the defendant must have knowledge,
21
but intent was not necessary.1
The court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to create a genuine issue
122
and thus
of material fact on the allegation of forced labor, murder, and rape,
reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case back for further
consideration. 23 In regard to the forced labor claims, the court reasoned that
Unocal showed the Myanmar military where to provide security and infrastructure
and did so with the knowledge that the military in that country had a history and
tendency to use forced labor. 124 Furthermore, the court found that the forced labor
would not have occurred but for Unocal hiring the Myanmar military to provide
security for the project. 25 The court made similar findings on the claims of
murder and rape. It said that the actions of Unocal amounted to "practical
assistance" and had a "substantial effect" on the military's ability to carry out these
violations against the local villagers. 126 This assistance occurred when Unocal
27
provided the military with intelligence on where to carry out security operations.
The decision in Unocal further expanded the reach of the ATCA. It supported
the decision in Iwanowa that certain crimes do not require the actor's conduct to
rise to the level of state action in order for the ATCA to apply. Furthermore,
Unocal created an aiding and abetting standard which could apply liability under
the ATCA. This aiding and abetting standard created a lower threshold to
implicate the use of the ATCA. In Unocal's case, the Ninth Circuit held Plaintiffs
met their burden by showing Unocal knew of the Myanmar military's penchant for
human rights abuses and told the military where to provide security and support.
118. Id. at 947.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 949-50; see Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment,
209, 234
(Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, 114 (Jan.
27, 2000).
121. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 951 (citing Musena at 180-81).
122. Id. at 956 (The court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact in regards to the claims of torture.).
123. Id. at 953 (reversing the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the ATCA claims in
regards to forced labor) and id. at 956 (reversing the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the
ATCA claims in regards to murder and rape).
124. Id. at 952; see also id. at 940 (discussing the fact that Unocal had several warnings that the
military in Myanmar often engaged in human rights violations).
125. Id. at 952-53.
126. Id. at 955.
127. Id.
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ABTAN, ET AL. V. BLACKWATER LODGE AND TRAINING CENTER, INC., ET AL.:

RESPONSE TO THE MASSACRE AT AL-NISOOR SQUARE

On October 11, 2007 the case of Estate of Himoud Saed Abtan, et al. v.
Blackwater USA, et al., was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District 1of
28
Columbia where the plaintiffs claimed Blackwater was liable under the ATCA.
The suit was filed in response to the September 16, 2007 al-Nisoor Square
incident.129 The complaint claimed that heavily armed Blackwater personnel
opened fire on innocent civilians in al-Nisoor Square resulting in multiple deaths
and injuries.' 30 The suit named seven plaintiffs and thirteen defendants, which
included all of Blackwater and its subsidiaries as well as Erik Prince as an
13 1
individual.
This case will mark an important milestone in attempting to hold government
contractors - especially private security contractors - accountable for their actions
overseas. The plaintiffs' success or failure and how the ATCA is interpreted in
this case are important because they could affect the number of future suits and
how they will proceed. The Abtan complaint alleges the following counts: 1) war
crimes; 2) assault and battery; 3) wrongful death; 4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; 5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and 6) negligent
132
hiring, training, and supervision.
The Iwanowa court held that the ATCA does create a private cause of action
and that the ATCA can be applied to private individuals. 133 Iwanowa also
discussed how the violation of the narrow subset ofjus cogens norms obviates the
need to prove state action to advance a case under the ATCA. 134 The addition of
war crimes to the counts in Abtan could create a situation in which Plaintiffs would
not have to prove state action under that count in order to recover under the ATCA.
However, the meaning of "war crimes" is unclear in the Abtan complaint and
without that specificity, determining whether Plaintiffs will not have to prove state
action on all the counts is difficult.
Plaintiffs in Abtan will most likely have to proceed under the reasoning set
forth in Wiwa and prove state action in order to hold Blackwater accountable under
the ATCA. Again, the Wiwa court used the "joint action" test to determine state
action as it applies to the ATCA. 135 In order to satisfy the "joint action" test,

128. See Center for Constitutional Rights, current cases, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/currentcases/atban%2C-et-al.-v.-blackwater-usao2C-et-al. (last visited Oct. 4, 2008): see also Abtan No. 1:07cv-01831 (D.D.C. second amended complaint filed March 28, 2008). On March 28, 2008 the original
case was joined with another suit filed by the family of another of the Iraqis killed in the attack and nine
of the injured Iraqis, changing the name of the case to Abtan. et al. v. Blackwater Lodge and Training
Center, hic., et al. http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/atban,-et-al.-v.-blackwater-usa,-et-al.
129. Abtan, No. 1:07-cv-01831 at 2.
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 4-7.
132. Id. at 16-19.
133. Iwanowa, 395 F.3d at 946-47.
134. Id. at 945-46.
135. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *13.
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plaintiffs must show that a private entity willfully participated in actions with a
State to violate international law. 136 The Wiwa court found willful participation
when Royal Dutch used the Nigerian police and military to protect their oil
ventures in the country. 137 In Wiwa a State's forces were operating under the
direction of a private entity. The opposite is true in Abtan. In Abtan, a private
entity is acting under the orders of a State (the United States) rather than the other
way around; thus, the case is factually different from Wiwa in a very basic, and
possibly important way. However, the "joint action" test merely requires willful
participation by a private entity and a State to break international law.1 31 If the
"joint action" test can apply to a private entity giving orders to a State, then the test
should be applied to a State giving orders to a private entity.
The true hurdle of the "joint action" test is proving willful participation by the
State and private entity. Such evidence seems to exist in the Abtan case. The
aforementioned memorandum to the House Committee for Oversight and
Government Reform references two incidents in which the State Department
worked with Blackwater to essentially cover up incidents in which innocent Iraqis
were killed. One incident involved a drunken Blackwater employee who shot and
killed one of the Iraqi Vice President's guards. 139 Another incident referenced in
the memorandum occurred when Blackwater contractors killed an innocent
bystander in June 2005.140 The Blackwater personnel failed to report the incidents
and even tried to cover up their existence.141 The State Department did not
conduct an investigation as to criminal liability in either incident, and instead
negotiated with Blackwater to pay $15,000 and $5,000 respectively for each
chose to use these measures as an effort to
incident. 142 The State Department
143
incidents.
the
of
dispose
quickly
The evidence reported in the House memorandum shows cooperation between
the State Department and Blackwater to avoid thorough investigations into
incidents where innocent people were injured or killed. The information in that
memo shows that the State Department was aware of incidents that violate criminal
laws, but did not take the necessary procedures to remedy the situation and actually
tried to cover them up. In response to the killing of the innocent bystander,
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. BLACKWATER MEMORANDUM, supra note 33, at 9-11. The above mentioned incident
happened when the Blackwater employee attempted to enter the Iraqi Prime Minister's compound. The
employee was confronted by one of the Vice President's guards and the employee shot him three times
with a Glock 9mm handgun. The employee fled the scene and was apprehended a few hours later in his
room at the Blackwater compound in Baghdad. When he was apprehended he was determined to be too
drunk to be questioned. The consequences for his actions were that his contract with Blackwater was
terminated and he was flown home to the United States. Id.
140. Id. at 12.
141. Id. at 12-13.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id. at 12 (In response to the killing of the innocent bystander, correspondence inside the State
Department said, "[W]e are all better off getting this case - and any similar cases - behind us
quickly.").
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correspondence inside the State Department said, "[W]e are all better off getting
this case - and similar cases - behind us quickly. 1 44 The quote by the State
Department official shows that the U.S. government knew that these violations
happened and that they will continue to happen, but that the government will
continue to resolve disputes by paying relatively small sums of money and
avoiding real investigation. Further demonstrating this point, following the
incident involving the Iraqi Vice President's guard, a State Department official
proposed a $250,000 settlement to the family and then reduced it to $100,000.145
Other State Department officials rejected both proposals as being much too large
because setting such a precedent would be very costly for the government. 146 This
type of reasoning is more evidence of the State Department's knowledge that such
incidents happened and will continue to happen, and that they do not want to
properly respond with an investigation and would rather just pay money to cover
the incidents up.
Plaintiffs still have a long row to hoe in proving state action through the "joint
action" test. Since much of the evidence to prove state action is to be found in
internal State Department and Blackwater communications, and communications
between the State Department and Blackwater, evidence could prove difficult to
acquire. However, if the evidence can be obtained, a court could very well find
that state action exists.
The communications revealed in the House memorandum show a desire by a
State to cover up actions by a private entity that violate customary international
law. The communications also show that the State Department expects similar
incidents in the future and plans on dealing with those incidents in a similar way by not performing official investigations and using small monetary settlements to
keep incidents quiet. Because Blackwater mainly operates in Iraq under contracts
with the State Department to protect State Department officials, 147 this cooperation
between the State Department (a State agency) and Blackwater (a private entity)
could represent state action and expose Blackwater to liability.
V. CONCLUSION

Accountability and oversight for private security contractors continues to be a
major problem in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 48 Right now, the major
security contractors in Iraq are Blackwater, Aegis, Dyncorp, Erinys and Triple
Canopy.149 All five of these companies are connected to questionable practices in
carrying out their contracts. Aegis is a British security run by a former British
military officer named Tim Spicer. 150
Spicer has a history of committing

144. Id.
145. Id. at 11.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 4 (Blackwater has been awarded over $1.5 billion worth of contracts with the State
Department between 2004 and 2006.).
148. PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS MEMORANDUM, supra note 17, at 7.
149. Id.at2.
150. SCAHILL,supra note 3,at 159.
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15
violations against civilian populations in his history as a mercenary. 1 Aegis was
accused of committing similar violations in Iraq when internet videos were posted
152
The Erinys
depicting Aegis contractors firing on civilian vehicles in Iraq.
153
The
contingent in Iraq is commanded by former South African mercenaries.
same House memorandum that focuses on Blackwater also mentioned Dyncorp
and Triple Canopy. The report said that, while Blackwater was the biggest
offender as far as unacceptable behavior, DynCorp and Triple Canopy combined
for 138 shooting incidents in Iraq from 2005 to 2007.154 In 62% of their shooting
155
incidents, DynCorp fired first and in 83% of Triple Canopy's they fired first.

These statistics regarding private security contractors show that a great deal of
abuse by contractors goes unaddressed. The "joint action" test has the potential to
apply not only to action between the U.S. and private contractors, but also
potentially to action between the new Iraqi government and private contractors.
Security contractor Erinys reportedly built up a 14,000 man private army in Iraq
that was partly comprised of Iraqis. That kind of cooperation between a security
contractor and a State is similar to the cooperation in Unocal and opens up the
door for these private entities to use Iraqi forces to commit war crimes or allows
contractors to aid Iraqi forces in committing war crimes.
The Abtan case represents only one instance in which a private security
contractor could be held accountable for its actions overseas. The various types of
jobs these contractors do and the various amounts of cooperation they get from
State actors could allow for ATCA liability under all the theories mentioned here.
Watching how the Abtan case unfolds is important because the decision in the case
and the application of the ATCA could have major effects on holding private
security contractors liable in the future.

151. Id. at 159-60 (Spicer owned and operated another private military firm, Sandline, fighting in
Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone, that was accused use of excessive force against civilians.).
152. Id. at 161; see Videotape: DailyMotion.com, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/
x34kfmbritish-mercenarys-in-iraq (October 4, 2007) (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
153. SCAHILL, supra note 3, at 77.
154. BLACKWATER MEMORANDUM, supra note 33, at 7
155. Id.

PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS
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PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS: EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS OF A

MARITIME CUSTOM (Aldo Chircop & Olof Linden eds., Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers 2006).
I. INTRODUCTION

The damaged tankers Erika and Prestige, denied access to ports or other
places of refuge, sank in 1999 and 2001, respectively.' They spilled their cargoes
of oil, wreaking much environmental damage on French and Spanish coastlines
and damaging the fishing and tourist industries. Another ship in distress, the
Castor, was towed around the Mediterranean for over a month in 2001, having

been denied entry by numerous states, before its cargo of gasoline was safely
offloaded at sea.
Denying refuge to a damaged tanker may alleviate
understandable anxieties of local authorities, but this course of action may also
render salvage operations impossible and contribute to an environmental
catastrophe that could have been avoided.
When foreign flag vessels in distress seek access to places of refuge, complex
problems arise. The issue of access to places of refuge illustrates how difficult it is
to arrive at a new legal consensus when changes in technology and social attitudes
challenge traditional legal understandings - in this case, the customary
international law right of refuge in internal waters. 3 Competing legal perspectives,
* Professor, California Western School of Law; President, American Branch of the International
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3. By contrast, many authorities deny the existence of a general customary international law right
of entry into port for foreign flag vessels that are not in distress. See, e.g., A.V. Lowe, Right of Entry
into Maritime Ports in InternationalLaw, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 597-98 (1977). Some authorities

limit the concept of "vessels in distress" to those in which a vessel is in difficulty and human life is at
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reflecting the concerns of various affected constituencies, vie for prominence. The
appropriate recourse is to some expert process in which these various concerns can
be evaluated in light of specific risk factors involved in each particular catastrophe.
What process should be used? Can all significant constituencies - ship owners,
cargo owners, their insurers, salvage interests, ports and coastal communities,
environmental and "international community" interests - participate? What are the
prospects for developing a legal process that operates quickly and efficiently, that
permits input from experts, and that accommodates essential interdisciplinary
perspectives?
This essay first provides an overview of Places of Refuge for Ships, a book
that contains essential information and perspectives for lawyers and policy makers.
Part III then briefly explores why the issue of places of refuge is daunting. The
reasons for the complexity of this issue set the scene for Part IV, which proposes a
process-oriented approach to assess and manage risks where vessels in distress
seek access to places of refuge.
II.

OVERVIEW OF PLACES OF REFUGEFOR SHIPS

Places of Refuge for Ships addresses its topic through a multidisciplinary lens.
Part I of the book highlights management perspectives on problems associated
with places of refuge. Part I's first chapter, written by one of the book's coeditors, Aldo Chircop of Dalhousie Law School, examines the International
Maritime Organization's influential, though legally nonbinding, 2003 Guidelines
on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance.4 The second chapter,
prepared by the other co-editor, Olof Linden of the World Maritime University in
Sweden, explores coastal and ocean management, developing the important theme
that the problem of places of refuge should be addressed through an integrated
interdisciplinary approach, rather than through resort to rules that regulate marine
activities based primarily on a vessel's nationality or location. Part I also contains
four other chapters, on the environmental component of the IMO Guidelines
(William Ritchie), risk assessment and decision making by maritime
administrations (Jens-Uwe Schr6der), port perspectives (Rosa Mari Darbra
Roman), and the roles of the media in covering maritime disasters (Mark Clark).
Part II, on legal and policy analysis, contains the bulk of the book's treatment
of international law. Aldo Chircop has contributed two solid chapters, one on the
customary law of refuge for ships in distress and another on international
environmental law considerations. Part II also includes chapters on refuge and
salvage (Proshanto K. Mukherjee), compensation for damage (Gaothard Mark
Gauci), insurance (Patrick Donner), and recovery in general average' in cases of
refuge (Hugh Kindred), which serve as useful introductions to these topics.

in which human life either is or is not at risk.
4. IMO, Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance, IMO Assemb. Res.
A.949 (23) (Dec. 5, 2003) [hereinafter IMO Guidelines].

5. General average is the maritime law mechanism for sharing proportionately the losses and
expenses that a ship's master has deliberately incurred to avoid or minimize damage when a ship has
encountered danger. See PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 347-48.
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The third and final Part of Places of Refuge evaluates various national
approaches concerning places of refuge, with a particular focus on process in
federal states. It contains chapters on Australia (Sam Bateman and Angela Shairp),
Belgium (Eric Van Hooydonk), Canada (Philip John), Denmark (John Liljedahl),
Germany (Uwe Jenisch), the United Kingdom (Toby Stone), and the United States
(Paul Albertson).
The problem of refuge has no easy answers. The challenge thus becomes to
devise procedures that allow stakeholders to be heard and risks to be effectively
assessed and managed in the face of often conflicting values and incentives. In
order to understand this challenge, it is important to appreciate why the issue of
places of refuge is complex.
III.

THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUE OF PLACES OF REFUGE

The law concerning places of refuge, and more generally concerning ships in
distress, is undoubtedly complex. It has been so for years, and has recently
become more so, for several reasons. First, decisions about ships seeking refuge
reflect a range of increasingly conflicting values. Second, multiple stakeholders
hold these conflicting positions intensely. The matter of vessels seeking refuge is
salient and politically sensitive. Third, it is difficult, ex ante, to devise a clear rule
concerning how cases involving vessels in distress seeking places of refuge should
be resolved. The treatment of such vessels depends on many variables: the
condition of the ship, its location, its cargo, its insurance coverage, the availability
and capabilities of ports and salvors, and weather.
First, decisions about places of refuge implicate many different values. The
resulting complexity is not entirely new. Rules applicable to ships in distress have
historically derived from different fields of international law. Trade law,
humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, admiralty law, the law of the sea, and
(a newer development) international environmental law are all relevant. Different
fields of law prioritize different (and sometimes competing) concerns: the integrity
of ships and their cargoes, the sanctity of lives put in peril when ships are in
distress, the navigational freedom and immunity of warships, a coastal state's
ability to protect itself and to apply its laws when an appropriate jurisdictional
nexus exists, and the global importance of sustainability and non-degradation of
the environment. Places ofRefuge ably explores many of these legal traditions.
Value conflicts related to places of refuge have intensified in recent decades.
The predominant humanitarian rationale for a right of access of vessels in distress
to a place of refuge - a right often asserted as existing in customary international
law6 - has been undermined. This is so because of changes in technology. These
6. See PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 191-92, 221-22. Pages 191-92 assess the
contours of the refuge custom at the end of the nineteenth century, including what perils triggered a
right of refuge, what types of vessels enjoyed the right, special rules concerning warships, where refuge
could be enjoyed, the right of free departure, and other rights and privileges related to refuge (e.g.,
concerning repairs, re-supply, unloading cargo, exemption from customs duties, and the right to
consular assistance). Pages 221-22, discussing the current views of the Comit6 Maritime International
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changes have helped to minimize the danger to humans, but have increased the risk
of damage from ships. Traditionally, access to places of refuge was often
necessary in order to save the lives of people on board a ship in distress. Refuge
thus linked to a broader duty of assistance that also found expression in the
international law rule that vessels have a duty to render assistance to those in
danger of being lost at sea. 7 Today, however, technology permits precise location
of ships in distress, and passengers and crew members on board such ships often
can be offloaded by helicopter or ship. Yet the need to insure the safety of the
crew and passengers on board a vessel in distress never completely explained the

customary international law rule allowing access to ports or places of refuge in
situations of distress, for the rule also supported the interests of ship and cargo
owners and the value of open commerce. These latter rationales remain, but they
have come into increasing tension with environmental values.
Modem ships pose dangers that older vessels did not.

Spills of oil or

hazardous cargoes from tankers may devastate the marine environment or threaten
the health and safety of coastal communities. These risks have been addressed
through a variety of initiatives directed at vessel safety and restricting access of
vessels to Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas. 8 Yet these preventive measures are not
the only ways to respond to increased environmental risks. The Law of the Sea
Convention and other treaties also incorporate protective jurisdictional principles,
allowing coastal states to counteract environmental threats from marine casualties. 9
These protective principles provide a conceptual basis for qualifying the traditional
customary right of access to places of refuge.10 State practice has moved toward
and its national delegations, refer to a customary international law right of refuge, but note that many
states no longer regard the right as absolute. See also infra text accompanying note 12.
7. See, e.g., International Convention on Salvage art. 10, Apr. 28, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No.
102-12 (1991), 1953 U.N.T.S. 193; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention]; International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue Annex 2.1.10, Apr. 27, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,093,405 U.N.T.S. 97.
8. On-board vessel safety devices and procedures have traditionally been mandated by
requirements of the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47,
1184 U.N.T.S. 3. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 94. The European Union has
pushed for a range of other initiatives, including the phasing out of single hull tankers, the enhancement
of flag state control, port state inspections of substandard vessels, coastal state control over foreign
vessels in transit, and the designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas. See generally Veronica
Frank, Consequences of the PrestigeSinking for European and InternationalLaw, 20 INT'L J. MARINE
& COASTAL L. 1 (2005).
9. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 7, arts. 211, 221; International Convention Relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 970
U.N.T.S. 211. Aldo Chircop argues that "[t]he historical practice shows that the right to refuge has
frequently been subjected to conditions," e.g., limiting the movement of ships because of health
quarantines. See PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 224. Denying a ship access to a place
of refuge altogether, because it may pose risks to a coastline, is of course a more severe limitation than
allowing the ship access but imposing a quarantine or other condition on it.
10. These protective principles are, however, counterbalanced by other legal principles designed
to protect the marine environment, obligations that could weigh against a coastal state refusing refuge.
See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 7, arts. 192 ("States have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment."), 194(2) ("States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that ...
pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond
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requiring notice and consent for entry into a place of refuge, something that
historically was not necessary except with respect to warships in distress." l Recent
authorities maintain that a ship in distress does not have an absolute right of access
to a place of refuge. For example, the Irish High Court of Admiralty concluded
that "[i]f safety of life is not a factor, then there is a widely recognised practice
among maritime states to have proper regard to their own interests and those of
their citizens in deciding whether or not to accede" to the request by a vessel in
distress for access to a place of refuge. 12 According to Aldo Chircop, "the right,
according to customary international law, for a vessel in distress to be granted a
place of
refuge no longer appears to be recognised by many States as an absolute
13
right."'
Second, decisions about whether or on what conditions to grant access to
places of refuge are difficult not only because such decisions require mediating
value conflicts, but because different constituencies care deeply about the
decisions. Debates in Europe following the 2001 Prestige incident have been
particularly intense. Ship owners and cargo owners are vitally interested in
assuring a place of refuge for a vessel in distress. Concerns for the safety of those
on board the vessel - salvors, if not passengers and crew - and for the environment
also may push toward granting access to a place of refuge. However, coastal
fishing, tourist, and residential communities, which fear devastating contamination
should an oil tanker break apart near them, may strongly oppose granting access to
places of refuge.
Third, the issue of granting access to places of refuge is complex because
whatever decision is made with respect to access of a particular vessel to a place of
refuge - granting unrestricted access, or denying access, or conditioning access on
meeting financial security or other conditions - along with associated decisions
regarding salvage, may provide little guidance for future cases. Ships seeking
refuge pose highly fact-specific dangers. It will be hard to generalize about the
risks particular communities face and about how best to manage those risks.
IV.

PROCESS AND THE ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF RISKS

The diverse practice of states, some of which have granted refuge and some of
which have turned away ships seeking refuge, has suggested to some the "need to
elaborate clear rules.' 14 Yet any bright-line substantive rule - say, one allowing an
absolute right of access to vessels in distress - will be insufficiently nuanced.

the areas where they exercise sovereign rights.), 195 ("In taking measures to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment, States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly,
damage or hazards from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into another."), 225 (in
exercising "their power of enforcement against foreign vessels, States shall not ...expose the marine
environment to an unreasonable risk"). Commentators have suggested that a treaty could help to limit
the liability of a coastal state that, in the face of such broadly worded principles, makes a difficult
decision either granting or refusing access to a vessel seeking refuge. See infra note 42.
11. See, e.g., PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 225.
12. ACT Shipping (PTE) Ltd. v. Minister for the Marine, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 30, 48.
13. PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 221.

14. Frank, supra note 8, at 54.
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Environmental risks will vary with the situation; most often, the risk of
environmental degradation will be lower if a vessel is towed into a place of refuge
than if it remains offshore, but the reverse may sometimes be true. Risks to human
life will vary from situation to situation. Risks to a port should a vessel in distress
be allowed entry will vary depending on the insurance coverage that the vessel
carries and the capabilities of port and salvage facilities. The complexities
associated with refuge situations suggest that the primary need is for an expert,
balanced process to assess and manage the risks involved in refuge situations. The
main utility of international law in this situation may be to promote a sensible risk
management process, rather than to provide a bright-line rule or even to articulate
values that already are generally shared (e.g., the preservation of human life and
the need to protect the environment). "Rules" that can help establish such a
process are certainly to be encouraged. But the central issue is, what process can
best determine whether (and on what conditions) to grant access to places of
refuge?
It was perhaps inevitable that a multifaceted "balancing" approach would be
articulated to address the problem of access to places of refuge. The IMO has
developed one notable balancing approach, in its nonbinding 2003 Guidelines on
Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance. The Guidelines are intended to
assist states trying to respond to a "ship in need of assistance," defined as "a ship
in a situation, apart from one requiring rescue of persons on board, that could give
rise to loss of the vessel or an environmental or navigational hazard."' 15 The
Guidelines do not address the rescue of persons lost at sea, but they contain
provisions both for masters and salvors with respect to a ship seeking access to a
place of refuge and for coastal states evaluating whether to grant refuge.
According to the Guidelines, coastal states should establish a Maritime Assistance
Service and develop contingency plans. 16 The Guidelines also call for eventspecific assessment - determining the events causing the need for assistance,
assessing risks related to the identified events (including environmental and social
factors, natural conditions, coastal state contingency planning, the nature and
condition of the ship and its cargo and crew, available insurance, and required
financial security), and identifying available emergency and follow-up responses
(including salvage). 7 The Guidelines take the position that "[w]hen permission to
access a place of refuge is requested, there is no obligation for the coastal State to
grant it, but the coastal State should weigh all the factors and risks in a balanced
manner and give shelter whenever reasonably possible."' 8 The focus of the
Guidelines (and, implicitly, the focus of any appropriate process to address vessels
seeking access to places of refuge) is on risk assessment and risk management, and
on incorporating multidisciplinary perspectives.
Although the IMO Guidelines are legally nonbinding "soft law," they appear
likely to influence national and regional practice. Indeed, the European Parliament
15.
16.
17.
18.

IMO Guidelines, supra note 4, 1,18.
Id. 3.3-3.6.
Id. 3.9. See also id. app. 2
2.1-2.4.
Id. c. 3.12.
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and the Council of the European Union have required EU member states to draw
up plans to accommodate major commercial ships in distress, and, in doing so, to
take into account the IMO Guidelines. 19 Member states' plans must "contain the
necessary arrangements and procedures taking into account operational and
environmental constraints, to ensure that ships in distress may immediately go to a
place of refuge subject to authorisation by the competent authority ' 20 -language
that certainly does not recognize an absolute right to refuge. 2 1 As Aldo Chircop
cautiously concludes, "if significant and consistent state practice in compliance
with the IMO Guidelines occurs in due course, the expectations generated by the
Guidelines may achieve legal significance. 22
One should ask whether decision makers who articulate or implement
balancing approaches are considering all the proper factors. The IMO Guidelines
compile factors to be weighed in a non-exhaustive list. 23 If other factors are known
in advance, they should be listed, to insure that decision makers will take them into
account. Some additional factors could well have been added to the IMO
Guidelines list that coastal states are encouraged to consider in determining
whether to allow a ship in distress access to a place of refuge. For example, it
could be useful to name oil spill trajectory models as a tool to complement expert
analyses of the "risk of pollution., 24 In addition, the IMO Guidelines list several
maritime and environmental treaties as constituting "inter alia, the legal context
within which coastal States and ships act in the envisaged circumstances, ''2' but
they fail to note several relevant multilateral treaties.26 One can appreciate why the
IMO Guidelines are imperfect: the issue of places of refuge had been discussed
only for a relatively short time when the Guidelines were developed, and they
"represent the lowest common denominator among IMO member states., 27 Yet it
would be desirable to list all potentially relevant factors, in order to increase the
likelihood that decision makers will consider all appropriate information when they
evaluate the risks associated with requests for access to places of refuge.
How should a balancing approach that stresses risk assessment and risk
management be implemented? Several contributors to Places of Refuge note the
19. Council Directive 2002/59, pmbl. (5), 2002 O.. (L 208) 10 (EC).
20. Id. art. 20. See also id. art. 18(1)(b) (member states may prohibit foreign vessels from, inter

alia, entering their ports in cases of "exceptionally bad weather or sea conditions," if such entry would
endanger the environment or human life).
21. Regional treaties may also facilitate the use of a balancing approach to determine access to
places of refuge. E.g., Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from Ships and, in
Cases of Emergency, Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea art. 16, Jan. 25, 2002, available at
http://l95.97.36.23l/acrobatfiles/02IG14_FinalActEng.pdf (requiring the development of "strategies"
concerning places of refuge for ships that pose environmental threats).
22. PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 44.
23. IMO Guidelines, supra note 4, 3.9.
24. See id. 3.11 (failing to particularize the considerations involved in determining risk of
pollution).
25. See id. app. 1. See also PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 89-90.
26. See id. at 233 (listing five such treaties).
27. PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 100; see also id. at 141-43 (listing standards
used to implement an environmental management system).
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importance of having a process that is transparent and that takes into account the
perspectives of all stakeholders - ports, coastal communities, flag states, salvage
interests, and ship and cargo owners (or their insurers) - as well as environmental
concerns. This process should reflect an integrated coastal and ocean management
framework, a topic explored in Chapter 3 of the book. It is important to accord
considerable weight to the views of experts, rather than to give final decisionmaking authority to, say, a port commissioner who may focus too heavily on risks
to one port rather than fully consider all environmental risks should a ship in
distress not be granted refuge. In short, "[a]ny decision on whether to grant or
refuse a place of refuge should be based on risk assessment, not on risk
aversion., 28 The assessment of risks also must be carried out efficiently. When a
ship in need of assistance seeks access to a place of refuge, there often is not time
for prolonged deliberation about the best course of action. Complex situations
must be evaluated and decisions must be reached quickly. Among the states whose
procedures are surveyed in this book, the United Kingdom has adopted a system administered through the Secretary of State's Representative for Maritime Salvage
and Intervention and through the Maritime and Coastguard Agency - that usefully
provides for input from experts and allows centralized decisions concerning
maritime disasters and questions of refuge.29
An optimum risk assessment and risk management process also requires clear
lines of decision-making authority. Mechanisms to address requests for refuge
have developed primarily at the national level. Problems of governmental relations
in federal states, however, have compounded the difficulties in fashioning sensible
procedures for evaluating requests for refuge. In those states, control over port and
coastal activities often has resided with local or other sub-state components of
government. Several of the states whose practices are analyzed in Places of
Refuge - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and the United States - are federal
states.30 The challenges facing federal states may not be insurmountable, but they
are significant. Sam Bateman and Angela Shairp, writing about Australia,
conclude that "[t]he politics of a federal jurisdiction mean that while the central
government may have the power to override decisions at a state level, it will be
circumspect in exercising that power. Inevitably this means that requests for
refuge will be treated in an ad hoc manner."31 Germany lacks a centralized coast
32
guard under federal command, and "the German model is fragmented,,
presenting federal-Ldinder communications and coordination difficulties. "[T]he
Belgian experience confirms that the devolution of maritime powers in a federal
state may lead to legal uncertainty as to the competence of authorities involved, as
well as to gaps in the statutory regime., 33 In Canada, "[t]he possibility of ...
28. PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 346.

29. See id. at 429-53.
30. How authority is divided among the component parts of federal states varies considerably.
See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 11.2 (2d ed.

2006).
31. PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 389.
32. Id. at 486.
33. Id.at 427.

2008

PLACES OF REFUGE

discussion on places of refuge being complicated by overlapping and intervening
jurisdictions is quite likely;" the need is to "streamlin[e] and harmonis[e] federal
and provincial responsibilities., 34 The United States, whose federal-state system
often confuses and exasperates other countries concerned with U.S.
implementation of international law, has enacted federal laws for contingency
planning and responding to oil spill emergencies. The 1990 U.S. Oil Pollution
Act, a response to the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaskan waters, and other federal
environmental legislation set out the procedure.35 Yet, this U.S. regime is not fully
unified, for the OPA permits component states of the United States to maintain
different limits of liability for damage caused by oil pollution.3 6 The structure and
politics of federal states can make it difficult to fashion efficient procedures to
address threats of oil spills and requests for refuge.
The need for coordinated regional international approaches to requests for
refuge also complicates efforts to design optimum procedures. When a ship in
distress seeks refuge, regional consultation and coordinated regional response
mechanisms may be necessary to provide the most effective emergency or salvage
services or to determine which of several neighboring states can best offer an
appropriate place of refuge. States have made some progress at regional
coordination. The 1983 Bonn Agreement Counter-Pollution Manual3 7 and the
Baltic Marine Environment Protection (Helsinki) Commission 38 provide for
regional cooperation on anti-pollution matters in general, and on places of refuge
in particular. Canada engages in bilateral planning efforts with the United States,
Denmark (concerning Greenland), and France (concerning St. Pierre and
Miquelon). 39 U.S. authorities have also agreed to regional plans designed to
coordinate responses to marine disasters.4 °

34. Id. at 512.
35. For an overview of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990)
[hereinafter OPA], see John E. Noyes, U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 7 INT'L J. ESTUARINE &

COASTAL LAW 43 (1992). For a discussion of U.S. legislation related to marine pollution, see John E.
Noyes, Case Study of the United States of America, in VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION AND COASTAL
STATE JURISDICTION 357 (Erik Franckx ed., 2001).

36. OPA, supra note 19, 33 US.C. § 2718 (2006).
37. BONN AGREEMENT COUNTER POLLUTION MANUAL 1 1.1.1-1.1.2. (Oct. 26, 2007),
http://www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/counter-pollution-manual/welcome.html.
The Manual was
prepared pursuant to the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil,
June 9, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3. The Agreement was extended to apply to other harmful substances on
Sept. 13, 1983. See Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and
Other Harmful Substances, Sept. 13, 1983, 1605 U.N.T.S. 39. See also PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS,
supra note 3, at 444.
38. The Commission was established pursuant to the Convention on the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Apr. 29, 1992, 2099 U.N.T.S. 195 (commonly known as the
Helsinki Convention). See PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 476-77.
39. PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS, supra note 3, at 522-24.

40. See id. at 522-23. The United States has acted unilaterally with respect to many issues related
to ships in distress and oil pollution. For example, with passage of the OPA the United States
demonstrated its unwillingness to join widely accepted treaties that provide for liability for damages
caused by vessel-source oil spills. These include the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage. Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, and the Convention on the Establishment of an
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Whether places of refuge should be the subject of a global treaty is
controversial. Nonbinding international instruments (such as the IMO Guidelines)
and regional, sub-regional, or national institutions or arrangements may better
carry out at least some of the various functions relevant to places of refuge specifying policies and norms, providing information and analysis, and
41
It is not apparent that
undertaking or supervising salvage and rescue operations.
arrived at
arrangements
over
a global convention holds a comparative advantage
regionally with respect to such issues as: what principles should govern access to
places of refuge; who should make decisions about refuge; how national responses
should be coordinated; and which potential places of refuge should be designated
in advance. Nevertheless, a global convention could usefully mandate and spur the
adoption of appropriate expert national and regional procedural arrangements, and
could offer other potential benefits as well.42 Still, the need for effective national
and regional processes will remain paramount with respect to the threshold
decision of whether to afford a ship refuge.
V. CONCLUSION

Efforts to prevent environmental disasters, particularly devastating oil spills
from tankers, have taken various directions, including vessel safety mandates,43
traffic control measures, and increased state inspections and control of vessels.
Yet preventive measures will not be perfect. The dilemma of whether to accord
access to places of refuge may still arise when a vessel is in distress and an oil spill
appears imminent.
Places of Refuge reveals just how complex the topic of the book is. The
complexities stem from the multiple areas of international law related to the topic
and from the multiple values and interests implicated when a ship finds itself in
need of assistance. The humanitarian rationale for granting a right of access to
vessels in distress has increasingly been undermined by technological
developments that allow passengers and crew members to be rescued at sea. The
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, and
their Protocols and Amendments.
41. See generally Lee A. Kimball, Whither International Institutional Arrangements to Support
Ocean Law?, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 307, 307 (1997) (discussing how the contemporary reality
of ocean space presents institutional challenges that could be better approached by devolving certain
responsibilities from the global to the regional level).
42. Uniform global standards might facilitate standardized salvage contracts or ship insurance, for
example by specifying standards for financial security from ships seeking refuge. A global treaty
addressing places of refuge could also clarify numerous uncertainties about liability for damage,
particularly on the part of states that either grant or deny access to places of refuge.
Some
commentators and the Comit6 Maritime International have indeed proposed a convention on the
subject, or more broadly on the management of casualties at sea. See, e.g., Eric Van Hooydonk, The
Obligation to Offer a Place of Refuge to a Ship in Distress, in CONTEMPORARY REGULATION OF
MARINE LIVING RESOURCES AND POLLUTION 85, 127-28 (Erik Franckx ed., 2007); Report on Places of

Refuge Submitted by Comite Maritime Internationalto the IMO Legal Committee, 2004 COMITE MAR.
INT'L Y.B. 389, available at http://www.comitemaritime.org/year/2004/pdffiles/YBK04-1.pdf; Comit6
Mar. Int'l, Draft Instrument on Places of Refuge, available at http://www.comitemaritime.org/worip
/pdf/PlacesRefugewP.pdf. The IMO to date has declined to call for such a convention.
43. See Frank, supra note 8, at 1, 4; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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advent of modem tankers has also created new risks to the safety of coastal
communities and to the marine environment, and international law has
correspondingly incorporated protective principles that states may raise in
opposition to requests for refuge. These developments have created a strong
impetus for qualifying the traditional rule, stemming from bilateral treaties and
customary international law, that a ship in distress had a right of access to a place
of refuge.
Decisions about granting access to places of refuge and about financial
security for ships entering places of refuge are necessarily highly contextual. The
case for use of a transparent, streamlined, expert process to assess and manage risk
factors from a multidisciplinary perspective is a strong one. Yet problems of
political relations in federal states and the need for regional coordination challenge
efforts to devise effective mechanisms to review requests for refuge. Places of
Refuge provides some reason for encouragement, for it reveals that talented
professionals are seeking ways to meet these challenges. Policy makers should
study the book's thoughtful analyses of rules and procedural mechanisms related to
places of refuge.

